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RUSSIA, THE STRAITS QUESTION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BALKAN LEAGUE, 1908-1912

IN 1908 Alexander Isvolski, the Russian foreign minister, had, like many of his predecessors, fallen a victim to the intrigue, jealousy and diversity of views which were so characteristic of the old régime.[1] He had assumed office in 1906 with a clean-cut program of action: to effect the return to Europe after the disastrous Far Eastern adventure, and to reëstablish Russian influence in the Near East by securing for his country the free passage of her ships of war through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. His plan was to prepare the way by negotiations with the Powers, and the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 was merely the first step in a policy which the Russian minister had hoped to crown by his interviews with Aehrenthal at Buchlau, with Schoen at Berchtesgaden and with Tittoni at Desio. The Young Turk Revolution had upset his plans somewhat, and he was told in London that the English government could not and would not support any scheme which failed to meet with the free approval of the Porte and thus put an abrupt end to the newly acquired influence of the English at Constantinople. This part of the program might, in the end, have been satisfactorily arranged, but Isvolski was obliged to shelve the whole Straits policy because of the opposition to his plan which developed in St. Petersburg during his absence.

[1] The whole discussion of the policy of Isvolski in 1908 and the reasons for its failure are based upon an article by the present writer, entitled "Russia, the Straits Question and the European Powers 1904-1908," to be published in the *English Historical Review*.

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There was no unity of opinion in Russia in regard to the advisability or desirability of changing the existing Straits convention, and Nelidov, a friend of Isvolski, had seen his own plan brought to grief in 1896 because of the opposition of Witte and Pobiedonostsev. In order to avoid complications and futile discussions Isvolski had embarked upon his policy without consulting any of his colleagues, though he had, of course, secured the approval of the Tsar. It was his misfortune that his assistant, Charykov, was also his rival, and seized the earliest opportunity to let the cat out of the bag, so to speak. Stolypin, the prime minister, Kokovtsev, the minister of finance, and General Roediger, the minister of war, were apprised of what was going on, and immediately joined in a vigorous protest to the Tsar. They were flatly opposed to the pursuit of an active policy at a time when Russia was militarily quite unprepared, but what they objected to particularly was the idea of bartering Russia's consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria for concessions in the Straits question. Stolypin may not have been an expert in matters of foreign policy, but he had been brought up in the Slavophil tradition and firmly believed in Russia's historic mission to liberate and protect the little Slav brothers in the Balkans. To allow a Catholic power like Austria to annex two Slavic Orthodox provinces without protesting would amount to treason to the Slavic cause. By threatening to resign Stolypin forced a change in policy and obliged Isvolski to withhold recognition of Austria's action. Though he failed to have a stop put to the negotiations in regard to the Straits he ruined the foreign minister's chances of success by obliging him to go back on his agreement with Aehrenthal and thus knocked out the keystone of the whole structure.

When Isvolski returned to St. Petersburg his colleagues heaped reproaches upon him. They spoke of a "diplomatic Tsushima" for which he was responsible, and nicknamed him the "Prince of the Bosporus." He himself felt like a ruined man, and offered to resign. The Tsar, who sympathized with his aims, induced him to stay, but he considered himself merely as a chinovnik in uniform, not as a foreign minister. Indeed,

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it was said that he was obliged to promise to submit his policy to the approval of the Prime Minister in the future.[1] Apparently he never learned of Charykov's duplicity and really held Aehrenthal accountable for his discomfiture. At any rate the only possible course for him to pursue was to join in the general outcry against the Austrian action and, if possible, to outdo his fellow countrymen in their indictment of Russia's rival. Personal rancor together with an insurmountable suspicion of Austrian plans became the determining motives in Isvolski's policy after 1908.

For the time being, however, he was in entire eclipse, discredited and distrusted. Charykov, who had worked hand in glove with Stolypin, saw a free field for the exercise of his own policy, which he had worked out just as carefully as Isvolski had worked out his own scheme. He had had long experience at Eastern posts and was known to be narrow-mindedly Panslavic, a typical Russian agent in the Orient, strongly tinged with the disease which afflicted most of them, as one of his acquaintances put it.[2] Like Isvolski he was wedded to the idea of opening the Straits for Russian warships, but he was quite out of sympathy with his chief's Westernism. Instead of buying the approval of the Powers by various concessions he meant to attempt a revival of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi of 1833, which had practically established a Russian protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. In order to attain this end he, like Isvolski, was quite ready to sacrifice the interests of the South-

[1] *Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914*, edited by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme (Berlin, 1922-1926), vol. XXVI (i), no. 9185, note. This collection is hereafter referred to as *G. P.*

[2] *G. P.* XXV (ii), nos. 8707, 8725. N. V. Charykov: born 1855; entered the foreign service in 1875 and took part in the war against Turkey; representative at Bokhara 1883-1890; secretary at Constantinople 1890; chargé in Egypt 1891; counsellor at Berlin 1893; diplomatic agent at Sofia 1896; minister to the Vatican 1897; minister to Belgrade 1900; minister to Holland 1907; assistant to the foreign minister 1908-1909; ambassador to Constantinople 1909-1912. On his character see the estimate of Nekludov in *Carnets de Georges Louis* (Paris, 1926), vol. I, p. 167; J. von Szilassy, *Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie* (Berlin, 1921), p. 186; H. Friedjung, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus* (Berlin, 1922), vol. II, p. 219.

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ern Slav states, the difference being that the foreign minister was prepared to sacrifice these interests to the Great Powers, while his assistant was ready to sacrifice them to the Turks. The one hoped to open the Straits by negotiating with the Powers first and then forcing the settlement upon the Porte, the other dreamed of "guillotining the Turks by persuasion" to use a phrase of Gabriel Hanotaux, and ignoring the Powers, on the theory that the whole question of the Straits was one which concerned only Russia and the Turkish government. Neither showed any of the simple-minded and thoroughly sincere solicitude for the little Slav brothers which is so characteristic of the Stolypin group.

Immediately the Austrian annexation of Bosnia had been announced Charykov had begun to exploit the tension between the Austrian and Turkish governments. He approached the Turks with the proposal that they open the Straits to Russian warships and take in return a Russian guarantee of their territory and Russian support in opposition to Austria. The Turks were suspicious and realized only too well that Russian warships in the Bosporus would mean, sooner or later, the domination of the Muscovite over Constantinople and the whole empire. Discovering that the support of England could be relied upon, they rejected the Russian advances.[1] Obviously the ground had not been adequately prepared, so Charykov adopted a more circuitous course. The Russians would attempt to iron out the difficulties between Bulgaria and Turkey and would attempt to form a huge Balkan bloc to act as a barrier to the Austrian advance. In preparation for the favorable reception of the Russian proposals in regard to the Straits, the press had already been singing the praises of the new régime in Constantinople. Now, on October 14, the *Novoie Vremia*, a leading nationalist organ, came forward with the new policy:

> Russia, having shown repugnance to derive selfish profit at Turkey's expense from the spoliation of the Slav provinces, and being therefore in a position to enjoy the confidence of the Balkan Slavs and Turkey, should encourage the idea of a Balkan

[1] See the writer's article referred to above.

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> Confederation under Turkish hegemony, as the best method of safeguarding Balkan interests and providing the necessary counterpoise to Austria.

On the following day the same newspaper published a direct plea for a close understanding:

> Russia and Turkey have shed more of each other's blood than was necessary. The time has come to understand that sincere friendship on the basis of mutual interests will render more profit to each than futile reminiscences of buried feuds. Muscovites and Osmanlis are really nearer each other than anybody else.

Other newspapers took up the cry and united in declaring that a national policy in the Near East, based on the interests of the Russians and Slavs, could not be other than friendly to a regenerate Turkey.[1]

The program had obvious advantages: it was sufficiently anti-Austrian to appeal to any Russian; its Turcophilism would find favor in England; it promised to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans at a time when Russia could not hope to take part; and finally it offered the only prospect of securing what both Isvolski and Charykov desired most: the opening of the Straits. Isvolski's position demanded that he subscribe to the nationalist view, and so he identified himself with the plan. In his famous Christmas speech in the Duma he openly avowed his adhesion. After emphasizing his friendship for a regenerate Turkey and voicing his hopes for an early agreement between Bulgaria and the Porte, he continued, amid cries of "Bravo!":

> We clearly intimated to Bulgaria that our future relations with her will depend, not upon her conduct in the past, but on her conduct in the future, so far as she may remain faithful to the solidarity of the other Slav States in the Balkan Peninsula. Gentlemen, we addressed the same counsels to Serbia and Montenegro. These three states must become imbued with the consciousness of the necessity of moral and political union. Our aim must be to bring them together and combine them with

[1] Reported in the London *Times*, October 15, 16, 24, 1908.

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> Turkey in a common ideal of defence of their national and economic development. . . . With this aim we must show Turkey our good will towards her efforts to renovate her internal organization, and, above all, must make it clear that we do not menace her security. But the above-mentioned object is attainable only on one condition—that events in the Balkan Peninsula are allowed to develop peacefully.[1]

While his audience hailed the new policy with the greatest enthusiasm, the speech was received in Berlin and Vienna with profound scepticism. Isvolski, it was said, was merely trying to frighten his adversaries by conjuring up a bogey.[2] After all, the idea of a Balkan Confederation was not new. It ran like a red thread through the history of the Near East in the nineteenth century, from Rhigas and Ypsilanti down. Some plans had called for a purely Slavic union, others for the inclusion of Greece or Rumania. Occasionally even the idea of associating the Turks had been suggested, though this was the most novel part of the Russian program.[3] The important point

[1] London *Times*, December 26, 1908. The substance of the speech was forecast on December 11 by the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger*. Isvolski himself had come to realize the necessity of having Turkey on the right side — Viscount Grey, *Twenty-Five Years* (New York, 1925), vol. I, p. 175; M. Bogitschewitsch, *Kriegsursachen* (Zurich, 1919), p. 159.

[2] *G. P.* XXVI (ii), nos. 9243, 9295, 9296, 9299, 9302: "Die . . . Kombination eines Balkanbundes inklusive der Türkei mit einer feindlichen Spitze gegen uns möchte ich nicht ernst nehmen" (Aehrenthal); "Nach meiner Ansicht ist der Balkanbund mit oder ohne Türkei eine Utopie" (Marschall); "Einen alle kleineren und grösseren Balkanstaaten umfassenden und unter Führung der Türkei einhermarschierenden Bund kann sich nur eine krankhafte Phantasie als etwas in die Wirklichkeit Umzusetzendes vorstellen" (Bülow).

[3] On the numerous early projects for a Balkan Confederation see especially M. R. Ivanovitch, "The Future of the Balkans" (*Fortnightly Review*, June 1909, pp. 1040-1058); V. Victorov-Todorov, "Balkanskie Soglashenie" (*Russkaia Mysl*, April 1915, p. 123 *et seq.*; R. Pinon, *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie* (Paris, 1911), p. 446 *et seq.*; K. Nicolaides, *Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkankriegen* (Vienna, 1914), p. 16 *et seq.*; Bourchier in the London *Times*, June 4, 1913; R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (London, 1917), p. 144 *et seq.*; E. Jäckh, *Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkankrieg* (Munich, 1913), p. 105 *et seq.*; D. Mitrany, "The Possibility of a Balkan Locarno" (*International Conciliation*, no. 229, April 1927, p. 23 *et seq.*). According to Izzet Pascha, *Denkwürdigkeiten des Marschalls Izzet Pascha* (Leipzig, 1927), p. 89, Abdul Hamid was himself considering a league with the Balkan States just before the revolution.

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was that all schemes of union even against the Turk had been frustrated by the rivalries and dissensions long existing between the various states. Was the prospect of success any better now? Rumania was known to be in alliance with Austria, and made a point of cultivating the friendship of the Turk in order to maintain a check upon Bulgarian aspirations. The Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks all had their eyes riveted on the Turkish province of Macedonia, and had for years been cutting each other's throats in the secluded mountain fastnesses. The Bulgars and Serbs had been bitter enemies since the day of Slivnitza in 1885, and the Bulgars were now on the verge of war with the Turks, while the Serbs were breathing fire and flame at the Austrians. Bulgaria had no quarrel with Vienna, while the Serbs had a real interest in maintaining good relations with the Porte, at least until an outlet had been secured on the Adriatic. As for the Greeks, their quarrel with the Turks on the Cretan question was a long-standing one and continued to color the relations between the two countries. To iron out all these difficulties would require a master mind indeed.

As a matter of fact Isvolski himself had no faith in the program. He was simply blowing Charykov's horn in order to drown out criticism of himself and convince public opinion that he had been misjudged. A huge Balkan Confederation directed against Austria was a pious wish at best. Meanwhile more immediate problems were urgently demanding a solution. Russia's defeat would be turned into complete disaster unless some obstacle could be placed in the way of Aehrenthal's victorious advance. Isvolski therefore did all that was humanly possible to frustrate the Austrian attempt to reach a separate agreement with the Porte. But even more important was the Bulgarian question. It was in Sofia that the key to the whole situation lay, for while the Serbs could be counted on by Russia and the Rumanians were hopelessly enthralled to Austria, Bulgaria had for years been wavering between Austria and Russia. Prince Ferdinand had long since discovered that a policy of having two irons in the fire was most likely to yield results. With great adroitness he had led the Russians on and held them off at the same time. Isvolski was not unaware of

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the crucial nature of Bulgaria's position and for some time attempts had been made to negotiate a military convention to replace the outworn pact of 1902. In fact, during the weeks preceding the Bulgarian declaration of independence Ferdinand had been pressed to accept a plan of joint action.[1] But the wily Coburger knew Russia only too well. He preferred to act independently and before making his final decision he visited not St. Petersburg, but Budapest. Isvolski was enraged by this treasonable action, but he could not afford to carry his resentment too far. He quickly became reconciled to the inevitable and remembered that Bulgarian independence had long been a cardinal aim of Russian policy.[2] At any cost Bulgaria must be prevented from going to war with the Turks, for such a conflict might well end with the Bulgarians at Constantinople, all at a time when Russia was militarily helpless. Isvolski therefore exerted himself to the utmost to smooth out the problems at issue between Sofia and Constantinople and to draw both powers to the Russian side in order to prevent their falling into the clutches of Austria.

But the players on the other side were hardly less adroit than Isvolski himself. The Turks were more afraid of the Russian and the Bulgarian designs than of the Austrians. They gently evaded the Serbian offers of an alliance against the Bulgarians, and, through the Young Turk press, cajoled the Russians while they negotiated a settlement with Vienna.[3] Ferdinand, on the

[1] A. L. Popov (editor), "Diplomaticheskaia Podgotovka Balkanskoi Voini 1912" (*Krasny Arkhiv* VIII and IX, 1925), p. 8. A goodly number of these important documents have been published in German translation in the *Kriegsschuldfrage* (December, 1925).

[2] Bogitschewitsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 153, 157, 163; *G. P.* XXVI (i), no. 8977; XXVI (ii), ch. ccii *passim*.

[3] On the Serbian offers of an alliance against Bulgaria see Bourchier in the London *Times*, June 11, 1913; B. Molden, *Graf Aehrenthal* (Stuttgart, 1917), pp. 78, 94; *G. P.* XXVI (i), no. 9026; B. Schwertfeger (editor), *Zur Europäischen Politik* (Berlin, 1919), vol. III, p. 174; L. von Chlumecky in *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, "Politische Uebersicht," October 21-29, 1908; Izzet Pascha, *op. cit.*, p. 107. There was also much talk of an alliance between Greece and Turkey against Bulgaria— E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce* (Paris, 1926), vol. V, pp. 8, 13. On the Young Turk press see the interesting quotations in A. Mandelstam, *Le Sort de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1917), pp. 56-58; also *G. P.* XXVI (ii), nos. 9243, 9244, 9295; London *Times*, October 22, 1908.

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other hand, could see no harm in making a *beau geste* to Russia. He had no intention of going to war, and was interested merely in exploiting an enviable situation. In February, 1909, he journeyed to St. Petersburg, allowed himself to be recognized as Tsar of the Bulgarians and listened to the seductive proposals made to him. Isvolski, who had just proclaimed to the world his love for the reformed Turk and the need for peaceful coöperation in the Balkans, now showed his real aims. Ferdinand was encouraged to hope for Russian support in realizing Bulgaria's aspirations in Macedonia, at the expense of the Turk. In writing to the Russian minister at Sofia, Isvolski revealed his hand completely: "The Constantinople rayon and the Straits come into the exclusive sphere of Russian interests", he pointed out. Bulgaria "will have the right to strive for the expansion of her boundaries to the extent of the San Stefano Bulgaria", while Serbia might have "territories that give her access to the coast of the Adriatic Sea."

Ferdinand allowed the Russians to settle the Bulgarian dispute with the Porte at Russian expense, but, while in St. Petersburg this was regarded as a great victory, the wary Balkan ruler had no intention of selling himself to the Muscovites.[1] In vain Isvolski waited for concrete Bulgarian proposals in regard to an alliance. Nothing came of the agreement which had been decided on "in principle." At the same time the Serbs were to meet with disappointment. No doubt instigated by the Russians, they had opened negotiations in Sofia. Whereas in October, 1908, they had been willing to aid the Turks against the Bulgarians, they were now prepared to make an agreement with their rivals at the expense of the Turks. Milovanovic,

[1] Popov, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10. On Russia's part in effecting a settlement of the Bulgarian-Turkish dispute see *G. P.* XXVI (ii), nos. 9314 *et seq.*; Mandelstam, *op. cit.*, p. 109 *et seq.*; Friedjung, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 254; J. Larmeroux, *La Politique extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie* (Paris, 1918), vol. II, pp. 107-108. The Russians were at least successful in forestalling an Austrian attempt to bait the Bulgarians by indicating the possibility of eventually acquiring Serbian territory — *G. P.* XXVI (ii), no. 9301; Feldmarschall Conrad, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit* (Vienna, 1921), vol. I, pp. 204-205; B. von Siebert, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre* (Berlin, 1921), p. 524.

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the able Serbian foreign minister, went to Sofia in March and opened pourparlers which continued until June. The ultimate object of the Serbs was, of course, to lay mines against the Austrians, but no agreement was possible without a settlement of conflicting claims in Macedonia. They were ready to plan a partition of the province on terms favorable to the Bulgarians, but the latter had no interest in an anti-Austrian policy and besides were unwilling to entertain the idea of abandoning any part of Macedonia. What they desired was autonomy for the whole province, their hope being that, once the stage of self-government had been reached, the road to union with Bulgaria would be a short one. On this rock the negotiations were once more wrecked.[1] The Serbs thereupon promptly reverted to their earlier approaches to the Porte, only to find that the Turks were no more ready to pursue an anti-Austrian policy than were the Bulgarians. Instead, they were attempting to negotiate an agreement with Rumania.[2]

During the first nine months following the annexation of Bosnia no progress had been made by the Russians toward the establishment of a barrier against Austria or toward the reëstablishment of Russian influence at Constantinople. Charykov had been rushed off to the Turkish capital as ambassador, but had been unable to accomplish anything.[3] Obvi-

[1] On these negotiations see especially Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 9; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 137-139, 141, 293; S. Sazonov, *Fateful Years* (New York, 1927), pp. 52-53. The anti-Austrian point comes out clearly from Schwertfeger, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 172-173, 213-214: "Une combinaison de ce genre fortifierait la position de la Serbie vis-à-vis de la Monarchie Habsbourgeoise"; "Ces tendances, qui sont ouvertement dirigés contre la pénétration du Germanisme dans les Balkans. . . ." Similarly Milovanovic to Gruic, April 14, 1909: "Eine serbisch-bulgarische Gemeinsamkeit wäre die erste, unumgängliche Bürgschaft, dass wir bewahrt bleiben vor einer Ueberraschung seitens Oesterreich-Ungarns" — *Deutschland Schuldig?* (Berlin, 1919), p. 115. Isvolski's fears of Austrian policy appear from *G. P.* XXVI (ii), nos. 9552, 9568, 9569; *cf.* also M. Hoschiller, *L'Europe devant Constantinople* (Paris, 1916), p. 63; V. Valentin, *Deutschlands Aussenpolitik* (Berlin, 1921), p. 111.

[2] Schwertfeger, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 174-175; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143; *G. P.* XXVII (i), nos. 9756, 9760, 9762.

[3] On Charykov's mission and aims at this time see Bogitschewitsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33; *G. P.* XXVII (i), nos. 9729, 9730; *Carnets de Georges Louis*, vol. I, pp. 36-37; Nikolaides, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

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ously the time had come for a return to Isvolski's earlier program of negotiation with the Great Powers. Already in May, 1909, a step had been taken in this direction when a draft treaty to be concluded with Germany was submitted to the Tsar. Under its terms Germany was to join the revived Austro-Russian Treaty of 1897 and was to guarantee Austria's obligation to abstain from all military enterprises in the Balkans. Point IV provided that "pending the establishment by the signatory powers of the Treaty of Berlin of formal sanctions indispensable for a change of the treaty, Germany would lend Russia the effective diplomatic support desirable for a definitive solution of the question of the Straits."[1] Nothing is known of the further history of this project, but certainly the famous Racconigi agreement between Russia and Italy in October, 1909, was quite in accordance with the policy long pursued by Isvolski. It was frankly directed against Austria and aimed at maintaining the *status quo* in the Balkans. In case the existing situation could not be maintained the Habsburg Monarchy was to be excluded from any share in the spoils.[2]

Naturally enough this spectacular meeting gave rise to all sorts of rumors and apprehensions in the Balkans. The Turks renewed their overtures to Austria and Rumania, and even the Slav states were in dread lest the arrangement might prove detrimental to their interests.[3] It was probably for this reason

[1] E. Laloy, *Les Documents secrets des archives du ministère des affaires Étrangères de Russie* (Paris, 1920), pp. 50-51. Charykov seems to have inspired this move, working on the theory that it would serve to check Austrian designs while Russia was unprepared—*G. P.* XXVI (ii), no. 9546.

[2] Text of the agreement in R. Marchand (editor), *Un Livre Noir* (Paris, n. d.), vol. I, p. 357; the pact had probably been made informally in September, 1908 (see the writer's article referred to above). On the agreement and its implications see further *G. P.* XXVII (i), nos. 9877 *et seq.*; Siebert, *op. cit.*, ch. xi *passim*; G. Giolitti, *Memoirs of My Life* (London, 1923), p. 202 *et seq.*

[3] Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 456-457, 120-121; *G. P.* XXVII (i), nos. 9734-8744, 9774, 9780-9785; Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 9; A Diplomatist (George Young), *Nationalism and War in the Near East* (Oxford, 1915), p. 164. It is extremely difficult to evaluate the advances made by Milovanovic to Aehrenthal at this time — see Molden, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146; Baernreither, "Aehrenthal und Milovanovic," in *Deutsche Revue*, January 1922, pp. 84-89; Crozier, in *Revue de France*, June 1, 1921, pp. 595-596; A. Gauvain, *L'Europe au jour le jour* (Paris, 1917), vol. II, p. 303 *et seq.*, these last two reporting completely contradictory utterances of Milovanovic.

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that Hartwig, perhaps the greatest Russian expert on matters concerning the Balkans, was sent to Belgrade to give the necessary reassurance.[1]

During the winter of 1909 to 1910 the situation continued to be extremely uncertain. While Charykov was hard at work attempting to effect a *rapprochement* between the Balkan states and the Porte, Isvolski renewed his efforts to draw the Bulgarians to the Russian side. In December, 1909, a projected treaty was worked out in St. Petersburg. It provided that in case of war between Russia on the one hand and Germany, Austria and Rumania, or Austria and Rumania on the other hand, or in case of war between Russia and Turkey, no matter which power took the initiative, Bulgaria should, on the demand of Russia, mobilize all her forces and begin operations according to plans previously worked out. Operations should continue until all war aims had been attained and should in no case cease without the consent of the Russian Government. In case Bulgaria were attacked by Austria as a result of an alliance with another power not provoked by Bulgaria, Russia would lend active military aid, but in case of an unprovoked attack by Turkey upon Bulgaria, Russia agreed merely to mobilize some of her forces, reserving liberty of further action, unless a third power, unprovoked by Bulgaria, should take part in the war on the side of Turkey. In the event of a successful war against Austria and Rumania, Russia would aid Bulgaria in acquiring the Dobrudja; in the event of a successful war against Turkey, Russia would do her utmost to secure for Bulgaria "localities with Bulgarian population, for example those within the limits fixed in the preliminaries of peace concluded at San Stefano."[2]

[1] On the Russian assurances see Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 457. Charykov redoubled his efforts to bring the Balkan states together—Schwertfeger, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 184-186; *G. P.* XXVII (i), nos. 9737, 9738.

[2] Text of the draft in *Dokumente aus den russischen Geheimarchiven* (Berlin, 1918), pp. 27-31; in abbreviated form in Laloy, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-58; independently printed also by Bogitschewitsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-121. Radoslavoff's statement that no agreement was made at this time is true, but in no way disproves the existence of the draft or the fact that it was made the basis of negotiations later—Radoslavoff in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, May, 1926, pp. 272-273.

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In March, 1910, Milovanovic paid visits to St. Petersburg, Constantinople and Sofia, while Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Peter of Serbia followed each other in visits at the Russian and Turkish capitals. On these occasions the whole problem of Balkan politics was gone over in detail, the Russians urging upon both the Bulgarians and the Serbians the necessity for solidarity and the desirability of maintaining friendly relations with the Turks. The chief question, however, was the future of Russian-Bulgarian relations, for no barrier could be erected against Austria unless the Sofia government would agree to become a party. When Ferdinand arrived in St. Petersburg, accompanied by Malinov and Paprikov, Isvolski handed him the draft treaty drawn up some months before. It was, of course, a thoroughly one-sided agreement, all in favor of Russia, and one can hardly blame the Bulgarians for having given it a cool reception. The project was discussed in Sofia in April and May, in conferences arranged by the Russian representative and attended by Malinov and Paprikov, but little progress was made. The Russian minister complained bitterly of the "suspiciousness and stubbornness" of the Bulgarians, but his efforts proved of no avail, and once more the Russian scheme hung fire.[1]

[1] Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 10; Victorov-Todorov, *op. cit.*, pp. 128, 132. Sazonov later said that it was the Bulgarians who had first submitted a draft — letter of Georges Louis, January 29, 1913, in E. Judet, *Georges Louis* (Paris, 1925), p. 209. On these visits generally see London *Times*, March 9, 14, 1910; Bourchier in London *Times*, June 11, 1913; Schwertfeger, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 194-197; *G. P.* XXVII (i), nos. 9747-9751; XXVII (ii), no. 10155; Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 150; Nikolaides, *op. cit.*, p. 25. There was a good deal of talk at the time of including Turkey in the League, and the Russian official communiqué on the occasion of King Peter's visit emphasized the desirability of maintaining good relations with Turkey (text in Wippermann, *Deutscher Geschichtskalendar*, 1910, pp. 286-287). In public, however, it was denied that there was any intention of establishing a confederation. Milovanovic in an interview said: "Il ne s'agit pas le moins du monde, comme on l'a dit, de conclure, de concert avec la Bulgarie, une fédération balkanique. Sans doute la fédération reste pour nous une combinaison idéale; c'est elle qui assurerait définitivement notre indépendence. Mais nous connaissons trop les difficultés qui s'opposent à sa réalisation actuelle et les soupçons que feraient naître des pourparlers préparatoires, pour nous lancer aujourd'hui dans des négotiations scabreuses."—Gauvain, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 303 *et seq.*, 328.

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The projected Balkan barrier was still in the realm of ideals, and the gathering of princes for the celebration of Nicolas' jubilee at Cettinje in August, 1910, was nothing more than a demonstration. It did, however, frighten the Turks, who once more opened negotiations with Rumania. Apparently the advances, as on previous occasions, proved futile, though Europe was flooded with rumors of a Turkish-Rumanian military convention.[1] The Bulgarians, who felt particularly menaced, never freed themselves entirely of the dread of such a combination and henceforth proved more amenable to the Russian program. The negotiations with Russia took a more favorable turn. Sazonov, the new Russian foreign minister, in December, 1910, instructed his representative in Sofia to make concessions in the direction of equalizing the obligations of the two powers under the treaty, adding, however, that Russia would nevertheless regard herself as exempt from fulfilling her promises. It is said that the pourparlers had almost come to a satisfactory close when, in March, 1911, Malinov fell from power.[2]

At the same time negotiations had been opened between Bulgaria on the one hand and Serbia and Greece on the other. They were countenanced, if not directly encouraged by Russia, and were of a friendly anti-Turk nature.[3] Apparently this change in the Russian attitude was due to Sazanov, the new

[1] *G. P.* XXVII (i), no. 9790 *et seq.*; Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 145; Schwertfeger, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 203-204; Molden, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-149. The general uneasiness was increased by the fact that the Turks purchased two German warships at this time—*G. P.* XXVII (i), chap. ccxii, appendix; G. Trubetzkoi, *Russland als Grossmacht* (Stuttgart, 1917), pp. 154-158.

[2] Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 10; Victorov-Todorov, *op. cit.*, pp. 128, 132-133. Apparently everything had been settled excepting the future Bulgarian frontier in Thrace. The Russians offered the San Stefano boundary or the Enos-Midia line. The Bulgarians insisted on the inclusion of Adrianople — pamphlet by Mishev, quoted by Balkanicus (S. Protic), *The Aspirations of Bulgaria* (London, 1915), p. 158 *et seq.* It is interesting to note that as late as May, 1912, Danev was trying to persuade Sazonov to assign Adrianople to Bulgaria—Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 522-525; Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

[3] Bourchier in London *Times*, June 5, 1913; Protic, *op. cit.*, p. 158 *et seq.*; A. Nekludoff, *Diplomatic Reminiscences* (London, 1920), p. 2; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-147; Jäckh, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114; Louis de Saint-Victor de Saint-Blanchard, "L'Équilibre balkanique", *Revue des sciences politiques*, February 15, 1914, pp. 12-48.

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foreign minister. Not essentially conversant with Balkan affairs, he was content to follow the school of his brother-in-law, Stolypin, and subscribed entirely to the ideas of Hartwig, whose aim was a union of the Slavic states of the Balkans, disregarding Turkey. In Isvolski's policy the Turks had played a distinctly secondary rôle. Charykov hoped eventually to be able to hug them to death. Hartwig and Sazonov, on the other hand, dreamed of smashing the Ottoman Empire by means of a Balkan League. Not in the near future, to be sure. Nothing could be done so long as the Austrian menace overshadowed everything else. But the beauty of a Balkan League would be that it could be used like a two-edged sword, against the Austrians or the Turks, as the situation demanded.[1] Thus far the chief difficulty had been in making the anti-Turk element (Bulgaria) sufficiently anti-Austrian, and the anti-Austrian element (Serbia) sufficiently anti-Turk.

There was little room for Charykov's plans in the policy of Sazonov, and the Russian ambassador to the Porte felt profoundly disappointed by this new development. Isvolski had at least allowed him to go ahead. Sazonov would almost certainly veto any attempt to realize his scheme.[2] As a matter of

[1] *G. P.* XXVII (i), no. 9871, illustrates Sazonov's suspicions of Austria's plans. *Cf.* also *G. P.* XXVII (ii), no. 10155: "Tscharykow, so liess er durchblicken, habe seine Freundschaft für die Türkei bisweilen zu stark affichiert." Miliukov writes in the *Retch*, July 25, 1916: "Sazonoff, receiving in heritage a situation thus complicated, formed a new resource—an alliance of the Balkan States which finally blocked the path of Austria to the South"—quoted by H. N. Brailsford, *A League of Nations* (New York, 1917), p. 64. Trubetzkoi, a close friend of Sazonov writes: "Ein Bündniss der Türkei mit den Balkanstaaten stellt sich uns als eine Idylle dar, zu der das Bild der Wirklichkeit gar nicht stimmen will." See also *Carnets de Georges Louis*, vol. I, p. 27, and Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 10. On Hartwig and his views see Nekludoff, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Friedjung, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 170; M. Martchenko, *La Catastrophe austro-hongroise* (Paris, 1920), p. 144 *et seq.*: "Hartwig ne s'entendait pas avec Isvolski. . . . A son avis, le dilemme austro-serbe ne pouvait être resolu un jour que par les armes." Similarly Brailsford, *op. cit.*, p. 64; Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.

[2] *G. P.* XXVII (i), no. 9753: "Es versteht sich von selbst, dass meine Ideen betreffs des Balkanproblems, wiewohl ich sie keineswegs zu abandonnieren gewillt bin, dennoch dieser geänderten Orientation akkommodiert werden müssen."

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fact the idea of a Balkan Federation under Turkish leadership would certainly have died then and there had it not been for two important changes which took place in March, 1911. In the first place Sazonov was taken so seriously ill that he was forced to abandon his post for nine months. His assistant, Neratov, was a henchman of Isvolski and worked hand in glove with him.[1] As a subordinate he lacked the necessary prestige and authority to enforce his own views and so the prospects for Charykov suddenly became more rosy than ever. The second change was due to the fall of the Malinov ministry in Bulgaria. The new Gueshov-Danev cabinet, was, if anything, even more Russophil than its predecessor, but was also very well disposed to the Turks.[2] Furthermore, for some reason or other, perhaps because of jealousy and because of Ferdinand's distrust of the new cabinet, Malinov said nothing about the negotiations with Russia, which were nearing completion. The whole correspondence was transferred from the archives of the foreign office to the police archives, and the Russians themselves seem to have taken no steps to initiate Gueshov.[3]

The first act in the field of foreign politics taken by the new Bulgarian premier was to cut short the anti-Turk negotiations carried on by his predecessor, and to reject new advances made by the Serbs and the Greeks.[4] His first object was to smooth

[1] "Neratoff. C'est celui qui travaille le plus avec Isvolski." — *Carnets de Georges Louis,* vol. I, pp. 31-32.

[2] Popov, *op. cit.,* p. 10. The Russian chargé at Sofia wrote: "There is still much work ahead, but the conditions for this work are now extremely easy, and the work may be productive in the extreme . . . Bulgaria has now entered the orbit of Russian politics." *Cf.* also M., "The Balkan League: History of its Foundation," *Fortnightly Review,* March, 1913, pp. 430-439, evidently an authoritative article. See also I. E. Guéchoff, *L'Alliance balkanique* (Paris, 1915), *passim,* but especially p. 4. It is hard to see how Larmeroux (*op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 194), knowing Gueshov's book, could write: "M. Guéchoff comprit que la Bulgarie n'avait rien à gagner à diriger sa diplomatie vers la Turquie." This is characteristic of the whole work.

[3] Victorov-Todorov, *op. cit.,* pp. 128, 132.

[4] M., "The Balkan League," *loc. cit.* According to Popov, *op. cit.,* p. 10, the Serbs proposed that a revolt be started in Macedonia and war be declared on Turkey. See also Bourchier in the London *Times,* June 5, 6, 1913; H. W. Steed, *Through Thirty Years* (New York, 1924), vol. I, pp. 360-361; Guéchoff,

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out the difficulties between Sofia and Constantinople, and during the summer of 1911 he discussed the matter with Assim Bey, the Turk minister. Progress was slow, but it was quite characteristic of the general situation that both Milovanovic and Venizelos in public speeches proclaimed their adherence to the idea of an entente with the Porte.[1]

Then, suddenly, in the last days of September, came the Italian ultimatum to Turkey and the declaration of war. The outward calm of Balkan politics was rudely disturbed. From the very beginning it was clear that the conflict might lead to complications in the Balkans, especially if operations were carried on in Europe. None of the Great Powers, not even Italy, desired a disturbance of the *status quo*, and the Austrian warnings to the Italians not to extend the theatre of war to Europe, were at this time quite superfluous.[2] But the Russians as well as the Balkan states had for years suspected the Austrians of sinister designs, and they feared that the Vienna government would take advantage of the situation to advance its own interests in the Sanjak or in Serbia. While giving assurances of their pacific intentions the Balkan states decided to close ranks.[3] The Bulgarians had finally made up their minds to seek an alliance with Serbia, partly to be able to present a united front against Austria, but also in order to frustrate any attempt on

op. cit., p. 63; *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, 1914), p. 43, hereafter cited as *Report*; Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 154; Saint-Victor de Saint-Blanchard in *Revue des sciences politiques*, February 15, 1914. Danev appears to have had no Turkophil leanings and to have disapproved of the cavalier manner in which Gueshov rejected all offers—Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-151; Nekludov, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[1] Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, p. 8; Nikolaides, *op. cit.*, p. 27; Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 154; *Documents diplomatiques: Affaires balkaniques* (Paris, n. d.), vol. I, no. 24.

[2] *G. P.* XXX (i), nos. 10835, 10842, 10857, 10858, 10861, 10863. The Russians urged upon the Balkan States the necessity for preserving the peace — Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 3, 6, 8. See also Molden, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-188; Giolitti, *op. cit.*, pp. 282 *et seq.*, 265-267.

[3] The excitement in the Balkan capitals comes out most clearly in the Russian documents. In Belgrade, Milovanovic was bitterly attacked for his passivity—Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 3, 8. Hartwig believed that the Austrians were "only waiting for an opportunity to come out with at least some sort of justification in defence of the *status quo*".

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the part of the Turks to avenge a defeat by the Italians by an attack on their neighbor. The Russians gave the plan their blessing. They had been urging it for years and had been devoting great efforts to it during the preceding months.[1]

But Russian policy was not to be restricted to this purely secondary rôle. Isvolski, now ambassador to Paris, saw a golden opportunity for realizing grander schemes and old ambitions. France was just securing control of Morocco after the Agadir crisis, and Italy was proceeding to the conquest of Tripoli. The favorable moment must not be allowed to pass without some gain being made for Russia. France and Italy must be called upon to give renewed assurances of support for Russia's ambitions in the Straits question, and Russia, while doing her utmost to maintain peace in the Balkans, must seize the opportunity to extort an agreement with the embarrassed Turks.[2]

Charykov had the same inspiration. The Balkan states were drawing together and the Turks were in a tight place. This was the ideal moment for bringing them all together, for posing as the protector of the Turks and for seducing them into accepting a new edition of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi:

> For us it is extremely desirable that the process of mutual rapprochement and accord between the Balkan governments and nationalities should be hastened and intensified [he wrote home on September 30]. Whenever the Balkan representatives speak to me on this subject I tell them that their interests, which in the present case coincide with the interests of the powers, make it desirable at the present time, in spite of the Italian-Turkish war, to preserve the peace and the *status quo*. But in view of the impossibility of predicting the effect which the Italian attack may have upon the Turkish Empire, it would be advisable for

[1] Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 7, 9; Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, p. 15; *Affaires balkaniques*, vol. I, no. 24. It appears that the first moves on the part of the Bulgarians were due to Rizov, the minister in Rome, who had conducted the negotiations in the spring of 1911, and to Todorov, the foreign minister. Gueshov himself seems to have been distinctly hesitant and dubious.

[2] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 136; F. Stieve, *Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Isvolskis* (Berlin, 1924), vol. I, no. 125; Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 494.

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> the Balkan States to come to an agreement concerning their common interests. Not by any means for the purpose of attacking Turkey or in any way departing from their correct attitude towards her, but in order to avoid fighting each other in case of a Turkish catastrophe and in order to be able to act safely, by common friendly efforts, in defense of their interests.[1]

Neratov was carried away by the arguments of the ambassadors and authorized Isvolski to secure from the French a general promise not to oppose the wishes of Russia in regard to the Straits question when Russia should consider it necessary to raise that question.[2] At the same time Neratov, closely following the suggestions of Isvolski, wrote to Charykov asking him to begin negotiations for a revision of the Russian-Turkish Railroad Agreement of 1900. In case the Turks appeared to be well-disposed he was to raise other questions "of more general import," one of which was the Straits question. On this point Neratov was closely sticking by Isvolski's program of 1908, amplified by the ideas of Charykov. Russia was to give the Turks effective support in maintaining the existing régime in the Straits, while extending this to include the adjacent territory. In order to facilitate the execution of this clause the Turks should agree not to oppose the passage of Russian warships through the Straits, on condition that they should not stop without previous arrangement. Russia asked only a general promise from the Turks not to oppose the Russian interests in the matter. Negotiations with the other powers were carefully reserved.[3]

During the following months the Russian diplomats were busily engaged on three different policies. Hartwig at Belgrade and Nekludov at Sofia were attempting to engineer a Balkan League, constructed at the expense of Turkey to block Austria, and perhaps in the distant future to realize Russia's

[1] Popov, *op. cit.*, no. 2; Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 468, the Bazili Memorandum of September 17, 1912, summarizing the negotiations of these years concerning the Straits.

[2] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 140; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, no. 132.

[3] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 458-459. Authorization to begin discussions was given on October 7.

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own ambitions in Turkey. Isvolski was negotiating with the powers to secure a free hand in the Straits question, preliminary to extorting a favorable settlement from the Turks. Charykov was energetically at work trying to effect a *rapprochement* between all the Balkan powers under Turkish leadership and Russian protection, hoping, eventually, to sell the Turks a guarantee of their territory (at the expense of the Balkan states) for extensive concessions to Russia in the Straits. Russian diplomacy was nothing less than transparent.

Nekludov had already hurried off to Davos to consult Sazonov in respect to the projected Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations: "Well, but this is perfect! If only it could come off!" exclaimed the Russian foreign minister. "Bulgaria closely allied to Serbia in the political and economic spheres; five hundred thousand bayonets to guard the Balkans—but this would bar the road forever to German penetration, Austrian invasion." Any aggressive anti-Turk proclivities he felt sure could be held in check by Russia. In any case the combination was so important that Sazonov felt that Russia must gamble on it.[1]

In reality, however, there were still many obstacles to overcome. The Bulgarian readiness to negotiate was largely due to fear of Turk aggression. There were rumors of mobilization on the Bulgarian frontier, and the statesmen at Sofia had temporarily lost their heads. Gueshov alone remained cool, and appealed to the powers to secure for Bulgaria assurances against Turkish attack. He allowed the negotiations with Serbia to be opened, but he was not exactly enthusiastic and evidently would have wished to definitely associate the Russians in order to protect Bulgaria from the wrath of Austria and Rumania.[2] On October 11 he himself, returning from Paris

[1] Nekludov, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46. Molden, *op. cit.*, p. 210; Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164; Brailsford, *op. cit.*, p. 64, all emphasize the fact that what the Russians wanted was a league to check Austria, not to dismember Turkey. This crucial point is very well developed by Saint-Victor de Saint-Blanchard in *Revue des sciences politiques*, February 15, 1914: "Dans la pensée russe, comme dans la pensée serbe, la crainte du péril autrichien domine manifestement les ambitions d'expansion." This is more than sufficiently borne out by the Russian documents published by Popov.

[2] Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 9, 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 37 (October 8-18).

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and Vienna, had a long conversation with Milovanovic on the railroad between Belgrade and Liapovo. Recognizing the impossibility of action at the moment and emphasizing the necessity for complete Russian approval, the Serbian minister suggested a general defensive alliance providing against attack by any power and against any state that might attempt to occupy Macedonia, Old Serbia or northern Albania. The plan was outspokenly anti-Austrian and reflects the Serb fears of Austrian designs in northern Albania. Macedonia and Old Serbia were brought in because it was obviously impossible to effect a settlement without deciding the future disposition of these territories. Milovanovic therefore suggested an offensive clause looking to the liberation of Macedonia and Old Serbia whenever the situation should seem favorable to both parties or whenever it should become necessary to end the anarchy and massacres in the provinces where vital interests of either or both parties were engaged. Tentatively he suggested previous assignment of undisputed regions to each side and Russian arbitration in disposing of the intervening zone. "Ah, yes," he added; "if, at the same time as the liquidation of Turkey the disintegration of Austria-Hungary could take place, the solution would be greatly simplified."[1]

Gueshov did not take very kindly to these suggestions. The Russians had induced the powers to give assurances against Turkish attack and had themselves brought pressure to bear in Constantinople. This they were obliged to do in their own interest, for a conflagration in the Balkans would have been disastrous for Russia at that time. Nevertheless these assurances went a long way toward calming the excitement in Bulgaria and strengthening Gueshov's hands as against the more belligerent elements. He still felt that it would be better if Bulgaria could arrange things directly with the Turks and thus avoid sacrificing part of Macedonia. His sympathies were with Russia, but

[1] Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, p. 22 *et seq.*; Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 16, 27, 32; Bourchier in London *Times*, June 11, 1913; M., "The Balkan League", *loc. cit.*; Bresnitz von Sydacoff (Philip F. Bresnitz), *Aus den Geheimnissen des Balkankrieges* (Leipzig, n. d.), p. 14 *et seq.* Saint-Victor de Saint-Blanchard in *Revue des sciences politiques*, January-February 1913, pp. 24-47.

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he did not want to be a mere cat's-paw to be used against Austria.[1] Assim Bey, the Turk minister in Sofia with whom Gueshov had carried on conversations throughout the summer of 1911, had just assumed the post of foreign minister and had promised faithfully to do his utmost to bring about an entente between Turkey and Bulgaria. His assumption of office had, in fact, greatly contributed to the relaxation of tension in the middle of October.[2]

The Russians, too, looked askance at Milovanovic's proposals. The one thing they were anxious to avoid was trouble in the Balkans which would give Austria a pretext to intervene. They had, therefore, discouraged the idea of a military convention suggested by Venizelos to Gueshov, though the agreement was to have been at least technically defensive. The Russians warned the Sofia government of the danger of becoming involved in the Cretan question and refused to approve any arrangement that was not designed to preserve the *status quo*. Gueshov was by no means eager and showed no inclination to give the suggestion of the Greeks serious consideration.[3] In regard to the Serbian proposals the Russians made their attitude equally clear. Nekludov suggested to Gueshov a vague and very diluted text to replace the offensive clause of the Serbian draft and furthermore proposed the addition of a provision for the adherence of the other Balkan states, Greece, Montenegro and Turkey. Neratov himself urged the necessity of carefully avoiding anything that might offend the Turks and believed that Russia should stay as much as possible in the background. Under these circumstances the negotiations between Belgrade and Sofia made little progress.[4]

[1] Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 27, 28, 31, 37.

[2] Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10; M., "The Balkan League"; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-304; Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 37, 38. Assim is said to have accepted office only on condition that an entente with Bulgaria should be sought. Before leaving Sofia he gave Todorov categorical assurances that he would devote his efforts to this end. Already on October 30 Nekludov could report from Sofia that "the most amicable relations have again been established between Sofia and Constantinople."

[3] Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, p. 63; M., "The Balkan League," *loc. cit.*; Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 29, 33, 39, 41.

[4] Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 33, 36.

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The Russian attitude had to some extent been conditioned by the pourparlers in which Charykov was engaging with the Turks. On October 7 he had been instructed to begin conversations, but before doing so he had suggested a number of changes in the Neratov draft. These had to do chiefly with the Straits question. Charykov believed that this part of the program should be taken up immediately. Above all he held that the whole straits problem should be linked up with the projected Balkan League and that Russia should promise Turkey her mediation in establishing with the Balkan states firm relations based upon the maintenance of the *status quo*. This seemed to Neratov a rather dangerous procedure, but Charykov had already broached the matter to Bompard, his French colleague, and had opened introductory discussions with Said Pasha, the Turkish prime minister, before Neratov had a chance to raise objections.[1] On October 14 Charykov, unofficially and informally, submitted to Said a written draft, embodying the changes he had suggested to Neratov. This draft provided for the abrogation of the Railroad Agreement of 1900 and its replacement by new arrangements far more favorable to Turkey. In addition the Russian government expressed its readiness to consider the question of abolishing the capitulations and to receive favorably any economic or financial proposals which the Turks might make. But the main thing was the Straits. Here the draft followed the project sent by Neratov on October 2, but it included a clause embodying Charykov's fundamental idea: Russia would promise to use her good offices to facilitate the establishment of stable neighborly relations on the basis of the *status quo* between Turkey and the Balkan states. Furthermore, the new régime proposed for the Straits was to be subject to the approval of the powers signatories of the London Convention of 1871.[2]

[1] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 459-460; vol. I, p. 143; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, no. 137.

[2] The text of Neratov's original instructions and of Charykov's project in Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 462-464. Summaries in Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 675 *et seq.*, and in M. Moukhtar Pacha, *La Turquie, L'Allemagne et l'Europe* (Paris, 1924), p. 210. The important passages dealing with the Straits in Charykov's

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By this action Charykov had far exceeded his instructions and he soon managed to raise a storm. Neratov wrote him sharply, reminding him that he had been asked to discuss the Railroad Agreement and that the government had intended to reserve action on the other matters. This was not quite accurate, for the ambassador had been empowered to raise the question, though he certainly had no authority to put it into so definitive or extensive a form. Neratov expressed decided disapproval of Charykov's wording of the project, insisted on the retention of the original and objected to the provision for the consent of the other powers.[1] Quite rightly he argued that this procedure might create complications. His plan, which was that of Isvolski, had been to get definite assurances from France and Italy and then to sound the other powers before officially opening the question at Constantinople. Negotiations with France and Italy were already under way and Neratov had explicitly stated to the French chargé d'affaires that Russia desired French support at Constantinople when the question was raised. Isvolski himself was much chagrined to learn of Chary-

draft read as follows: "4) Le gouvernement Impérial de Russie s'engage en outre à donner au gouvernement Ottoman son appui efficace pour le maintien du régime actuel des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, en étendant le dit appui également aux territoires adjacents, dans le cas où ceux-ci seraient menacés par les forces armées étrangères. En vue de faciliter l'exécution de la clause précitée, le gouvernement Imperial Ottoman s'engage, de son côté, à ne pas s'opposer en temps de paix, comme en temps de guerre, au passage des navires de guerre russes par les Détroits, à condition que ces navires ne s'arrêtent point dans les eaux des Détroits, sauf accord. L'application de cette interprétation de la convention conclue à Londres le 1/13 mars 1871, demeure subordonnée au consentement préalable des autres Puissances signataires de la dite convention. 5) Le gouvernement Impérial de Russie s'engage également à employer ses bons offices pour faciliter l'établissement entre le gouvernement Impérial Ottoman et les États Balkaniques, des rapports stables de bon voisinage, sur la base du statu quo." (In Moukhtar Pacha's version this last clause reads: "La Russie formerait une alliance des États Balkaniques sous l'hégémonie de la Turquie.")

[1] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 460-461, Neratov to Charykov, October 22. Already on October 10 he had written objecting in a general way and warning the ambassador against initiating negotiations on too large a scale, even in a private way. Now he wrote that Charykov's letter to Said "ne trouvera point ici d'approbateurs." According to Molden, *op. cit.*, p. 197, Neratov and Charykov were confirmed opponents.

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kov's precipitate action, the news coming to him indirectly from London at a time when the Russian government had not yet breathed a word to its own ambassador to England.[1]

Although Charykov had exceeded his instructions, the moment for his action was not ill-chosen. There were rumors afloat that the Italians were planning to extend operations to the Aegean, and this would almost certainly mean trouble in the Balkans.[2] Under the circumstances the Turks were not averse to a guarantee of their European possessions. Assim Bey, in fact, frankly avowed his desire for an understanding with Russia as well as Bulgaria. Gueshov was distinctly well-disposed, and Milovanovic was anything but Turkophobe. What the Turks objected to was not a Balkan League as such, but the idea of a league under Russian direction. The traditional distrust could only be enhanced by the fact that Charykov had linked the idea of a territorial guarantee and a Balkan League with the Straits question. The ulterior motive was too obvious to escape attention.[3]

The Turkish statesmen therefore decided to sound out Russia's friends and, if possible, to remove the objectionable features of the plan by associating England and perhaps France.

[1] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 142-147; vol. II, p. 465; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, nos. 135, 137, 138, 140, 141; especially Isvolski to Neratov, October 12, 1911: "Apparemment Tcharykof a déjà entrepris quelques pas à Constantinople; je crains qu'avec sa précipitation coutumière il ne se hâte trop et gâte les choses." On October 15 the *Neue Freie Presse* printed a St. Petersburg dispatch stating that while Russia regarded the existing arrangements as burdensome, there was no intention of raising the Straits question at the moment. According to Moukhtar (*op. cit.*, p. 210), Said immediately communicated the Charykov note to the English ambassador.

[2] London *Times*, October 17; *Neue Freie Presse*, October 17; *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 10929.

[3] Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-304; Schwertfeger, *op. cit.*, vol. III, nos. 133, 136; *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 10911; XXXIII, no. 12044, Marschall to Foreign Office, October 23: Assim says "er strebe nach einer Entente der Türkei mit allen Balkanstaaten einschliesslich Rumäniens auf der Basis der gegenseitigen Zusage, sich einer Aggressivität zu enthalten. . . . Auf den von Russland gewünschten Balkanbund dagegen werde er nicht eingehen, weil bei (diesem) die politische und nicht die ökonomische Entwicklung im Vordergrund stehe. Ein solcher Balkanbund werde unter russischer Direktive stehen und Oesterreich-Ungarn zum unversöhnlichen Gegner haben." This is substantially what he told the Belgian minister. See also Moukhtar, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

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On October 16 Said Pasha, the Grand Vezir, told the Chamber, behind closed doors, that the situation was critical. The Turks, he said, had pursued a policy of isolation, much to their own detriment. The Porte must now seek assistance in extricating itself from the existing difficulties. Alliances could be easily concluded, but the Turkish government could not consider an agreement that would put the empire under the tutelage of another power. He then indicated that he had hopes of concluding an entente which would cost some geographical, political and commercial sacrifices, but these sacrifices would have to be made. In any case the government would apply itself to the task of strengthening the relations with all the powers, particularly the Balkan States: "We desire to maintain and strengthen our normal and sincere relations with the Balkan States on the basis of mutual confidence and the reconciliation of our common interests."[1]

More the Grand Vezir refused to say, but from that day on the question of a Balkan Confederation was the all-absorbing topic in the Turkish capital. Public opinion, estranged from the Triple Alliance as a result of the Italian aggression, had become outspokenly favorable to the Entente powers and it was generally supposed that Said had hinted at an English alliance which might involve giving England Koweit and concessions in the Bagdad Railway question.[2] As a matter of fact the English government was actually approached and proposals for an alliance were submitted. It was suggested that France and Russia might be associated later. The Turks asked, in return for the alliance, that England should give substantial aid in defending the Ottoman sovereignty in Tripoli. In reply Sir

[1] I have pieced this account together from the versions given by Marschall (*G. P.* XXX (i), nos. 10897, 10898, 10901) and in the London *Times*, October 19, 20; *Neue Freie Presse*, October 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26. See also Conrad, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 178-179, report of the Austrian military attaché in Constantinople, October 24, 1911.

[2] *G. P.* XXX (i), nos. 10897, 10898, 10901. *Cf.* also the London *Times*, October 30; *Neue Freie Presse*, November 8, 9, which are astonishingly accurate. See also Schwertfeger, *op. cit.*, vol. III, no. 136; E. J. Dillon, "M. Tsharykoff and the Latest Phase of the Straits Question", *Contemporary Review*, January 1912, pp. 122-123; Driault and Lhéritier, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 60.

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Edward Grey expressed his sympathy for an agreement with the Porte, but pointed out that England could not depart from her policy of neutrality in the Tripolitan conflict.[1]

Meanwhile the Turks put off the reply to Charykov's letter from week to week. Everything hung in the balance. The negotiations between Serbia and Bulgaria were tied up pending further developments of the Turkish policy.[2] The Turks were taking soundings before deciding on a definite course, and at the same time Neratov was continuing his efforts to get from the powers an expression of their attitude in regard to the Straits question. The English government had already learned in an indirect way of Charykov's action and had been approached by the French government for an expression of opinion. Nicolson and Grey took their stand by the promises made in 1908. They once more pointed out that the moment was ill-chosen, but stated that the Foreign Office recognized the memorandum of October 14, 1908. Any further project would have to be examined in the light of the treaties and submitted to the cabinet. Furthermore Nicolson raised the question as to how Russia could guarantee the integrity of the Turkish territory on the Straits while Turkey was engaged in war.[3]

[1] *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 10912; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-305; *Neue Freie Presse*, October 21, and the interesting correspondence between Djavid Bey and Winston Churchill in W. Churchill, *The World Crisis* (New York, 1923), vol. I, pp. 523-524. According to Moukhtar (*op. cit.*, p. 211), Said approached the English only after he had in vain sounded the Austrians and Germans. Charykov also believed that there had been negotiations with Germany (Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 679), but there is no evidence of this in the German Documents.

[2] On November 4 Neratov wrote definitely that in the view of the Russian government any treaty must leave Turkey the opportunity to join. A draft submitted by Milovanovic on November 3 seemed to Neratov entirely too aggressive and anti-Turk, though it hardly went beyond the outline discussed by Gueshov and Milovanovic on October 11. Nekludov reported on November 6: "I declared categorically to Spalaikovic (Serb minister to Sofia) that Russia would not hear of any aggressive actions or schemes of partition directed against Turkey and that an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria must be a purely defensive one designed to maintain the *status quo*."—Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 42, 45.

[3] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 147-149, 151; vol. II, pp. 467; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, nos. 141, 148; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 674, 675, 679, 680. It is hard to understand how, in 1914, Grey could make the assertion that the Straits had not been discussed by Russia and England during the preceding five years—*British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, vol. XI (London, 1926), no. 5.

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The French government, meanwhile, was waiting to see what the English would do. As in 1908, they were content to leave the odium to their friends.[1] In order to bring the discussions to an end Neratov on November 2 instructed the ambassadors in London and Paris to get written declarations from the French and English governments. France was asked to give Russia "entire liberty of action", while Russia would give assurances that there was no intention on her part to involve France in an action in behalf of Russian interests. England was requested to give simply a written expression of opinion on the question of Russia's freedom of navigation and of the projected agreement with Turkey. Russia, it was repeated, was not planning an immediate solution of the problem.[2]

So far as it is known, the English government successfully evaded a written declaration, and evidently the Russians did not press the point in view of the reluctance of the French. Isvolski had taken advantage of the conclusion of the Franco-German treaty regarding Morocco to submit a note to the Quai d'Orsay on November 4. In this he included a clause of his own expressing the Russian conviction that the French government, in return for the benevolent attitude of her ally in the Moroccan question, would be ready to give assurance that it recognized Russia's freedom of action in the Straits regions and would not refuse its assent to measures Russia might take to guarantee her interests and consolidate her position. The French government was still suspicious and, even after assuring itself that the Russian note was more than an independent act on the part of Isvolski, did nothing during November. M. Georges Louis, temporarily director of the Quai d'Orsay, made it clear that he disliked the idea of giving Russia complete liberty of action. In spite of Isvolski's assurance that the Russian note had no connection with the Charykov pro-

[1] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 150; vol. II, p. 465; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, no. 147. The negotiations with the powers are summarized in E. A. Adamov, *Konstantinopel i Prolivi* (Moscow, 1925), vol. I, p. 14 *et seq.*

[2] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 466-467; Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 681-682.

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posals but was simply a matter of principle, no move was made in Paris to draw up a written reply.[1]

Meanwhile the Russian ambassador in Berlin had been informed. No real opposition was expected from either Germany or Austria. Indeed, on November 16 the German ambassador in St. Petersburg volunteered the information that Germany would probably put no obstacle in Russia's way, provided Germany were allowed to participate in the negotiations. Official soundings were then taken in Berlin and Vienna. The Germans made no difficulties and the Austrians, while holding back, recognized Russia's special interests in the Straits, while emphasizing the need of finding a formula which would guarantee Austria against an attack by the Russian fleet.[2]

The general result of the Russian soundings in the European capitals was, on the whole, promising. No far-reaching assurances or blanket promises had been given, but it was quite evident that arrangements might be made with the powers if the Turks could be brought to accept the Russian view. The prospects for this were, as we have seen, not entirely black.

[1] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 154, 155, 162, 164, 166, 169; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, nos. 153, 154, 156, 158, 159, 162, 178. The negotiations with France dragged on and it was only on January 4, 1912, that a written reply was handed to Isvolski. The essential passage read: "D'une manière générale, je suis heureux de confirmer de nouveau à Votre Excellence les déclarations du Gouvernement français, à l'occasion des événements de 1908, relativement aux satisfactions que le Gouvernement russe pourrait être amené à poursuivre dans la question du Détroit du Bosphore et des Dardanelles. Le Gouvernement français reste disposée à échanger des vues à cet égard avec le Gouvernement russe, si les circonstances nouvelles rendaient nécessaire un examen de la question des Détroits."—Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 179; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, no. 185; a summary of the negotiations with France in Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 464 *et seq.*; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. II, no. 182; on this matter see also Judet, *Georges Louis*, pp. 95-96, 160 *et seq.*; R. Poincaré, *Au Service de la France* (Paris, 1926), vol. I, pp. 346-347.

[2] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 160; vol. II, pp. 468-470; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, no. 155; *G. P.* XXX (i), nos. 10970, 10973-10977, 10990, 10992, 11005; von Szilassy, *op. cit.*, p. 207. The Germans were more favorably disposed than the Austrians. Aehrenthal evidently intended to ask compensation for any gains made by the Russians. From the German documents it appears that neither Germany nor Austria gave more than a promise to consider favorably any proposals the Russians might make. The Russian memorandum in Marchand gives the impression of far more extensive assurances.

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Charykov was hard at work urging on all sides the necessity for a Balkan Confederation. The matter was being discussed in the press and in Constantinople there was a fair amount of favorable sentiment. But the Turkish statesmen, knowing the price asked by Russia, could not bring themselves to a decision.[1]

Meanwhile, towards the middle of November, there were more rumors of the extension of the war to the Aegean and of a coming attack by the Italian fleet on the Dardanelles, Saloniki, Smyrna or Beyrut. The powers of the Triple Entente were distinctly opposed to any such action, and when the Turks threatened to take measures of defense in the Straits the Russian government proposed to the powers that steps be taken to warn Italy against so dangerous an enterprise. No real representations were made, for the Italian government anticipated action by declaring that no blockade of the Dardanelles or attack upon Turkish ports had been envisaged.[2]

The incident is important, for it gave Charykov another opportunity to play up Russia as the friend and protector of the Turks and to urge once more the necessity for concessions to Russia in the Straits question. The Turks feared the Russian action more than they welcomed it, for they suspected that Charykov would not allow the chance to slip by.[3] They were right. Charykov, having never received a reply to his unofficial draft of October 12, now resubmitted the same draft officially, with only one change. According to the first version the Russian-Turkish arrangement was to be subject to the approval of the powers. In the new version it was merely

[1] Popov, *op. cit.*, no. 40; Conrad, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 189-190; London *Times* and *Neue Freie Presse*, November 10-15. A commission of deputies was actually formed to study the idea, and similar organizations were projected in Sofia and Belgrade—Schwertfeger, *op. cit.*, vol. III, no. 136; *Neue Freie Presse*, November 21, 1911.

[2] Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 48, 49; G. P. XXX (i), nos. 10941, 10942, 10944, 10945, 10948, 10951 *et seq.*; Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 485; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, no. 163; London *Times* and *Neue Freie Presse*, November 22-29, 1911.

[3] *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 10945. The threatened closing of the Dardanelles had caused a temporary paralysis of Russian trade and consequently there was every prospect that the Russian government would capitalize the situation.—*Neue Freie Presse*, November 23, 27, reporting conditions at Odessa.

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stated that the two governments should notify the powers of the agreement.[1]

There is no evidence that Charykov was in any way authorized to proceed officially in this matter, or that he had even taken the trouble to consult his government. Apparently he regarded the situation as ripe for action and relied upon the original vague instructions which Neratov had sent him. Of course the Turks could know nothing of all this. All they could see was that Russia had officially raised a question of the greatest moment. The whole import of the problem forced itself upon them. The presence of Russian warships in the Bosporus would be synonymous with the end of Turkish independence. They had always relied upon England to prevent such a catastrophe. Now, they argued, Russia must have secured the consent of England, and the fate of the Ottoman Empire had been decided.[2]

In a flash the Anglophil and Entente sympathies so prevalent in Constantinople after the outbreak of the Tripolitan War disappeared. Assim Bey hurried to von Marschall, the German ambassador and, with the exclamation: "The great blow has just been struck at us", communicated the full text of the Charykov note. In great excitement he declared that what Russia proposed was nothing less than a protectorate and that if Russia were successful it would mean not only the end of Turkey but the end of Austria's Balkan policy and Germany's Oriental policy as well. Russia, by taking advantage of Turkey's critical situation, showed plainly enough that she was aiming at the disruption of the Empire. The suggested Balkan League would be merely a preliminary step to the break-up of Turkey's European possessions.[3]

[1] The Russian draft was submitted in the form of a letter on November 27.— Marchand, *op cit.*, vol. II, p. 461. Summaries of the draft in *G. P.* XXX (i), nos. 10978, 10985, in part verbatim. *Cf.* also Dillon, *loc. cit.*

[2] *G. P.* XXX (i), nos. 10978, 10982. Assim suspected that the Russians themselves had raised the spectre of an Italian attack in order to supply a pretext for opening the Straits question. Marschall inclined to the same view, but there is nothing in the Russian documents to bear this out.

[3] *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 10978: "Es handle sich um ein russisches Protektorat

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Marschall was duly impressed and declared frankly for the *status quo*. Kiderlen, the German foreign minister, was more sceptical, and the ambassador therefore bombarded the Foreign Office with memoranda setting forth the dangers of the situation. The Russian proposals were almost a word-for-word repetition of the famous treaty of Unkiar Skelessi of 1833. They implied Russian domination of Constantinople and this in turn meant the collapse not only of the Ottoman Empire but of Germany's position in the Near East. There could be no doubt whatsoever, he thought, that the whole thing was being engineered by Russia with the approval of England and Italy. France would not dare oppose.[1]

Marschall was wrong in suspecting an entente conspiracy, as Assim soon found out after sounding the English government. Grey replied that he regarded the Russian *démarche* as out of place at the moment. At any rate the approval of the powers would be necessary.[2] This was enough for Assim. The affair had already leaked out and was everywhere discussed in the newspapers. The *Yeni Gazetta* was practically invited to take a strong stand and on December 6 wrote:

> The Russian move is the most important event that has taken place in Turkish history in the last forty years. . . . The attitude of the Porte in this affair is clear: we remain immovably attached to our most vital interests. No government, no Turk could for a moment entertain the idea that the Ottoman Empire might fall to the level of a Russian vassal.[3]

über das türkische Reich. Russland werde, wenn seine Kriegsschiffe die Meerengen frei passieren, zur ausschlaggebenden Vormacht in Konstantinopel. . . . Die ganze oesterreichische Balkanpolitik und auch die deutsche Orientpolitik brechen zusammen, sobald Russland hier der entscheidende Machtfaktor werde."

[1] *G. P.* XXX (i), nos. 10980, 10981, 10987, 10988. Marschall went so far as to hand in his resignation, but the Kaiser sided with him against Bethmann and Kiderlen—*G. P.* XXX (i), nos. 10993, 10998.

[2] *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 10983; *Neue Freie Presse,* December 7, 9, 11. There appears to have been a general appeal sent out on December 4. *Cf.* also Hoschiller, *op. cit.,* pp. 64-66.

[3] *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 10983; Schwertfeger, *op. cit.,* vol. III, no. 137; Hoschiller, *op. cit.,* pp. 64-65; C. Vellay, *Le Problème Méditerranéen* (Paris, 1913), pp. 62-63; London *Times,* December 6 and 7; *Neue Freie Presse,* December 3-6,

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When Charykov appeared on the evening of December 6 with a formal written note, Assim confined himself to a few remarks, emphasizing the fact that the Porte regarded the Straits question as of far greater importance than the Railroad Agreement. He would submit the whole matter to the cabinet.[1] Three days later he was not yet in a position to give a reply. Charykov wrote home for permission to initiate the French and British ambassadors. This permission was never given.[2] Neratov had not approved of Charykov's independent action and already on December 6 the *Novoie Vremia* published a semi-official communiqué stating that the Russian government was not negotiating officially with the Turkish government about the Straits and that it had no knowledge of private conversations between Charykov and Assim Bey on this question.[3]

At this very moment Sazonov arrived in Paris on a tour preliminary to the resumption of his ministerial duties. There he conferred not only with the French statesmen, but with Isvolski and Benckendorff, who had come from London to be present. No doubt he learned in detail what the attitude of the French and English governments was, and we may imagine that Isvolski gave a not too favorable review of Charykov's high-handed

but especially December 7. The Turkish newspapers were all flatly opposed to concessions and when Hussein Djavid, the editor of the *Tanin*, who was closely connected with the Russian Embassy, suggested the possibility of an arrangement, he was almost expelled from the Committee of Union and Progress—Mandelstam (who was first dragoman of the Russian embassy), *op. cit.*, p. 66; *Neue Freie Presse*, December 11, 1911.

[1] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 173; vol. II, p. 461; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, no. 171.

[2] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 461. Neratov merely suggested at Paris that the French ambassador be informed—*ibid.*, vol. I, p. 173; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, no. 171.

[3] Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 173; vol. II, p. 461; Stieve, *op. cit.*, vol. I, no. 171. Especially Neratov to Isvolski, December 9, where he speaks of the "six points malheureusement déjà transmis officiellement par Tcharykof à Hassim Bey, dont le texte complet, et par son essence et par sa rédaction, provoque de notre part les observations que Tcharykof connaît déjà." *Cf.* also Dillon, *loc. cit.*, who says he can vouch for the disapproval of Neratov and Sazonov. The Russian *démenti* of December 6 in the *Neue Freie Presse*, December 6, 7; Hoschiller, *op. cit.*, p. 65; Vellay, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

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action.[1] Besides this, he must have been put *au courant* of the negotiations between Serbia and Bulgaria, for Milovanovic had conferred in Paris with Stanciov and Rizov on November 18–19. The French had been more or less initiated into the project from the beginning and had given it their blessing. Milovanovic had spoken eloquently of the Austrian designs in northern Albania and the French statesmen had declared themselves prepared to further the realization of Serbia's national problems in every respect. They were distinctly sceptical about a Balkan Confederation, while they sympathized entirely with the idea of a Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty which would create an "effective barrier against German-Austrian pressure."[2]

This was quite in accordance with Sazonov's own views and therefore it was not likely that he would recognize Charykov's action, especially as it did not promise success. On December 8 he declared to Stephen Lauzanne of the *Matin* that there was no "Dardanelles Question" properly speaking, and that Russia had not engaged in negotiations or attempted any *démarche.* There had merely been discussions designed to keep the Straits open to commerce. On the following day he wired home that Charykov was to be instructed to establish

[1] London *Times,* December 7, 8, 9; *Neue Freie Presse,* December 8. According to K. Helfferich, *Der Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1919), vol. I, pp. 93-94, Benckendorff begged Sazonov on his knees to have the scheme dropped.

[2] Guéchoff, *op. cit.,* p. 40 *et seq.*; Popov, *op. cit.,* no. 51. As early as October 1909, Milovanovic had discussed with Pichon the idea of a closer union between the Balkan states and had requested the French to bring pressure upon the Bulgarians. Pichon had expressed complete sympathy with the idea — Popov, *op. cit.,* p. 9. The French view on a Balkan Confederation to include Turkey is well brought out in Gauvain, *op. cit.,* vol. II, pp. 313, 328, but especially in the report of Panafieu, the chargé at St. Petersburg, December 22, 1911: "Comment les populations chrétiennes des Balkans pourraient-elles accepter un lien politique quelconque qui les mettrait sous la dépendance de la Turquie et les forcerait à l'inaction, alors que toutes ont des appétits à satisfaire soit sur la Turquie elle-même, soit sur quelqu'un de leurs voisins? Leur rivalité est trop ancienne et trop aiguë; les sentiments que les Grecs, Bulgares, Roumains, Serbes manifestent à l'égard les uns des autres sont trop peu bienveillants, malgré la communauté de religion et un régime identique, et à plus forte raison à l'égard de leurs anciens maîtres les Turcs, pour qu'il soit permis d'escompter la formation d'une confédération, même sous la direction d'une grande puissance quelconque."—Driault and Lhéritier, *op. cit.,* vol. V, p. 61.

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clearly the absolutely private character of his exchange of views.[1]

With that the game was really up. On December 14 Charykov asked Assim to regard his action in the Straits question as "*non avenu*" and explained that Sazonov had been inadequately informed on the matter. Neratov, he insisted, had given his approval.[2] On the very same day the Austrian ambassador declared to the Turkish foreign minister that Austria would stand by the existing arrangements until a solution could be found that would safeguard the interests not only of Russia and of Turkey, but also those of the other signatory powers. The German ambassador followed with an analogous statement on the next day.[3]

Charykov evidently thought that the final word had not yet been said. He told his Rumanian colleague that the question would be raised again in the near future, and continued to urge upon the Turk statesmen the desirability of an understanding on this matter. In fact he went so far as to tell the Porte that a reply to his note was still expected. On December 21 Assim therefore handed him the following declaration:

> The Imperial government, in conformance with the treaties concluded prior to 1878 and ratified at the Congress of Berlin, cannot authorize the exclusive passage of the Russian fleet through the Straits in time of peace or in time of war and declares that all rights to the Straits belong exclusively to the Ottoman nation and its sovereignty, for the safeguarding of the integrity of its territory.[4]

[1] *Matin,* December 9; *Temps,* December 9; London *Times,* December 9; *Neue Freie Presse,* December 9. Marchand, *op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 462; Gauvain, *op. cit.,* vol. III, p. 230; *Journal des Débats,* December 15, 1911.

[2] *G. P.* XXX (i), 10999; *Neue Freie Presse,* December 14, 1911.

[3] *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 10997; London *Times,* December 18; *Neue Freie Presse,* December 17; Hoschiller, *op. cit.,* p. 66.

[4] *G. P.* XXX (i), nos. 11000, 11002, 11003; text of the reply in Schulthess, *Europäischer Geschichtskalendar, 1911,* p. 521; Hoschiller, *op. cit.,* p. 66; Adamov, *op. cit.,* p. 16. The date generally given, December 8, is obviously old style, though the Turkish cabinet seems to have reached its decision on December 7 or 8 new style (*Neue Freie Presse,* December 9, 1911).

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This is the last that we hear of the incident. It seems likely that Sazonov, on his return to St. Petersburg, looked into the matter more closely and sent even more categorical instructions to the ambassador. To the Serbian minister he spoke in almost scathing terms of the whole incident:

> M. Charykov [reported Popovic], whom many regard as a somewhat muddled-headed politician, knows that this question is one of great importance for Russia, and that the statesman who succeeds in solving it will cover himself with glory. Since M. Neratov directed the foreign office until a few days ago, M. Charykov made use of the weakness of the interregnum to pluck a few laurels for himself, by raising the question at Constantinople on his own responsibility. With Sazonov's return the matter immediately took on a different aspect.[1]

Had Sazonov had his way Charykov would have been recalled immediately. As it was he was allowed to stay until mid-March, 1912, almost till the very moment that the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was signed.[2] Negotiations for this important pact had taken a more energetic course since the reappearance of Sazonov. Hartwig, who was in entire sympathy with the foreign minister's views, had long been chafing at Charykov's schemes. The confederation which the latter advocated he regarded as a Utopia. Serbia and Bulgaria, he reported on

[1] Bogitschewitsch, *op. cit.*, p. 167; similarly *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 11004; *Neue Freie Presse*, December 15. Also a letter of Georges Louis, December 30: "M. Tcharykoff, emporté par son ardeur habituelle et convaincu qu'en allant de l'avant il serait approuvé par l'Empereur, a pressé le Gouvernement turc plus que ne le souhaitait M. Neratoff, beaucoup plus en tout que ne le voulait M. Sazonoff, qui a compris tout de suite qu'il fallait arrêter net des démarches qui découvraient si inopportunément le gouvernement russe."—Judet, *Georges Louis*, p. 166.

[2] On December 29 the *Neue Freie Presse* reported that Charykov would be recalled on January 14, that is, the Russian New Year. Similarly *G. P.* XXX (i), no. 11046. When finally recalled, Charykov was practically disgraced. The exact reasons for this are not clear, but it was generally agreed that his disappearance meant the end of the Russian pro-Turk policy—*Neue Freie Presse*, March 14, 1912; London *Times*, March 13, 1912; Schwertfeger, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, no. 7; Gauvain, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 13; *Affaires balkaniques*, vol. I, no. 25. Moukhtar, *op. cit.*, p. 211, thinks Charykov was recalled at the instigation of the English and French.

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November 5, would agree to it if the Russian government insisted, but neither was enthusiastic and the whole negotiations might be jeopardized if the point were pressed. Besides, the confederation could never be a stable institution. At best it would be merely a temporary expedient designed to gain time not only for the Balkan states, but for Russia, whose ultimate aim, after all, must be the realization of an age-old mission: to set foot upon the shores of the Bosporus, the entrance to the "Russian Sea."[1] As a matter of fact the Bulgarians had no desire to see the Russians gain control of the Straits and they were profoundly dismayed by the news of Charykov's *démarche*. On December 6, the very day on which the Russian government had issued a denial that negotiations were being conducted at Constantinople, Neratov wrote to the Russian minister in Sofia:

> You may inform Gueshov confidentially that an exchange of opinions is taking place between the Turks and ourselves in regard to questions interesting us in particular. In this we are treating with especial care the questions which may affect the interests of the Balkan countries. In particular, as regards the Bulgarian interests, we contemplate no deals affecting those matters which formed the subject of our confidential proposals to Bulgaria in 1910. . . .[2]

One could hardly imagine a more deceptive statement. In any case, the Charykov incident showed the need of hurrying the negotiations between the Balkan states. The Austrians were making efforts to engineer a league between Bulgaria and Rumania, with which Turkey would in all likelihood be associated.[3] The Turks themselves were suggesting to Bulgaria an entente providing that neither party should interfere in the domestic affairs of the other, that each should so regulate its home affairs that its neighbors should have no reason to com-

[1] Hartwig to Neratov, November 5—Popov, *op. cit.*, no. 44.

[2] Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, p. 59; Popov, *op. cit.*, no. 56. On the Bulgarian view in respect to the Straits see the numerous quotations in Protic, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

[3] Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 54, 57, 59, 60. The Austrians appear to have offered the Bulgarians a free hand in Macedonia.

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plain, and that each should promise not to undertake to enlarge its frontiers for a period of perhaps ten years. This was the Turk reply to the suggestions which Gueshov had made two months before. He was justified in suspecting their sincerity, therefore, and in looking upon the whole move as an attempt to sound out the position of Bulgaria.[1]

In any case it was too late for such combinations. Returning from a visit to Vienna, Ferdinand appears to have become convinced that the Entente Powers were in the ascendant and that little was to be hoped from Austria. He was more disposed than he had ever been to accept the alliance with Serbia, especially as the Russians were now urgently pressing the point. Neratov suggested that the agreement should be based on the principle of mutual support in case of the violation of the *status quo* and the delimitation of spheres of cultural influence. This would protect both parties from attack and would obviate the necessity of deciding in advance the problems of the future. All efforts of the Russian representatives were now concentrated on this problem, and by the end of December almost all the difficulties had been removed.[2] There remained only the drawing of the line of partition in Macedonia, upon which both sides insisted. By the end of February even this point had been settled. There was no more serious talk of including Turkey or even of Russian-Turkish friendship. In fact Sazonov began the new year with vigorous attempts to mediate between the Italian government and the Porte, taking a distinctly friendly attitude towards Italy throughout. It may well be that the Italian government was not

[1] Popov, *op. cit.*, no. 58. Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10, gives the text of Assim's note, but says it was never submitted to the Bulgarian government. The Russian documents show that this is a plain misstatement.

[2] Popov, *op. cit.*, nos. 57, 59, 62, 65; Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, p. 58; Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 153. Already on December 11 Milovanovic had jubilantly declared in the Skupchtina that the Balkan States were drawing together and that this gave him greater confidence in the future — *Neue Freie Presse*, December 12, 16. New fears of Austrian aggression had made the Serbs more pliable — Popov, *op. cit.*, no. 52; *Affaires balkaniques*, vol. I, nos. 1, 2. Ferdinand evidently felt uneasy about the anti-Austrian implications of the Treaty until the very end — Nekludov, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

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entirely a stranger to the Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations.[1] At any rate, with the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance the Charykov incident passed into history and a new chapter in Russian foreign policy was begun.

* * * *

"It is difficult, even after the event, to get any clear idea of the purpose and proceedings of Russian diplomacy, further than that it has been going to and fro in the earth and walking up and down in it; for even when it plays Providence, it moves in a mysterious way," says "A Diplomatist" in his interesting book on *Nationalism and War in the Near East* (p. 162). The purpose of this paper has been to elucidate one of the most obscure chapters in the history of Russian pre-war diplomacy. The aim has been to show how the Russian policy was dominated by two fundamental considerations, which were closely connected. The first was to gain control of the Straits and the second to block the *Drang nach Osten* of the Central Powers. In ultimate aims there was perhaps little difference between the Russian statesmen, but in regard to methods there was no unity whatsoever. Each thought that he had the key to the situation, and none of them hesitated to double-cross the other in the attainment of the goal. The critical moment came with the outbreak of the Tripolitan War. Germany and Austria, as allies of Italy, were temporarily discredited at Constantinople. Isvolski believed that the moment when Italy was realizing on the Racconigi Agreement and France was establishing her position in Morocco presented a golden opportunity for Russia to demand freedom of action in the Straits. There is no indication that he favored definite action at Constantinople just then. As in 1908 he thought it more important to square the Great Powers first. On the other hand Charykov believed the time had come for a real step in advance. Tur-

[1] The statement of Italian complicity has often been advanced. *Cf.*, for example, Saint-Victor de Saint-Blanchard in *Revue des sciences politiques*, January-February 1913, pp. 24-47: "L'historien futur devra rechercher les origines du bloc balkanique dans la coopération de l'Italie et de la Russie dépuis les accords de Racconigi jusqu'aux menées de M. Isvolsky et de M. Tittoni." The Turkish government certainly believed in Italian intrigues — Popov, *op. cit.*, no. 55.

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key's embarrassment could be exploited in Russia's interest. The Balkan States were drawing together. Turkey could be sold membership in the league and a guarantee of the territory adjacent to the Straits for the price of concessions to Russia in the shape of free passage for her warships in time of war as well as peace.

Neratov, temporarily in charge of the foreign office, was apparently a man of no authority. He was a tool of Isvolski, but was unable to force through the one ambassador's program as against the other's. His instructions to Charykov betray uncertainty and indecision. They were ill-defined and left too much to the ambassador's discretion. Charykov, an incurable optimist (he was nick-named "*à la bonne heure*" by his colleagues), plunged into the work of realizing his favorite idea, drew up unwarranted proposals on his own initiative and gave the whole procedure a much more formal character than had been intended.[1] The scheme was bound to fail. Russian public opinion and Russian official circles were interested in the Straits and regarded the idea of a Balkan Confederation as at best a means to the end.[2] In Constantinople, on the other hand, there was considerable interest in the Confederation, but the old suspicions of Russian policy persisted and were only enhanced by the reopening of the Straits question. The Turks desired a Confederation solely in order to forestall aggressive tendencies on the part of the Balkan States. They feared the hand of Russia and in any case were unwilling to purchase protection at the Russian price.

The net result of Charykov's action was that he estranged the Great Powers and made the realization of Isvolski's plan once more impossible; he also estranged the Turks and drove them back into the arms of the Central Powers; and finally he

[1] On Charykov's character see Nekludov's estimate (March, 1911): "Il est très allant et dépasse souvent ses instructions. Son imagination l'entraine, son optimisme aussi, et il ne voit jamais qu'il se trompe. Il est tellement saisi par son idée du moment qu'il croit n'en avoir jamais eu d'autre." — *Carnets de Georges Louis,* vol. I, p. 167; similarly von Szilassy, *op. cit.,* p. 186.

[2] On Russian opinion see Hoschiller, *op. cit.,* p. 75; Mandelstam, *op. cit.,* p. 66; Conrad, *op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 213 *et seq.*; but especially *Neue Freie Presse,* November 22, and London *Times,* November 13, 1911.

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contributed indirectly to the conclusion of a Balkan Alliance which not only left out the Turks but actually established the principle of success at the expense of the Turks. In the end the Balkan League, which the Russians had always intended should be primarily a barrier against the Austrian advance, became an instrument of aggression in the opposite direction. The whole idea had become distorted and the results were disastrous for European peace. For it should be particularly emphasized that the Russians at this time had no aggressive plans. They were quite unprepared for war and everybody knew it. In encouraging the Balkan League they were merely trying to prevent the exploitation of their weakness by their rivals. Isvolski, Charykov, Sazonov, all alike desired nothing more fervently than the maintenance of the *status quo*. But Isvolski and Charykov hoped to secure it by acquiring control of the key to the Near East, the Straits. Sazonov, on the other hand, like Hartwig, believed that the far-flung schemes of the two ambassadors were not realizable. At best one could hope to bring the Balkan States into the same anti-Austrian fold. If this could be done only by giving the combination an anti-Turkish turn as well, the chance must be taken. After all, they argued, Russia, which had stood sponsor to the whole plan, would be able to control the actions of these small states. The evidence on this point is overwhelming. Until the end of the summer of 1912 Sazonov brought pressure to bear upon the Balkan States to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.[1] He

[1] The Confederation, Russia fondly believed, "would prove a docile instrument in her hands and serve the double purpose of maintaining peace in the Balkans and of barring an Austrian advance to the Ægean."—Sir George Buchanan, *My Mission to Russia* (London, 1923), vol. I, p. 121. The correctness of this view is borne out by Sazonov's own letter to Isvolski and Benckendorff on March 31, 1912, notifying them of the conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian pact: "Since there is a special clause which obliges both sides to consult Russia before taking active measures, we believe that this gives us the means of bringing pressure on both parties and that at the same time we have taken protective measures to oppose the expansion of the influence of a larger power in the Balkans." — Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 154. See also Sazonov, *op. cit.*, p. 54. *Cf.* also Kiderlen's letter to King Carol, April 15, 1912, in E. Jäckh, *Kiderlen-Waechter* (Berlin, 1924), vol. II, p. 186. When Danev, on a mission to Livadia in May 1912, hinted at the possibility of war against Turkey, Sazonov

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failed entirely to foresee that the Balkan bloc, prepared by Russia to obstruct the road of the Austrian advance, would automatically turn against Turkey. With the rest of Europe he was taken unawares by the outbreak of the war.[1]

Of the Balkan States themselves little need be said. In the years from 1908 to 1912 each and all of them were torn by conflicting motives. They all felt the need of protection, either against Austria or against Turkey. At the same time they were unwilling to give up their grand ideas. In order to guard themselves against the enemy and further their designs they were ready to stoop to any means, even to an agreement with the enemy if necessary. There is nothing edifying in the picture here presented either of Russian policy or of the policy of the various Balkan States. But, like their patron, the small states in 1911 were still thinking primarily in terms of defense.

was horrified. Russia, he said, sympathized with an alliance for defense, but not with one which envisaged offense. Russian opinion would not countenance such action on the part of the Balkan States. — Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 522-525; Nekludov, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83; Guéchoff, *op. cit.*, p. 73 *et seq.*; Velchev's pamphlet, *The Full Truth about Bulgaria's Collapse* (1913) quoted in Schulthess, *op. cit.*, 1913, pp. 759-760. When Poincaré came to St. Petersburg in August 1912 and was shown a copy of the treaty he pointed out its implications in dismay, but Sazonov reassured him with these words: "We warned Bulgaria and Serbia of Russia's intention not to recognize the alliance concluded by them excepting as a defensive measure aiming to guarantee the independence and liberty of these countries against the designs of Austria-Hungary and that we did not wish in any way to collaborate in projects of aggression on their part." —Marchand, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 342; *Affaires balkaniques*, vol. I, no. 57. As late as September, Sazonov told the Bulgarian minister in London to avoid war, because war would bring Russia into conflict with the Triple Alliance or Turkey: "We do not want to be exposed to this danger. We have not yet liquidated one war, do you want to force us into another one? No, we shall leave you to your fate and your own statesmen shall bear the responsibility for the catastrophic results. Our idea of an agreement among the Balkan States was intended to protect the peninsula against foreign conquest. We had no thought whatsoever of an alliance with aggressive purposes."—Velchev, quoted in Schulthess, *op. cit.*, 1913, pp. 759-760.

[1] Miliukov in the *Retch*, July 25, 1916, quoted by Brailsford, *op. cit.*, p. 64. Similarly the Bulgarian newspaper *Volia*, August 22 – September 4, 1914: "The Balkan War broke out against the wish of Russia, which had created the Balkan Alliance in the hope of directing it against Austria, when the moment for a declaration of war on Germany should arrive"—quoted by Protic, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

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The military leaders were all impressed with the strength of the Turkish army; and the Serbs, at least, intended that the alliance, if it ever functioned at all, should function against Austria.[1] It was Danev and other Bulgarian leaders of the same stamp who finally precipitated the crisis and gave the whole League its outspokenly anti-Turkish character. The Serbs were unable to stem the tide. Like Sazonov they had not reckoned on being outwitted, though all were playing a game the object of which was to exploit one's friends in one's own interest.

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[1] Bourchier in London *Times,* June 13, 1913, says that in February, 1912, he found Milovanovic still worried at the idea of a rupture with the Porte. *Cf.* also M., "The Balkan League", *loc. cit.*: "When the question of an alliance was first mentioned the possibility of a war did not seriously enter into the calculations of the contracting parties." This is amply proved by the story of the negotiations, as outlined above. In March, 1912, Milovanovic described as the chief object of the treaty "protection against Austria". — Bogitschewitsch, *op. cit.*, p. 35. Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe,* p. 267, rightly emphasizes the fact that until the actual outbreak of the war the military leaders were greatly impressed with the Ottoman strength in the Balkans. It is well known that throughout Europe it was feared that the Balkan States would be defeated.

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ON INLAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION IN ANTIQUITY[1]

EVERY change in antiquity toward increased speed of transportation of goods, increased comfort of travel, and greater rapidity of communication must have had results upon ancient social and economic life relatively as important as each corresponding change has had in modern times. Some of the outstanding innovations in these respects one finds mentioned in the current histories of ancient civilizations. Upon the development of shipping and its results and upon the general political, economic and social life of antiquity, numerous studies are at hand. Regarding methods and changes in inland transportation and communication there is astonishingly little available, even in the larger histories of ancient civilization.[2] An adequate attempt to supply this want cannot be made in a paper so brief as this must be. It is, therefore, to be regarded as a project which may repay an investigation much more complete than can here be accorded it.

In 1925 a newspaper report announced that Stephen H. Langdon, who was then in charge of the field work of Oxford University—Field Museum excavations at the site of the Sumerian town of Kish, had discovered representations of toy horses in a palace at Kish which belonged to a period about 3000 B. C.[3]

[1] Presented as a paper at the annual meeting of the Michigan Schoolmasters' Club on April 27th, 1928, at Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[2] An exception to this statement is to be noted for the numerous discussions of the introduction of the horse and the camel which are to be found in the *Cambridge Ancient History* (cited below as *C. A. H.*). See vol. I, index, *s. v.*

[3] See the *New York Times* of May 11, 1925. It has not as yet been confirmed, so far as my information goes; but the announcement seems to be authentic. This discovery would presuppose either that the Sumerians were already in touch with the horse-riding nomads of the region of the Oxus River, or that these Aryan tribes had, even that early, begun to penetrate southward toward their later homes in Media—almost a thousand years before the time at which this southward movement has been commonly dated. *Cf.* the suggestion of Bruno Meissner, *Babylonien und Assyrien,* vol. I, p. 219, that the mule, a

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So far as the existing evidence stood before 1925, the horse had not been known in these lands before 2200 B. C. The new discovery is important; but, if confirmed by authoritative publication, it would not materially change the previous historical conclusion that the *use* of the horse in the Sumerian-Akkadian centers was not widespread until over a thousand years later. Just as the elephant is fully known to us and used in children's toys in our country but has for us no economic significance, in the same way the horse may have been known in the Sumerian towns by 3000 B. C.—no doubt as a strange and foreign animal; but it did not come into general use there until after 2000 B. C. There are numerous indications which point to this conclusion. In the past thirty-five years there have been found near Kaisariyeh (the ancient Cappodocian Caesarea in lower Asia Minor) several hundred business letters and documents in old Assyrian, which date from c. 2500 B. C. to c. 2200 B. C. They give us most interesting and important economic information regarding an Assyrian bazaar town, called Karum Kanes, "the harbor (i. e. bazaar) Kanes". It was a trading town having direct connections with the old Assyrian center of Assur. To Assur it sent raw products (copper, woolen cloths) which were finished in the establishments at Assur. In exchange the Assyrian merchants of Karum Kanes sold in the Cappodocian area copper utensils, articles of adornment, refined oils, jars—the manufactures of Assyrian Assur. The transportation lines ran northward up the Tigris river from Assur as far as possible, then by caravans of laden asses, or by wagons drawn by asses, to Kanes. Horses are not mentioned in these documents.[1] Quite as significant is the fact that the horse does not appear in the Hammurapi Code.

The first recorded historical mention of the horse in this region actually occurs, however, upon a tablet which is of the Hammurapi period. There it is called "the ass from the

crossbreed of the horse and donkey, may have been known to the Sumerians early in the third millenium. This, also, would throw the presence of the horse close to the date fixed by the published discovery at Kish.

[1] Benno Landsberger, "Assyrische Handelskolonien", *Der Alte Orient*, vol. XXIV, no. 4. *Cf.* Fr. Hrozny in *Syria*, vol. VIII (1927), pp. 1-12.

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east".[1] It is only with the establishment of the Kassite dynasty from beyond the Zagros mountains as the ruling people of Babylonia (c. 1750 B. C.) that the horse came into common use in the lowlands of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. The wagon with two wheels was an invention long since known in the Sumerian towns.[2] The use of the horse-drawn chariot in warfare was not a difficult step forward. It may have come with the Kassites; or it may have been evolved by the civilized Babylonians through the application of this new and swift motive power to a type of vehicle already well-known to them.[3] It is unnecessary to expand one's comments upon the tremendous changes which this new engine of war created in the field of military strategy. It greatly increased the mobility of armies. It brought into tactical manoeuvers the possibility of concentrating immediately at the essential point of a battlefield a force which might often determine the outcome of a battle. On *a priori* grounds it seems reasonable to attribute, as has recently been done,[4] the conquest and the long control of the Babylonian lowlands by the Kassites to the greater mobility which their armies possessed over hostile armies through the use of the horse in warcraft.

Almost immediately this new war engine, the horse-drawn chariot, was adopted by the Semitized Hyksos who invaded Egypt from Syria in the eighteenth pre-Christian century and ruled in Egypt for about two hundred years. With them the horse came into Egypt. In the national Egyptian uprising of the early sixteenth century the Theban Pharaohs adopted the use of horse and chariot in their wars of liberation. The

[1] J. L. Myres in *C. A. H.*, vol. I, p. 107.

[2] The Louvre has several small representations in terra cotta of primitive "stool chariots" discovered in the earliest strata of the Acropolis of Susa. These are depicted in the book of Commandant Lefebvre des Noëttes, *La Force Motrice Animale* (Paris, 1924), plate III. They are to be dated at about 3000 B. C.

[3] *C. A. H.*, vol. I, p. 501. It is possible, as suggested by Bruno Meissner, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 217, that the early Sumerians had used war chariots drawn by donkeys. If this is true they may have been fast animals, bred presumably from native wild asses.

[4] Sir E. A. Wallis Budge, *Babylonian Life and History*, 2nd ed. (1925), p. 39.

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chariot proved of great service to Egyptian warfare in its imperialistic advance into Syria and in the maintenance of Egyptian control there in the time of the Empire.[1] Thereafter the horse and chariot appear frequently in the annals of the Syrian campaigns of Thothmes III[2] and in hunting enterprises in Egypt under Thothmes IV and Amenhotep III.[3] These hunting trips seem to have been semi-military in their organization. One other outstanding and highly important development, which followed hard upon the exploitation of the horse in warfare, may reasonably be attributed to the application of its speed to the problem of communication between distant places. This lies in the extraordinary increase in the area of direct diplomatic relations and of international communication which appears in the Tell Amarna correspondence of the fourteenth century B. C. Recently this fact has been explained, on its material side, as due to the use of chariot-riding messengers.[4]

It is a strange fact that the possibility of increased speed which lay in the introduction of the horse was not utilized by the Egyptians in their commercial expeditions. Even the Pharoahs and the nobles seldom rode horseback.[5] As far down as 750 B. C. it was still regarded as something uncommon and worthy of special mention when an Egyptian prince of Sais rode horseback and "asked not for his chariot".[6] Only fear for his life drove him to this unwonted feat. Travel was carried on throughout the history of Egypt down to the time of the Persian conquest in the old manner. The common people moved about in the oldest manner in the world, on foot. Higher personages were carried in litters, either slung between

[1] H. R. Hall in *C. A. H.*, vol. I, p. 320. For one of the earliest representations of the chariot see *C. A. H.*, Volume of Plates, I, p. 135 (a). The wall painting there reproduced is of about 1450 B. C.

[2] Breasted: *Ancient Records of Egypt* (*B. A. R.*), vol. II, nos. 421, 424, 470.

[3] *Ibid.*, nos. 813, 864.

[4] R. Campbell Thompson in *C. A. H.*, vol. II, p. 227 *et seq.*

[5] A rare example of a horse-rider, ascribed to the 19th or 20th dynasty, has been published by G. Daressy in *Annales du Service des Antiquités de l'Égypte*, (1904), vol. V, p. 97.

[6] *B. A. R.*, vol. IV, p. 860; A. Wiedemann, *Das alte Aegypten*, p. 200.

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two donkeys or upon the shoulders of human bearers.[1] For well over a thousand years, therefore, the introduction of the horse had no direct effect upon transport in ancient Egypt. The heaviest loads were still drawn on sledges by human motive power—probably the most expensive of all draft methods. Lesser loads but still heavy ones, were drawn by bullocks which remained throughout the ancient Near East in antiquity the favorite motive power for heavy work on short hauls, just as is the case today in the work of the fellaheen of Egypt. The great bulk of the heavy field labor, such as ploughing, also fell upon the bullock. Lighter tasks, such as carrying in wheat bundles during the harvest period, were performed by donkeys. Presumably on long caravan hauls donkeys were used. The speed of the old Pharaonic caravans which penetrated southward into Yam continued, therefore, throughout the history of Pharaonic Egypt, to be determined by the possible distance of each day's journey which donkey caravans could cover. Those who know the present-day kingdom of Egypt will bear witness that this pace is not so slow as one might expect.

Under the rule of the Kassites in the Babylonian lowlands the breeding and maintenance of many horses became a characteristic of the royal *oikos*. The interest of the Kassite rulers in their horses is shown in the customary greeting which they sent to their brother kings in Egypt: "May it be well with you, with your land, with your house, with your wives, with your children, with your great ones, with your horses, with your wagons."[2] Just as in Egypt, the horse cannot yet, either in Babylonia or in Syria, be regarded as an economic good generally affecting the speed of transport in trade or in the travel of merchants or their agents. It was still a beloved and highly prized animal, dedicated to its utility in war and in the hunting sports of kings and grandees.[3]

[1] Wiedemann, *op. cit.*, p. 201 *et seq.* The statuette of a horse rider in the Metropolitan Museum published in the *Bull. Metrop. Mus.*, vol. XI, p. 85, is probably a forgery, according to Wiedemann, *loc. cit.*, p. 200, note 4.

[2] Meissner, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 218.

[3] I have found no supporting evidence for the implication of R. Campbell Thompson, in *C. A. H.*, vol. II, p. 228, that horses were employed by merchants in the Kassite period.

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In the course of the ninth century B. C. we first find the use of light horse cavalry, as an adjunct of the chariot corps of the Assyrian army.[1] In the history of warfare in the Near East this arm of the military service has been of outstanding importance continuously since that day. If the direct value of the horse in times of peace was completely restricted to its use for the rapid transport of kings and other persons of high degree,[2] indirectly it did affect both the speed and the volume of goods in transport through its half-breed offspring, the mule. The use of the mule as draft and transport animal, though known to the Babylonians of the second millennium, first becomes marked in the reliefs of the Assyrian period.[3]

In our present attitude toward war and peace we are prone to forget that mankind, in periods of peace, has tended to cleave to his traditional modes (the *mores majorum*), to remain conservative. It is difficult to grant that wars have been a source of ferment, an historical force and a civilizing agency, that they have furthered invention and the adaptation of known, but latent, possibilities; and that these adaptations for warfare often remained as residuum of good to human kind in times of peace. War, the destroyer, has also been a great disperser of utilities. Such dispersion of an economic asset by wars may be observed in the spread of the camel as a transport animal. Native to the desert spaces of Arabia and south central Asia, it was known in the third millennium to the Sumerians, but not used by them. The name they gave to it was the "ass of the sea-lands".[4] Presumably these "sea-lands" would be the

[1] Depicted on the bronze reliefs from the gates of Shalmaneser III in L. W. King, *Bronze Reliefs of Shalmaneser King of Assyria, B. C. 860-825* (London, 1915), plates V, XVII, XLIII. These same reliefs show that the wasteful method of using men for draft and transport service was still largely employed. See plate XIII and other plates.

[2] "Without me, the galloping horse, no king, governor, lord or prince goes forth on highway or path", Meissner, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 217. On the bronze reliefs from the gates of Shalmaneser (King, plate LXXIV) cavalry often appears as the bodyguard of the king. For the horse as an animal of luxury, see A. Köster in *Lehmann-Haupt Festschrift*, vol. I, p. 158.

[3] Meissner, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 219. See A. H. Layard, *Ninevah and Babylon*, p. 583, for a heavily loaded two-wheeled cart drawn by mules.

[4] *C. A. H.*, vol. I, p. 501.

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Syrian desert. After the Semites fully controlled the Babylonian area the Semitic name *gamallu* appears. The word appears rarely, however in the Babylonian records; and the rational explanation has been offered that the Arabs kept the trade from the oases to the border towns of the desert in their own hands, and that, as a requirement of their monopoly of desert trade they kept their camels to themselves.[1] Whether for this reason or from mere economic inertia of an undeveloped people, the fact remains that down to about 1000 B. C. camel breeding had not developed in the desert oases to the point of supplying a surplus of these animals for sale to the peoples inhabiting the arable lands along the desert's rim. It was the conquering Assyrian kings who brought the camel into general use in the Tigris-Euphrates region.[2] They adopted it as a beast of burden in war and through their campaigns spread the knowledge of its peculiar advantages in relations with the desert. In the battle of Karkar, fought in North Syria in 853 B. C. by Shalmaneser III against the Arameans and their allies, an Arab chieftan, Gindibu, appeared among the allies of the King of Damascus as leader of a troop of 1000 camel riders. On the bronze reliefs of Shalmaneser camels appear as captured animals in the booty of North Syria[3] and as tribute from Gilzan, a district east of the Tigris river near the Upper Zab.[4] The conquest of Syria, Philistia and Palestine by Tiglath-Pileser III (745–727 B. C.) brought great numbers of camels to his armies as booty from the Arabian tribes.[5] After the capture of Damascus by Tiglath-Pileser, Samsi, a desert Queen of the Aribi who lived in the modern Djof,[6] paid heavy tribute to the Assyrian conqueror in cattle and camels. The 30,000 camels reported in the Assyrian records may certainly be regarded as

[1] R. Campbell Thompson, *ibid.*

[2] Meissner, *Babylonien und Assyrien*, p. 220.

[3] L. W. King, *Bronze Reliefs* etc., plates XXIII, XXIV.

[4] *Ibid.*, plate XL.

[5] *C. A. H.*, vol. III, pp. 35-39; *cf.* Meissner, *Babylonien und Assyrien*, vol. I, p. 220, where Tiglath-Pileser III should be read for Tiglath-Pileser IV.

[6] See *Handbuch der altarabischen Altertumskunde*, edited by Ditlef Nielsen, vol. I, p. 65.

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a stiff figure, no doubt to be decreased by a digit or two;[1] but the fact of the tribute in camels is not to be disputed.[2] Thereafter, in the late Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods, the camel became a military beast of burden in South Western Asia, a regular appendage of all large army movements.[3]

Upon the basis of an increase in the numbers of the camels bred in the desert of Arabia, we can rationally explain the development of the early Arab cultures of the Minyaean and Sabaean kingdoms of southern Arabia and their inclusion within the outer fringes of the Mediterranean world. The former began its development about 1300 B. C.,[4] the latter about 800 B. C. Likewise the movement of the Nabataeans from the desert westward into Arabia Petraea followed hard upon the extension of camel breeding; and the consequent development of the Nabataean culture centering at Petra is roughly datable[5] within the period of more extensive use of the camel. No change in the possibility of penetration of desert Arabia beyond that effected by camel riding has occurred until about twenty-five years ago. The automobile and the airplane have begun to change desert warfare, and fundamentally. Sheik Ibn Saud of the Wahabis, whether at Hail or at Mecca, is no longer unassailable or isolated. An air man might reach him in a half-day out of Cairo or Amman.

Egypt, of course, is not changeless; but the force of custom has always been a tremendous factor in its life, and old ways are exceedingly slow to alter. Though the camel was known to the ancient Egyptians even in Neolithic times and may have been used throughout the Pharaonic period in the caravan trade across the desert eastward of the Nile, within Egypt itself the use of the camel was exceptional, if it was used at all. It does not appear at all, so far as my knowledge goes, among the

[1] A. T. Olmstead, *History of Assyria* (New York, 1923), p. 199.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

[3] See the laden camel in an Assyrian relief reproduced by A. H. Layard, *Ninevah and Babylon*, p. 582.

[4] D. Nielsen, *Altarabische Kultur*, vol. I, pp. 67, 75.

[5] For their history from about 587 B. C. onward see Sir Alexander B. W. Kennedy, *Petra* (London, 1925), p. 29.

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animals used in the hieroglyphs,[1] and rarely upon the wall reliefs of the Pharaonic period. As the animal is peculiarly adapted to successful use in the country and is to-day one of the most marked features of its transportation system, the strange fact of its absence in the Egypt of the Pharaohs calls for explanation. One suggestion offered is that there was some priestly injunction against the camel.[2] Weidemann's idea was that the canalization of Egypt made the animal inadaptable to use in the Nile valley and that the camel came in late in the classical period and in the early Middle Ages, when the irrigation system had decayed.[3] This supposition does not seem to be warranted in view of the extended use of camels under a highly developed irrigation system in the Ptolemaic and in the Roman periods.

If such a prejudice had existed in Pharaonic times, in the Ptolemaic period it had disappeared. For the camel appears in the Zenon papyri of the time of Ptolemy II in regular use as a beast of burden in the Nile valley[4] and in the thriving trade of the dioecetes, Apollonius, into Philistia and Palestine. A Columbia University papyrus, as yet unpublished,[5] tells of the use of camels, in groups of two or four, carrying bricks, dates, mattresses or pickled meats between Gaza and Egypt, and carrying wheat in Galilee. When the camels traveled without a load they were said to be "empty", just as our freight cars are; and when they received freight cargoes they were said to have "taken"—that is, they had taken a load.[6] Along with them mules were used, differentiated as "carriage" mules and "pack" mules.[7]

[1] Otto Keller, *Die antike Tierwelt* (Leipzig, 1909), vol. I, p. 275.

[2] Keller, *loc. cit.*

[3] A. Wiedemann, *Das alte Aegypten*, p. 198.

P. Cairo Zenon (*Catalogue générale des antiquités égyptiennes du Musée du Caire*, Cairo, 1925), 59143, with references to other papyri.

[5] P. Columbia Inv. No. 205, date lost, but certainly of the Zenon group of documents.

[6] *Ibid.*, No. 205, line 2. *Cf.* M. Schnebel, *Die Landwirtschaft im hellenistischen Aegypten* (Munich, 1925), pp. 332-33. The instances of their use have increased since Schnebel's book appeared.

[7] P. Cairo Zenon, vol. I, no. 59008, ll. 11-14.

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Argumenta ex silentio are dangerous things—whether one draws a positive or a negative conclusion out of silence. We know relatively little about Egyptian history and the life of the country in the time of the Assyrian and Persian dominations from the sixth pre-Christian century to the triumphant entrance of Alexander in 332 B. C. The chances are, however, that the introduction of the camel into the economic life of Egypt came with the conquering armies of the Assyrians. If this assumption is incorrect, then surely it came in with the Persian armies of Cambyses. For Cyrus the Great, when he began to take over the dominion of the shattered Assyrian Empire, already used camels as an important part of his commissariat and equipment train,[1] and Herodotus states that there was a camel corps of Arab fighting men in Xerxes' army.[2] It is, therefore, apparent that the Persians had adopted the use of the camel when they took over the dominion of the old Assyrian Empire in the sixth century. From the Persians Alexander adopted the camel for its use in desert travel, at least.[3]

It is not surprising to find that the camel never appeared in the countries of Southern Europe, except as an exotic animal, to be shown in the pomp and ceremony of triumphal processions and games. Climatic conditions offer a satisfactory explanation of this fact. It is astonishing, however, how slowly its use extended along the shore of North Africa westward into Numidia; for despite the chill weather of the winter months, it is well adapted to the country and is much used by the Berber tribes today in their seasonal movements in search of work. There is only the one record that King Juba of Numidia, in his support of the senatorial forces in 46 B. C. against Julius Caesar, had camels in his army.[4] Pliny the Elder, who had

[1] At the battle with Crœsus before Sardes in 546 B. C., Herodotus, I, 80.

[2] Herodotus, VII, 87.

[3] Quintus Curtius Rufus, IV, 7, 12 mentions the fact that Alexander used camels on his renowned visit to the oasis of Siwah. In his *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926), Rostovtzeff has reproduced (plate XXXVII) terracotta figures of laden camels which were found in Syria and Asia Minor. They indicate extensive use of the camel as a transport animal in those districts in the period after Alexander.

[4] *Bellum Africanum*, 68, 4.

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visited North Africa in person, fails to mention the camel as a feature of the life of the country. Only in the fourth century of our era does it become common there.[1] Two suggestions for this situation present themselves—local custom combined with inertia, and the lack of any large movement of conquering armies westward in North Africa from the camel-using countries of Egypt and Syria.

The Romans first became acquainted with the use of the camel as a transport and fighting branch of military service in their war with Antiochus the Great of Syria. At the battle of Magnesia in 190 B. C. they met, without apparent difficulty, an Arab camel corps of *sagittarii* aligned with the scythe-bearing chariots of Antiochus.[2] They made no attempt to incorporate this branch of the service of the Hellenistic monarchs into their armies. Nor was such a development to be expected, since they carried on no wars which required desert penetration until the time of Augustus. Even then it came to them only through the bitter experience of necessity. In 27 B. C. Augustus sent his ill-starred prefect of Egypt, Aelius Gallus, upon an expedition along the Red Sea coast of Arabia. It has never been easy for generals trained in the school of European warfare to forget their training when thrown into desert warfare and adopt the methods of the Bedouin. Aelius Gallus was no exception to this rule. In the second year of his campaign he was compelled to use camels for the transportation of drinking water for his troops. The geographer, Strabo, who is our chief source of information, was a friend of Gallus and an ardent defender of his memory. Strabo attributes this necessity to the malignity of the Arab guides of Gallus.[3] Friendship has blinded him to the fact that the information service of Gallus was singularly inadequate for the difficult task which he had

[1] Stephane Gsell, *L'Afrique du Nord*, vol. I, pp. 59-61. *Cf.* the representation, taken from a monument at Ghirza, of a camel used in ploughing, in Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, p. 284. Rostovtzeff assigns it to the fourth century.

[2] Livy, XXXVII, 40, 12.

[3] Strabo, XVI, 781.

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undertaken.[1] Once disembarked upon land, his primary need was a service of supply by means of camels.

To sum up the results thus far attained: By 600 B. C. three new motive factors had come into the cultural areas about the eastern Mediterranean which contributed to the development of travel and transport by land. These were: the horse, the mule and the camel, with the restriction to be observed that the horse was not used except for rapid communication and rapid travel.

Good roads are needed in order to take the best advantage of the superior speed of the horse. The building and maintenance of good highways, covering and joining together distant stretches of territory, is generally attributed to the Persians. The first official postal system, based upon the speed of horses used in relays over good roads, if it was not taken over by them from the Assyrians, must also be ascribed to the Persians. Rapid dispatch of official communications was made possible over the roads perfected by Darius I. Herodotus has given us a somewhat rough and ready sketch of the system as it operated in his time in Persia.[2] According to Xenophon,[3] as well as Herodotus, the stations were established at intervals determined by the distance to be covered by a running horse in a day. At these points relays of horses were placed. The resultant rapidity of official communication would be at the gait of a highly bred horse at his best speed over a day's stretch. If necessity urged, as Xenophon has stated, a night relay could be added to that by day. The chief political result of this increase in speed lay in the greater possibility of centralization of administrative power.[4] To this result we must ascribe, in part, the compactness and the endurance which characterized the Persian Empire in the face of its heterogenous composition and its sprawling length from east to west. We have the proof that this government postal service went over directly to Alexander

[1] *Cf.* J. G. Milne, *Egypt under Roman Rule* (3d ed., London, 1924), p. 8.

[2] Herodotus, VIII, 98.

[3] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia,* VIII, 6. 17.

[4] *C. A. H.,* vol. IV, p. 193. Xenophon himself was conscious of the political necessity of this postal service. See *Cyropaedia, loc. cit.*

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and his successors. This is found in the statement of Diodorus[1] that Antigonus the One-Eyed reorganized the Persian postal system in Western Asia during the period of his supremacy among the successors of Alexander of Macedon.

In their Egyptian satrapy, also, the Persians had evidently established their rapid post system. At least we find it as a going organization in Ptolemaic Egypt. A papyrus fragment of the time of Ptolemy II out of a daybook kept at a post station, located on the Nile somewhere in Middle Egypt, has come down to us.[2] Friedrich Preisigke, a German postal official who devoted the latter part of his life in the most useful manner to the study of the Greek papyri, has made a keen analysis of this document.[3] It is scarcely possible to reject Preisigke's conclusion that the Ptolemaic postal system was the direct continuation of the express post established under Persian rule in Egypt. Because of the greater speed in communication attainable by land over that by water, it was organized as a highway express by ridden horses, not as a mail-boat system. It was entirely devoted to the official service. In the station-master's daybook information was noted down as to the time at which letters or rolls arrived; from what carrier received, number of rolls and number of letters, name of addressee, direction from which they came (whether from north or south);[4] and name of carrier who received them for further transport. In a general way, therefore, the system corresponded to our registered letter delivery. Preisigke has further established a strong probability that the system worked upon a definite schedule, of four daily transfers at this particular station. One post traveling from south to north arrived in the morning; at midday one from north to south; in the evening one in each direction. He has further drawn the conclusion that the relays were based upon a six-hour journey for horse and rider.[5]

[1] Diod. Sic., XIX, 57, 5. *Cf.* U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge der Papyruskunde,* vol. I, p. 372.

[2] P. Hib. (Grenfell and Hunt, *Hibeh Papyri,* London, 1906), no. 110, verso.

[3] Published in *Klio,* vol. VII, pp. 247-277.

[4] Given as "from up-stream", or "from down-stream".

[5] *Klio,* vol. VII, p. 251.

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From letters and documents which passed through the office of an astute Carian Greek named Zenon, supplemented by other documents of the period, one might paint a series of pictures showing the surprising facility of travel to and fro, by land and by sea, in and about the land of Egypt. This picture might be made rich in its details; and it would not be devoid of social and economic interest. From all points of the Greek *oikoumene*, men of adventurous spirit flocked into Egypt. Scholars, poets, artists were among these; but chiefly they were men whose ambition was to get on financially. From Caunus in Caria came the relatives and friends of Zenon.[1] From the Thracian seaboard Greeks came in great numbers, from the towns of lower Asia Minor, from Cyrene, some even from Sicily.[2] Men came on diplomatic mission to the court of Ptolemy Philadelphus from the distant Bosporan kingdom in lower Russia and from Argos and were duly entertained by visits to the sights of ancient Egypt and the up-to-date wonders of the Greco-Egyptian economic civilization of the day. On Mesore 1st (the 21st of September), 254 B. C., Apollonius, the Treasurer of Egypt, wrote a letter in haste to Zenon.[3] Zenon received the letter upon the next day and was careful to note the exact time of its receipt in his docket upon the front of the letter which bore the address. The docket reads: "Year 32. Mesore 2nd. Apollonius. 10th hour. Regarding the vehicles for the ambassadors from Paerisades and for the Argive envoys." On no other one of the documents or letters received by Zenon, of those now published, have I been able to find any other notation of the exact hour of receipt in the

[1] M. Rostovtzeff, *A Large Estate in Egypt in the Third Century B. C.* (Madison, Wis., 1922), pp. 182-183.

[2] *Cf.* Fritz Heichelheim, *Die auswärtige Bevölkerung im Ptolemäerreich* (Leipzig, 1925).

[3] See the London papyrus published by H. Idris Bell in *Symbolae Osloenses* (1927), fasc. 5. Walter Otto, in *Abh. der Bayer. Akad., phil.-hist. Kl.*, vol. XXXIV, no. 1 (1928), pp. 44-47, expresses the conviction, contrary to Bell's view, that the *theoroi* from Argos mentioned in this letter were actually a religious embassy which had been sent to attend the celebration of the *Ptolemaeia* in the early part of 254 B. C. and had stayed in Egypt until the date of the letter, namely Sept. 21.

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customary docket of its content.[1] On Phamenoth 30th (i. e. in May) of this same year (32 of Ptolemy II), Apollonius was in the Fayum, or near it, and wrote two letters to Zenon in regard to a petition of some peasants over which he, as Dioecetes, must exercise jurisdiction. In the one he stated that he was himself too busy to come to Philadelphia, but that he would send Peton, a judge, to hear a certain case on the morrow.[2] In the second letter he ordered Zenon to lodge Peton and give him supplies for one day.[3] On the address side of these two letters Zenon's dockets are fully preserved. Zenon has noted the year, month and day of receipt, but not the hour. Obviously these two letters came by private messenger.

In the case of the letter regarding the reception of the ambassadors, Zenon's care in noting the exact hour of receipt of the letter is, therefore, not to be explained by the mere fact that it came from his master and patron, the State Treasurer Apollonius. The distance from Alexandria to Medinet-el-Fayum by the railway of today is 210 miles, including the crossing from the left Nile bank into Cairo to and fro. By the ancient direct route as drawn on the Peutinger map, via Nikiou and Memphis to Isiou at the entrance of the Fayum, the distance was about 310 kilometers[4] or 184 miles. Roundly, therefore, we may take it to have been a 200-mile stretch from Alexandria to Philadelphia in the Fayum. This distance could readily have been covered by the express post with its six-hour relays so as to reach Zenon at the 10th hour (about three o'clock) of the second day. We have only to assume that Apollonius had sent off his letter from Alexandria with the early post of Mesore 1st,[5] and to recall that the Ptolemaic express

[1] The editor has assumed that Apollonius must have been somewhere near the Fayum because the letter was received upon the day following its dispatch. Under the usual conditions of private communication this would be correct.

[2] P. Cairo Zenon, vol. II, no. 59203.

[3] *Ibid.*, no. 59204.

[4] See the charts of Konrad Miller, *Itineraria Romana* (1916), p. 863 *et seq.* The distances given on the Peutinger Table for the Nile route above Memphis are confused and unreliable. See K. Miller, *Die Weltkarte des Castorius* (Ravensburg, 1887), p. 108.

[5] The riders of the early American "Pony Express" from Saint Joseph, Mis-

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traveled by night as well as by day.[1] The London Papyrus recently published by Bell is, in my opinion, unique in its character—an original letter, which traveled from Alexandria to Philadelphia in the Fayum by the Ptolemaic official express mail. The content of the letter gives a clear idea of the forms of travel by land: of important personages, by chariot; of their retinue, by less pretentious types of wheeled vehicles. The baggage was carried on pack mules. The visitors were presumably coming from Alexandria, by Nile boats and by canal, to a canal port in the Fayum called Ptolemais. The letter reads:

> Apollonius to Zenon greeting. As soon as you may have read the letter, send to Ptolemais the chariots and the other carriages and the pack mules for the ambassadors of Paerisades and the envoys from Argos whom the king has sent to see the sights of the Arsinoite nome; and see to it that the vehicles do not come too late for their need. For at the time of writing you they had already started up the river. Farewell. Year 32, Panemus 26th, Mesore 1st.

From other documents of the Zenon group one gains an idea of the state and comfort in which the Greek and Macedonian ruling class traveled in Egypt. When the Treasurer-General, Apollonius, made an official tour of inspection he and his retinue sailed in a small flotilla of Nile boats.[2] They carried the necessary supplies for an extended trip, including silverware for the table in a special storeroom, with its own overseer; steward's supplies in a special storeroom, with a recording office connected with it for the record of its disbursements; two groups of horses for travel inland from the Nile—one of these for Apollonius and his close retainers and one for Amyn-

souri, to San Francisco at first averaged eight miles an hour, over a 75-mile, or twelve-hour, distance. See *The Century*, vol. LVI, p. 889. On the six-hour stretches and the level roads of Egypt a constant average of seven miles per hour is surely a minimum of speed to expect.

[1] According to Preisigke, *Klio*, vol. VII (1907), p. 254.

[2] P. Cornell, 1, in Westermann and Kraemer, *Greek Papyri in the Library of Cornell University* (New York, 1926).

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tas, a man evidently high in Apollonius' service at that time.[1] A special cook accompanied the expedition. There were three accounting offices on the fleet with an accountant for each. To these, when stress of work demanded, extra accountants were added.[2] There were two regular letter writers. There was a bath steward, and a dispenser of lamp oil, whose supplies included only castor oil (*kiki*). Sesame oil, which was of finer quality than the *kiki*, was doled out by another steward. It is the account of disbursements kept through two full months by the *kiki* steward which gives us such detailed knowledge of this trip of Apollonius.

Upon the general model of the government postal service described above, Augustus Caesar established the *cursus publicus* of his Roman imperial organization. A report made by a Chinese ambassador who was sent into the Roman Empire at the end of the first century after Christ gives us an impression of its efficiency. The condition of the roads and the milestones and the spacing of the postal stations and inns attracted his admiring attention.[3]

From the point of view of motive power all the essential and fundamental elements of the ancient systems of land transport and communication had reached their full development in the Hellenistic period. One other factor tended to facilitate the use of the transportation means then existing. This resulted from the contribution made by the Greeks to the science of surveying. From a statement made by the geographer Strabo we conclude that the chart of Asia drawn by Eratosthenes in the third century B. C., as a part of his new map of the inhabited world, was based upon information furnished by the road-surveyors who accompanied the army of Alexander.[4]

[1] *Cf.* P. Cairo Zenon, no. 59030, where Amyntas has been ordered by Apollonius to send some horses for his use. Though the writer's name is lost the letter has been assigned to Amyntas by Edgar on identification of the hand with that of no. 59039.

[2] P. Cornell, I, lines 95-103, 115-117, 123-125.

[3] See the translation by Fr. Hirth, *China and the Roman Orient*, pp. 43, 44, 70.

[4] The Greek word for these surveyors is *bematistai*. For Eratosthenes' reliance upon the official records with respect to the distances upon the highways of India, see Strabo, II, 2, 7.

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The map of the *oikoumene* drawn by Eratosthenes included eight parallels of latitude and seven meridians of longitude.[1] This development in cartography under the hands of Eratosthenes, based upon the work of his two Greek predecessors, Anaximander and Dicaearchus, put into visual form the results of the geographic discoveries of the period of Alexander so that these could be readily comprehended by the layman. It was due to this development of cartography that the use of maps became so important under the Empire. A recent writer goes so far as to affirm that "the Empire governed the world by using them."[2] Recent investigation has made it probable that a large highway map of the Roman Empire was prepared at Rome by order of the Emperor Caracalla[3] at the same time at which the *Forma Urbis* was drawn.[4] In the Roman military service of the Empire Roman army officers of high command were furnished with rough maps of the regions through which they were to lead their troops. This fact has recently become assured by the discovery at Doura, a Roman military post upon the Euphrates River, of a rough map painted on leather, giving certain military stations along a Roman road stretching around the Black Sea and down into Armenia.[5] The distances between the stations are given in *milia*. The map seems to have belonged to some soldier of the Roman troops serving at Doura towards the middle of the third century A. D. Wishing to have a record of his travels with the army he had obtained permission to copy the stations at which he had stopped from the military maps available in his legion and had used his crudely painted copy as the cover of his dress-parade shield.

[1] H. F. Tozer, *History of Ancient Geography* (Cambridge, 1897), p. 181.

[2] M. P. Charlesworth, *Trade Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge, 1924), p. 13.

[3] Otto Cuntz, *Die Geographie des Ptolemaeus* (Berlin, 1923), p. 137, with reference to the investigations of W. Kubitschek.

[4] The fragments of the Forma Urbis are now in the Capitoline Museum at Rome.

[5] See Franz Cumont, "Fragment de bouclier portant une liste d'étapes", *Syria*, vol. VI (1925), pp. 1-15, particularly pages 14-15, with reproduction in colors and references. Cumont's admirable commentary contains references to the scanty material upon the use of maps in Roman imperial times.

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We are completely lacking in any precise proof from antiquity as to whether such highway maps, with indications of the distances between important stations, were made available for the use of private persons in their commercial travels by land. Maps were in use in the schools—of that we are certain.[1] For trade voyages in distant waters, pilots' guides were surely compiled in the first century after Christ. But by land the comprehensive system of Roman milestones within the bounds of the Empire and the clearly marked character of the highways may well have sufficed for all practical purposes.

One other factor of inland transport and travel was of vital importance in ancient economic life in those areas where geographic conditions permitted its application, namely, river and canal traffic. In the basins of the Nile and the Euphrates and Tigris the productivity of the land made arable by silt deposits was dependent solely upon the rivers and the use of their waters by irrigation systems. What the rivers and the irrigation canals produced, they bore patiently and easily upon their backs to distant destinations. In the early days of Sumerian-Babylonian and Assyrian development, down to the time of Persian highway construction, and throughout the Pharaonic period in Egypt, the importance of the inland waterways cannot be overestimated. In the consideration of this subject it must be noted that, under a modern computation of cost of ancient water transportation, in both of these areas it would be exceedingly low, because the original expenditure for construction would be budgeted against agricultural production rather than against transportation. The lower cost of water transport of goods in Egypt over land transport, even under the developed system of roads which existed under the rule of Ptolemais and the Romans, was still marked: and the officials were completely conscious of it. An official letter of the third century B. C. deals with the arrest, in Egypt, of two ship-carpenters who had been assigned to the task of putting into condition some freight boats. The boats in question were to be used in the transport of government grain. An official wrote that the

[1] See W. Kubitschek's article on "Karten" in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, vol. XIX, pp. 2121-2122.

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chief of police should be ordered to release the two men. Otherwise, he says, it might be necessary to transport the grain by land; and he points out that the cost would be five drachmas dearer by land for each unit of 100 artabas.[1] The lack of a date on this document makes it impossible to reckon the difference in exact percentage. It is safe, however, to assume that it was five per cent or somewhat below that.[2] Certainly it was not higher.

The lack of development of river traffic and canal construction among the Greeks is readily explained by a glance at the map of the Greek Peninsula. In the peninsula itself there are few important navigable rivers. In compensation nature had provided Greece with numerous bays which cut deeply into the land, furnishing access both east and west and north and south into the country, and obviating in large measure the necessity of canal-building. From north to south along the eastern coast the Euripus furnished a protected waterway for shipping which passed between Euboea and the mainland. This was the regular route of the traffic from the south to Thracian lands. Of still greater importance was the complete intersection of the middle of the penisula from east to west, except for a distance of four miles, by the Gulf of Corinth and the Saronic Gulf. Ancient schemes and attempts to cut a canal through the isthmus, planned by Periander of Corinth, by Demetrius Poliorcetes and by Julius Caesar, and actually begun by Nero, did not succeed. This important lack of the best means of obviating the long and dangerous journey around the Peloponnese was partially met in antiquity by the building of the *diolkos*,[3] a system, presumably of wooden grooves, by

[1] *Flinders Petrie Papyri*, vol. II, no. 20, Dublin, 1893 (Ulrich Wilcken, *Papyruskunde, Chrestomathie*, no. 166).

[2] If the document were of the middle of the third century one could fix the difference at 5%, basing the calculation upon the ratio then existing, that 1 artaba wheat equals 1 drachma. See Westermann, "Egyptian Agricultural Labor" in *Agricultural History*, vol. I, p. 43.

[3] See the article "Isthmos" in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, vol. IX, p. 2259, and compare Charlesworth, *Trade Routes of the Roman Empire*, p. 117. The primary sources for the plan of Cæsar and the attempted cutting of the canal by Nero are Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 44; *Nero*, 19.

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which freight vessels of lesser tonnage could be effectually portaged across. It was even used at times for the portage of ships of war by the Greeks and Macedonians, but always for the lighter vessels.[1] An inscription, found a short time ago in the American excavations at Corinth, gives the information that a Roman general of the late Republic again used it for the transport across the Isthmus of warships; but the information which is contained in the inscription implies that, in this case, fairly large vessels were thus moved.[2] What has come down to us from antiquity is, of course, the information about the outstanding uses of this portage system. The assumption that it was in constant use for small freighters, at least into the imperial period,[3] is a safe one.

The question of the direct connection, by waterway and by land routes, of the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea was of vital importance to the trade of Egypt at all times. No one of the Hellenistic-Macedonian dynasties showed so marked and conscious an interest in trade as the Ptolemies. Among the Ptolemies it was Philadelphus who displayed the most intelligent activity in this field. He rebuilt the canal, made by Darius the Persian, which connected the Bitter Lake, and so the Red Sea, with a Nile canal, thus establishing direct communication by water between Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.[4] He established a new land route from Coptos, in Upper Egypt, to the harbor of Berenice on the Red Sea. Along this desert route stations were constructed at regular distances, with equipment for travelers and for the care of camels.[5] The importance of these two routes is carried beyond the scope of this study by their connection, after 100 B. C.,[6]

[1] For example, by Philip of Macedon in 217 B. C.—see Polybius, V, 101, 4.

[2] Published with an excellent commentary by Lily Ross Taylor and A. B. West in *A. J. A.*, vol. XXXII (1928), pp. 9-22. The editors of the new inscription identify the Roman general who used the *diolkos* as Marcus Antonius, the orator, and assign the event to 102 B. C.

[3] *Cf.* Strabo, VIII, 2, 1.

[4] De la Blanchère, article "fossa" in Daremberg-Saglio, vol. II, p. 1331.

[5] Strabo, XVII, 1, 45.

[6] Walter Otto in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie,* vol. VII, p. 1661, dates Hippalos, the discoverer of the Indian monsoon, and the first merchant who dared to use it, about 100 B. C.

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with the discovery of the seasonal wind, blowing to and from India with unchanging regularity in six-month periods. Upon the combination of these three factors the trade of the Roman Empire with India and China assumed the proportions which are manifest in isolated statements of Strabo[1] and throughout the *Periplus Maris Erythraei*.

The Roman emperors developed, extended and perfected the road system which their forefathers of the republic had competently begun in Italy and in the early provinces adjacent to Italy. In like manner they were responsible for great projects, sometimes for great accomplishments, in the development of inland waterways. In some cases these were designed to furnish artificial outlets for rivers which constantly silted at their natural mouths. In other places they were clearly designed to furnish complete transportation between distant places by water. Augustus, Nero and Trajan, insofar as information has come down from antiquity, showed the greatest interest in such projects.[2]

As might be expected the plans ascribed to Nero's principate were more grandiose than practical, and hence came to nothing.[3] Of the numerous schemes of this kind entertained by Trajan, his reconstruction of the Nile-Red Sea water route was successful. The canal was still navigable, during high Nile, in 710 A. D. and still bore the name of the "Waters of Trajan".[4]

The essential elements in the problem of successful transportation may be reduced, perhaps, to two items. Stated in non-

[1] Strabo, XVII, 1, 13, comparing the trade with India and the east coast of Africa in his own time and the Ptolemaic period, speaks of "large fleets" in his own day plying the Indian Ocean as against less than twenty vessels in the previous period.

[2] The general reference is to de la Blanchère's article in Daremberg-Saglio, *s. v.* "fossa".

[3] The project, inaugurated with considerable pomp by Nero in person (Suetonius, *Nero*, 19; Dio Cassius, LXV, 16, 17), of piercing the Isthmus of Corinth, and the still more grandiose idea of making a direct waterway from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, via the Rhone, the Saone, the Moselle and the Rhine.

[4] P. London, no. 1346 (*Greek Papyri in the British Museum*), vol. IV (London, 1910), p. 19.

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technical language, these are: time and capacity. The object of those who directed transportation efforts, in any such civilized community as that of the Roman Empire, must always have been to reduce the one (time), and increase the other (capacity). They must have endeavored to bridge the space between production and consumption in the shortest possible space of time, as any other directors of transport must do. They must have sought to increase the carrying capacity of each motor unit to the utmost. In judging of the services of the government of the Roman Empire it is essential to keep these problems in mind. Sufficient praise has already been accorded to the imperial government of the Roman world for its energy in perfecting and extending the operation of existing and known transportation and communication factors, within, and even beyond, the bounds of its immediate societal obligations. These praises need not be repeated here.[1] Too little attention has been given to the *difficulties* involved in the transportation problems of the Empire. In this respect two important facts must be faced. The first is that the sources of raw materials used in the cultural services of the Empire covered three of the world's six continents. The second is the fact already pointed out, that all of the motive forces which antiquity could, or did, contribute to the solution of its great transportation task, had already been supplied. No additional force which was basically new could be evolved by the Roman Empire. Nor was any new force brought in until in recent times when steam, electricity and gas were applied as motor forces to vehicles in the transport of goods.

If we grant that the Roman imperial rulers and their helpers did well in the matter of perfecting the existing agencies, the one remaining question is: What steps did they take to the end of controlling and organizing the service of supplies of their great dominion? The answer to this would lead into the long and difficult discussion of the growing tendency of the imperial government to take over the control of the transportation

[1] See the concluding chapter of M. R. Charlesworth, *Trade Routes and Commerce*, who gives a satisfactory summary of these services.

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agencies of its time.[1] The proper approach to the problem lies in the determination of the difficulties involved. These lay primarily in the urban character of the Greco-Roman world. The difficulty of feeding the cities was constant, paramount and never overcome. The solution which the Roman government was forced, by gradual steps, to adopt was that of bringing under its control, in liturgical services,[2] most of the transportation organizations, by land and by water. The service of transport finally became an hereditary obligation upon those engaged in it.[3] The eventual result was bad; but the effort to meet the problem was certainly necessary, and probably, on the whole, praiseworthy. Accepting the viewpoint that the Roman emperors faced their difficulties, on the whole, with an honest and sincere desire to overcome them to the public advantage, it is particularly in the field of transportation that one is forced back upon some conclusion similar to that advanced years ago by Ludwig Mitters in his attempt to explain the passing of Greco-Roman civilization. It was his belief that the building of a world empire by the Caesars came too early, that is, it was beyond the capacity of a large centralized unit, under the economic conditions prevailing in antiquity, to meet its own economic problems.[4] From this point of view the development of smaller national units of government in the Middle Ages was historically logical and necessary.

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[1] This problem has been best approached, in the form of suggestive comments, by M. Rostovtzeff in his recent book upon *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 138, 149, 255, 432-433, 529 and elsewhere. See his index under "*transportation*".

[2] The meaning of "liturgy", in the Greek sense, is that of a compulsory service for the public welfare imposed by a state or community. See Fr. Oertel, *Die Liturgie* (Leipzig, 1917), p. 3.

[3] The liturgizing of the transport means of the Roman Empire took place in the period from the end of the second Christian century to the middle of the third century. Thereafter the tendency toward making it an hereditary burden progressed rapidly. See Oertel, *Liturgie*, pp. 130-131.

[4] Ludwig Mitteis, *Aus den griechischen Papyrusurkunden* (Leipzig, 1900), p. 27 *et seq.* Mitteis emphasized the fact that money economy had never actually taken firm root in antiquity. It is my belief that Mitteis' suggestion must be extended to cover many other items, notably the great difficulty of food transportation to the numerous urban-industrial centers of the Roman world.

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THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND THE INTELLECTUALS

OUTSIDE the ranks of organized labor there are numbers of persons sincerely desirous of promoting the well-being of the wage-earners. Among these, to employ an expression not infrequently made use of by spokesmen of organized labor, are the "intellectuals." The exact meaning of this expression is not generally clearly indicated, but it is fairly safe to infer from the contexts of editorials, articles and speeches that persons in this category are thought to have enjoyed the advantages of "higher education." Unless themselves intellectuals, writers in trade-union publications have been inclined, until recent years, to regard the intellectual as typically "long on theory" and "short on practical experience." Especially was this attitude given expression when any of these outsiders attempted to put into effect measures at variance with the policies of organized labor.

This situation, however, has been substantially modified during the past few years. Organized labor has not, of course, completely reversed its position. In fact, there is no likelihood of such a reversal in the near future. There is nevertheless evident a modification in the attitude of trade unions toward the intellectuals; and this, the writer believes, is fraught with significance.

The earlier position of organized labor in the United States will be indicated by excerpts from editorials in *The American Federationist*, official monthly magazine of the American Federation of Labor. The more recent and altered position of the unions in respect to the intellectuals, as manifested in the *Federationist*, is not set forth directly in editorial statements. Rather, the changed attitude is to be inferred from the *absence* of the occasional strong disparagement of intellectuals which formerly obtained, together with other indications to which reference will be made later in this article.

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Question may arise whether it is permissible to regard the Federation and its official organ as representing the views of the labor movement in the United States. Important unions are outside the Federation, and, within it, the international unions are characterized by certain marked differences. Extreme variations might therefore be expected concerning editorial policies. But such variations do not appear to exist among the official journals of the leading international unions affiliated with the Federation—at least concerning the subject under consideration.[1] The *Federationist* appears broadly to reflect the general change that has occurred in the attitude of organized labor. It does not follow that the *Federationist* has been a pioneer in bringing about this change. There would be cause for surprise were this the case: such differences as exist among the organizations which comprise the Federation, coupled with the provisions of the Federation's constitution which bestow on these bodies substantial autonomy, make it expedient for the official organ of the Federation to exercise care that its views actually do express the sentiments of the majority elements within the Federation. Hence, pioneering in this respect, as with other matters of policy, does not occur until the rank and file are in a receptive mood. Frequently the lead will be taken by some affiliated international. In the nature of the case, the *Federationist*, in order to maintain harmony among not too homogeneous elements, must not advocate policies or express points of view at variance with preponderant opinion within the Federation.

The condition just indicated affords significance to any change in attitude toward intellectuals that a study of the *Federationist* may reveal, for such a change may be interpreted as signifying

[1] The writer feels justified in making the statement above, after having sampled generously the files of a number of unions affiliated with the Federation—see footnote 1, p. 396 *infra*. The case of the *Advance*, weekly magazine of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, an unaffiliated organization, is worth noting here. This well-edited journal has always freely published articles by the intellectuals and has never evidenced the suspicion of them which at one time marked the *Federationist* and many other labor journals. In this, as in other attitudes and policies, the Amalgamated has done pioneer work for the American labor movement.

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a corresponding change in the general labor movement. This implies that when the *Federationist* during the long period President Gompers was its editor occasionally indulged in suspicious and even contemptuous animadversions upon intellectuals as a class, the strictures represented much more than the personal prejudices of Gompers. Most of the editorials to which attention will be directed were under his signature and they inevitably bear the stamp of his personality. It is well known that Gompers' opinion of intellectuals was not always—to put it mildly—complimentary. But toward the end of his career, in response to changing conditions, the views of the doughty little leader show evidence of modification. And there is other evidence that the more kindly opinion now entertained for the intellectuals is not merely a matter of editorial or personal caprice.

Examination will now be directed to the attitude of the *Federationist* toward intellectuals. In 1900 an editorial by President Gompers was published in the *Federationist*[1] in which, after calling attention to the rapid growth of union membership, the assertion is made that "a few persons here and there are endeavoring to foist themselves on our organizations; and without using harsher terms, the purpose sought . . . is not calculated to promote the cause for which the labor movement stands." Restraint, however, soon gives way to "harsher terms" and the persons referred to are characterized as "self-seekers, political hucksters, and financial charlatans"—appellations which on occasion were doubtless appropriate. No direct reference has so far been made to intellectuals, but shortly it is stated:

> If professions of sympathy on the part of some who are not wage earners are at all sincere, they can render the movement much more assistance, and be of far greater service . . . by aiding and encouraging the organization and the work on the outside than by attempting to become members, and in the circles of the meetings endeavor to control . . . the unions. We court the sympathetic aid of all, but we resent the attempt on the part

[1] *The American Federationist,* April, 1900, pp. 100-101.

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of anyone not a wage earner . . . to formulate the policy of the trade union movement.

"The emancipation of the workingmen must be achieved by the workingmen themselves" is an adage long ago recognized by the trade union movement and . . . friends of our cause who are ineligible to membership . . . will best demonstrate their sympathy by restraining their zeal to become members, and seek by their supposed "superior" intelligence to fasten themselves upon the wage earners' movement. . . . That from the council of many comes wisdom has long been recognized, and that this wisdom is much more far-reaching in its influence for good than the supposed "superior" intelligence of the professoriat, the business man, the theorists, the self-seekers or the camp followers.

"'Conservative' economists and professors" are editorially disparaged in the *Federationist* of August, 1911. But no names are given and it should be pointed out that from the beginning the *Federationist* has cited the views of economists, when this could be done to the advantage of organized labor, and has occasionally published articles by them. The editorial, entitled "Overlooking Expert Testimony",[1] contains the following:

College men are frequently victims of a set of prejudices against trade unions which were first voiced by English textbook writers a century ago. These have given the cue to the "conservative" American economists and professors, who solemnly repeat the old stuff about the destruction of machinery in the English mill districts and the opposition to improved factory organization, as if these facts had any practical bearing in these days of the Steel Corporation and machine glass blowing. But we take the professors as we always found them as a class, incurable impracticals who in licking boys into shape are content to supersede the wet-nurse and give way to the base-ball magnet.

Some of their students, as cockerel economists, write up labor subjects for periodicals, and their work gives the knowing ones pain. . . . These chappies, as self-confident as any correspondence school graduate in veterinary surgery, rush into print where

[1] *The American Federationist,* Aug., 1911, pp. 608-609.

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> veterans fear to tread. It rarely occurs to one of them that in order to learn what labor's views or methods or projects are, he ought to get testimony on the subject.[1]

Sufficient evidence has been presented to indicate the essentials of the Federation's earlier attitude toward the intellectuals. On the part of the official spokesmen of the Federation there was a disposition to view with suspicion those intellectuals who evinced a desire to help solve the problems of wage earners. Particularly was this the case when labor leaders observed what they construed to be a tendency to ignore or run counter to Federation policies. Something of a feeling of contempt was evident for the "theoretical" proclivities of the intellectuals.[2]

[1] The excerpts above are representative. Additional citations, with brief mention of their subject-matter, follow: "They Don't Suit the Intellectuals", an editorial in the *Federationist,* Feb., 1913, pp. 128-31, dealing with the criticisms against the labor representatives on the United States Industrial Relations Commission. President Gompers wrote: "It is the spirit of superior intelligence and assumption of paternalistic condescension on the part of some that prevents harmony and cooperation between those who study the field of industrial economy from the standpoint of participants and those who from the outside study the same problems. . . . Wisdom and understanding do not always accompany diplomas or degrees or attach themselves to endowed chairs." An editorial in the *Federationist,* June, 1915, pp. 430-32, finds fault with the American Association for Labor Legislation because of its support in New York of the Spring Bill. The bill was designed to reorganize the administrative agencies for the enforcement of the New York labor laws. President Gompers states that this difference caused him to resign from the Association. In the *Federationist* for May, 1918, strong dissatisfaction is expressed because certain intellectuals had adversely criticized the personnel of a British trade union delegation to the United States, alleging that it did not truly represent the British workers. In this editorial what is considered the proper scope of the intellectuals' activities in regard to labor is indicated: "Instead of carrying on a wholly destructive policy . . . the true intellectuals have another and legitimate field. They can act as advisers and formulators of constructive plans . . . . to be submitted to . . . . the workers themselves in the American labor movement." Matthew Woll, vice-president of the Federation and president of the Photo-Engravers, editorially expressed the Federation's disapproval of the Committee of Forty-Eight's efforts to induce organized labor to aid in establishing an independent third party. He wrote in the *Federationist,* June, 1919, pp. 517-519: "Organized labor does not want, does not need and will not accept the kind of cooperation that these persons have offered. . . . Labor does not need to be interpreted by so-called and self-styled intellectual advisers."

[2] Further evidence on this point is disclosed in an editorial by Matthew Woll entitled "Labor Will Lead", *Federationist,* June, 1919, p. 513. The editorial was inspired by an article by George P. West in the *Nation* for June 29, 1918.

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But, no doubt, there was also fear that wage-earners in large numbers might be diverted by the alluring presentation of these theories.

This fear goes back much farther than any of the editorials cited or the circumstances which caused them to be written. Not a few of the more prominent Socialist leaders, always looked upon by the dominant elements within the Federation as trouble-makers and would-be disrupters, have been intellectuals. Moreover, within the inner councils of the Knights of Labor intellectuals played an active and possibly decisive rôle. And it was the complete inability of this ambitious organization to meet the requirements of the national and international unions that was primarily responsible for the organization of the Federation in 1881. The experience with the Knights, together with the failure of the various independent labor party movements, were influential in persuading Federation leaders that some of the conspicuous proposals of the intellectuals gave license for branding them as "incurable impracticals."

To understand better the ill-will which developed between labor leaders and numbers of intellectuals, let us examine briefly the main articles in the latters' indictment of the Federation.[1] In the first place, probably a large proportion of intellectuals were convinced that organized labor ought to follow the example of British labor by establishing an independent labor party. Many of this conviction doubtless were motivated by a desire to participate more actively in promoting labor's interests. "Politically minded," they were disillusioned with the possibilities afforded by the old parties; and most of them were and are debarred from assuming an active rôle within the organized labor movement because of ineligibility to membership. Consequently the formation of a new party, hospitable to brain workers as well as to wage-earners, appealed to them. Such a party would bring about acceleration in the discouragingly slow improvement—many believed no improvement was discernible—in the lot of important sections of the

[1] It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the intellectuals are, notoriously, not a homogeneous group; particularly does this lack of like-mindedness assert itself in regard to their plans for social amelioration.

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laboring class. And the intellectuals would be given an opportunity to assume active (possibly leading) rôles in labor party politics.

Allied closely to the factor just discussed was an especially keen interest on the part of intellectuals in labor legislation. True, organized labor, as embodied in the Federation, has sponsored not a few labor laws; but the Federation has been reluctant to look upon legislative bodies as a primary source of improved conditions for the wage-earning class—a point of view distinctly at variance with that of the intellectuals. It occasionally happened therefore that legislation favored by the intellectuals did not meet the approval of the Federation. Compulsory health insurance and unemployment insurance are examples in point. Furthermore, friction sometimes occurred concerning the best legislative procedure to secure an objective desired by both the intellectuals and the Federation.[1]

Another ground for criticism on the part of certain intellectuals, along with some of the more radical labor leaders, was the alleged opposition of the Federation to the industrial form of unionism. Such critics were and are convinced that the old-fashioned trade-union type of organization is inadequate as a weapon for dealing with employers. They place special stress on the advantages of the industrial union as a means of protecting and promoting the interests of the semi-skilled and unskilled wage earners. The Federation has been charged time and again with indifference to the welfare of these largely unorganized workers.[2]

These points of difference resulted in little disposition toward cooperation between many intellectuals and the leaders of most of the unions in the United States. But in recent years a sig-

[1] *Cf.* reference to Spring Bill, *supra*, p. 392, note 1.

[2] This is not the place to examine the merits of these charges or to point out possible extenuating circumstances. Suffice it to say that the Federation denies the charges and calls attention to several large industrial unions within the Federation, the departments of the Federation, the tendency toward voluntary amalgamation of related trades, and to the fact that the Federation as such has no constitutional power to force amalgamation upon affiliated international unions.

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nificant change has come about. Numerous intellectuals and labor leaders, for reasons of principle or of expediency, have buried the hatchet. From all indications, something in the nature of genuine respect for one another is either here or on the way. In the remainder of this article, the nature of the change is indicated and an analysis of some of the major influences contributory to bringing it about is attempted.

An examination of any recent issue of the *Federationist* reveals that a large proportion of the space is given over to the contributions of intellectuals about whom as a class, until a few years ago, the *Federationist* was constrained on occasion to express serious misgivings. The issue of August, 1926, is typical of the altered attitude. There are no editorial bouquets for the intellectuals—to offset the brickbats that at one time were thrown. But possibly the contents of the magazine are more eloquent of a change than editorial protestations of admiration or respect. After the editorials by President Green, there are two articles by trade-unionists; both deal with organization technique and are educational in nature. Their writers, it is worthy of note, represent a type of intellectual developed *within* the Federation. There follow seven articles by intellectuals, two of whom are actively associated with universities. Space is then devoted to an article by the secretary of a bricklayers' local on the education of apprentices. Of the six remaining articles, the position of some of the writers is not indicated; but one teaches in a college, another is engaged in statistical work with a state department of labor, while a third is a state director of workers' education. Of the five book reviews, four are by writers connected with colleges or universities and the writer of the fifth is an accountant. The contents of the number published more than a year later tell the same story. The issue for September, 1927, devotes most of its space to the problem of unemployment. The material was originally presented in the form of papers at the Conference on Unemployment, July 30–31, 1927, held on the campus of Bryn Mawr College. Those participating were guests of the Summer School for Women Workers in Industry. Of the eight papers, three are by union officials and the remainder are by

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intellectuals, one of whom is the secretary of a labor college. The wide practical and theoretical knowledge manifested by both classes of contributors is in strong contrast to the incomplete view formerly subscribed to by labor: that the solution of unemployment lay in shorter hours coupled with immigration restriction.[1]

[1] The writer has examined the journals of a number of international unions in order to check the results of his study of Federation literature. The *Federationist* has been examined from the beginning, whereas the other journals have been examined for the two or three years beginning in 1900, for the years 1913 and 1914, and for the past several years; in one case, that of the *Carpenter,* the journal was examined in addition for the year 1896. All but one of the journals are official organs of international unions affiliated with the A. F. of L. Selections were made with no previous knowledge concerning the views of the journals in regard to intellectuals, with the exception that the writer has been familiar with the *Locomotive Engineers' Journal* for the past four or five years. The basis of selection was designed to include publications of important unions that are also representative of widely different trades.

International Molders' Journal: In the issue of April, 1913 (pp. 308-309) is an editorial entitled "Working Out Our Salvation". It deprecates the activities of "our friends in other walks of life . . . who offer us advice as to how the fight should be carried on. . . . They advise us to be more polished and diplomatic in our language, to never allow our indignation over injustice to sway us from our even keel for a moment. We should endeavor to maintain our rights, but in a . . . kid-glove, parlor-reception sort of manner. . . ." In the same number is an article by John P. Frey condemning the "scientific management" of Taylor. Expressions similar to those quoted are contained in an editorial in the issue for September, 1913 (pp. 752-753), and in an article by Herbert Casson, March, 1914 (pp. 207-208). During this same period, it is interesting to note, there were contributions from economists who had given special attention to labor problems: see an article by John R. Commons on "Industrial Education and Dependency", August, 1913, and one by Robert F. Hoxie, "The Truth About the I. W. W.", December, 1914. The occasional rather mild strictures against intellectuals which formerly obtained, are not disclosed by an examination of this journal for more recent years.

Monthly Journal of the International Machinists: References on the subject are meager. In the August, 1900, issue (p. 421) the editor attacks the 18th- and 19th-century economists for supposedly advancing "the hideous theory that man was a riches-producing animal . . . and that man's entire labor force was expended on making things to sell, irrespective of their usefulness or utility, and ignoring everything in the way of beauty if it interfered with profits." In the issue of January, 1901 (pp. 1-3) the editor attributes most of the advance toward the solution of "sociological problems" to the cooperative efforts of unions. Recent numbers fail to reveal any condemnation of economists for being too much imbued with the view that production is the beginning and end of economics; nor are criticisms directed against other types of intellectuals.

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The present make-up of the *Federationist* is not altogether revolutionary, for occasional articles have appeared from its inception by persons outside the organized labor movement. A fairly large proportion of the material now published, while of interest to wage-earners, does not deal directly with trade union functions and problems. These articles by intellectuals are much more in the nature of information than of advice. But the willingness and almost eagerness to learn from the intellectuals is indicative of a new orientation on the part of the Federation.

What explanation can be offered for this new orientation? It might be ascribed, in the main, to the Federation's growing interest in education. According to this view, the *Federation-*

At the same time, it is considered highly worth while to editorialize on the value of education to wage-earners (December, 1926, pp. 473-474).

Typographical Journal: In former years there was no indication, one way or the other, of any concern with intellectuals. But in the issue of February 1927 (pp. 175-176) under the heading of "Vision of the Future" the editor writes as follows: "Those men who prognosticate for the future are close students of economics and history, and careful thought should be given to their opinions, for after all, as real economists, they but follow the rule of viewing all modern movement in the light of past history. . . . Their knowledge of the labor movement is deeper and more thorough than that of many labor leaders. . . ."

The Carpenter: This magazine reveals an attitude different from that of the *Typographical Journal,* though the difference is more one of emphasis than of contrast. In the issue of August, 1896, (p. 8) it is asserted that "it has been the office of philanthropy from time immemorial to offer up benefactions for the struggling weak; pseudo-reformers have always been ready to point the way to better results . . . but there never has been any uplifting or beneficial reform except such as has come or may come from the efforts of wage earners in their own behalf." The present position? Diligent search fails to discover either praise or blame for the intellectual. Whereas the *Typographical Journal* formerly refrained from criticizing the intellectual and now praises him (perhaps unduly), the *Carpenter,* which at one time had only unkind words for him, shows increasing tolerance in its present silence.

Locomotive Engineers' Journal: For the earlier years, 1899, 1900, 1913 and 1914, there are no references to intellectuals or articles by them. The whole tone and subject-matter make the reader realize why Hoxie in his *Trade Unionism in the United States* (see pp. 105-112) appears to regard the Engineers as an example *par excellence* of "business unionism". The *Locomotive Engineers' Journal,* as those familiar with labor publications are well aware, has relied for a number of years upon intellectuals for a large proportion of its contributions and therefore presumably holds persons of this category in fairly high esteem.

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ist is one of several instruments for the expression and promotion of that interest. But while recognizing the probable significance of this factor, it remains true that whatever may be the main impelling force back of the change, the growing interest in education as it is now manifested reflects an altered attitude toward intellectuals.

A factor contributory to a better feeling toward intellectuals was the higher regard for some of them which developed during the war. Numerous intellectuals in the service of the government came in contact with labor leaders. Some of them were technical experts while others had little or no specialized training. Both types were almost uniformly sympathetic with the organized labor movement and understood the wisdom of obtaining labor's cooperation. The fact that the actions of these intellectuals were in conformity with the policies of the government did not militate against the Federation's giving the intellectuals, as well as the government, credit.[1]

Another influence making for a modification in the attitude toward the intellectuals, is the change in the Federation's point of view in respect to scientific managers, or, as they are at present more commonly called, efficiency engineers. The efficiency engineer is not entirely typical of the intellectuals to whom attention is primarily directed, but the altered attitude toward this specialized group appears to have contributed in bringing about the general modification in the Federation's position. Labor unions were at first extremely critical of scientific management.[2] This was due, in part, to the methods prescribed by the earlier scientific managers and in part to the unfriendly attitude toward unions that was assumed by some of the leading exponents of the movement—notably by Frederick W. Taylor. "Scientific management" and "Taylorism" became synonymous in Federation literature.

But with the coming into prominence of a school of "effi-

[1] Exceptions, of course, exist; in this instance probably the most outstanding is that of Dr. Garfield who as Fuel Administrator strongly antagonized organized labor because of his opposition to substantial wage advances for the miners—advances which other government officials held to be justified.

[2] See *Scientific Management and Labor* (1915), by Robert F. Hoxie.

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ciency engineers", frankly accepting unionism as desirable and seeking to persuade managements of the benefits to be derived from cooperation, organized labor was quick to change its former position of unmitigated hostility. Unconditional opposition to "scientific management" was replaced by the advocacy of "science in management," *provided* always, a "voice" was granted to trade unions in determining the scope of the new methods and the conditions under which they were utilized. Much attention has been devoted during recent years, both in the *Federationist* and at the annual convention of the Federation, to the positive gains in productivity that are claimed to follow inevitably upon the employer's complete and whole-hearted acceptance of unions as institutions fundamental to the efficient functioning of modern industry.[1]

Because of the Federation's growing recognition of the importance of production, together with the high esteem it holds for certain of the efficiency engineers, intellectuals outside the ranks of the technicians have been constrained to adopt a more friendly attitude toward the Federation. Federation pronouncements and policies for a long time had conveyed the impression that organized labor was almost exclusively concerned with the distribution of wealth. Higher wages and improved working conditions were demanded, but typically no special concern was shown over how the funds were to be obtained that would make possible wage advances and better conditions. It was generally assumed that employers were making excessive profits and so could afford to pay higher wages; that high wages benefited industry as a result of increased purchasing power on the part of laborers; and that wage increases often had the effect of making labor more efficient and, by so doing, of lowering unit costs. These results were assumed to occur more or less automatically, following a wage advance.

When doubts began to develop concerning the all-sufficing efficacy of wage increases alone, the way was prepared for an altered point of view with regard to production. This did not

[1] This comparatively new interest on the part of the Federation in production, in contrast to its former almost exclusive concern with distribution, is a study in itself and one which the writer intends to make.

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signify any diminution in the high estimation placed upon the traditional established bargaining devices; rather, that these devices needed to be supplemented by a more direct and conscious approach to problems in production. Marked increases in physical productivity could be attained through the efforts of unions and thus the justification established for wage increases. However, to make the improvements in production technique that were called for, the Federation argued that an essential condition was the complete recognition of unions by employers. Such recognition should be granted not grudgingly but with a full understanding of the benefits to both sides. This newer attitude of the Federation appealed strongly to some of the efficiency engineers. The Federation's position also met a favorable response from another group of intellectuals: those whose approach to the problems of wage-earners came mainly by the way of the social sciences and not, as with the engineers, through a specialized knowledge of managerial and production technique. These "social science intellectuals", if one may so describe them, were the very ones who not so many years before had been the subject of editorial strictures in the *Federationist* and who, in their turn, were prone to find serious fault with the Federation.

Both groups of intellectuals heartily approved the pronouncement on labor in relation to production contained in the Executive Council's report to the Federation convention that met in 1923 at Portland, Oregon. This section of the report,[1] under the title of "Industry's Manifest Duty," makes an eloquent plea, and to many a convincing one, for the wisdom of positive coöperation between management and organized labor. The sympathetic response of the intellectuals to the views set forth in "Industry's Manifest Duty" and to editorials and speeches further elucidating these views, could not have failed to impress

[1] *Convention Proceedings*, A. F. of L., 1923, pp. 31-34. Numerous editorials have appeared in the *Federationist* expounding the ideas officially subscribed to in 1923. Mention should also be made of that part of the Executive Council's report to the convention of 1920 where, under the head of "Constructive Demands", substantially the same arguments are presented; see *Convention Proceedings*, 1920, pp. 86-88.

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favorably many labor leaders; whatever tendency already existed to regard the intellectuals in a more friendly light was given a new impetus.[1]

The Federation in 1925 at its Atlantic City convention gave evidence in another direction, at least by implication, of a growing respect for intellectuals. During the period of adverse criticism of the intellectuals, one of the favorite points of attack was their "theoretical" proclivities. But at Atlantic City we find the delegates turned theorists. The convention promulgated what has come to be known as the Federation's wage theory. It may be summarized: gains in productivity from better machinery and other improvements in the arts, the successful operation of which is dependent upon labor, should result in at least proportional wage advances to labor; otherwise not only is injustice done labor but overproduction takes place, thus inflicting damage upon all classes. There is no occasion to examine this "theory" here. The point of significance is that the Federation gave implied recognition to the need for "intellectualizing". Unsatisfied with the economic "laws" of wages advanced by many of the professional economists, the Federation, through its delegates, itself indulged in "theorizing". This new-found interest was not, of course, in theory for its own sake. Nor was the motive the usual one in connection with wage theory: to explain how wages *are* determined. Instead, the purpose was the very practical one of setting up a principle to explain how wages *ought* to be determined.[2]

[1] Perhaps there should be no cause for surprise in the discovery that intellectuals have not been a unit in throwing bouquets at the Federation. Some of them of a radical bent (evidently due in certain cases to their acceptance of the communistic interpretation of the class-struggle doctrine) have roundly condemned the Federation—or rather, its leaders—for this new type of "working class collaboration" with capitalism. For an able and more moderate statement of this critical attitude, the reader is referred to an article by Benjamin Stolberg in the *Modern Quarterly,* October, 1926. See also an editorial, "A Motionless Labor Movement?", *New Republic,* June 1, 1927.

[2] The interest in wage theory did not originate in 1925. The Executive Council in 1921 recommended, and the convention authorized, an investigation of wage theories (*Convention Proceedings,* 1921, pp. 68, 314). The following

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What took place at Atlantic City can hardly be regarded as one of the causes of the Federation's changed attitude toward the intellectuals. The "wage theory" enunciated at Atlantic City was in part a consequence of the more direct and conscious concern with production which received its best expression at Portland two years earlier; in part it resulted from a growing conviction that wage earners were not receiving their "fair share" of the greatly enhanced productivity that has pre-

year the committee which had been appointed was instructed by the convention "to continue the investigation" (*Convention Proceedings*, 1922, pp. 34-36, 354). An examination of the Executive Council's reports for the two years reveals beyond doubt that the new-found interest in wage theory developed because of the widespread advocacy during the depression of 1920-1921 of "the cost of living principle" as a basis for setting wages — this with a view of bringing about wage readjustments downward. The principle, used in this manner, caused alarm in union circles: theory began to take on a practical significance.

These statements in 1921 and 1922 also reveal that the Federation's interest in production was preparing the way for the wage theory which was formulated at Atlantic City in 1925. But that the Federation's attention to wage theory was originally the outcome of its concern over the advocacy of wage reductions on the basis of a declining cost of living, is demonstrated by the absence of any reference to the subject of wage theory in the Executive Council's report for 1923 and the further absence of any mention of the Committee on Wage Theories. During 1923 industrial employment improved markedly. The general decline in prices had been arrested and there was no longer the widespread claim on the part of business interests that wage reductions were essential. Again in 1924 there was no mention at the convention of wage theory. Reference has been made to what occurred in 1925 at Atlantic City. In the same year there was published by the Federation a pamphlet, *Wage Negotiations and Practices*, by Matthew Woll. This pamphlet contains data from some of the unions comprising the Federation on the method of wage payment, duration of agreements and the degree of control exercised by the internationals over local agreements. No statistics on wage rates or earnings are given and wage theory is not discussed. A foreword by President Green states that the pamphlet is an outgrowth of the action taken in 1921 which authorized an investigation of wage theories. In 1926 a pamphlet was published entitled *Wage Theories*; it embodies an address given by President Green at Princeton University in February of that year. After devoting brief attention to Adam Smith, J. S. Mill and Henry Ford, Mr. Green turns to an exposition of the theory advanced by the Federation at Atlantic City. (For a critical examination of the Federation's wage theory, see an article by Herbert Feis, "A New Wage Policy for Labor?", *Survey*, January 15, 1926, pp. 497-498). At the Los Angeles Convention of 1927, further attention was given to wage theory, emphasis being placed on the need on the part of unions for research and adequate statistics. The term "social wages" was used to denote the principle the Federation desires to see established.

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vailed in recent years. Whatever was the relative influence of these two factors, they combined to induce a realization of the possibilities of giving thought to economic problems to the end that they might be intelligently controlled. The altered emphasis in the Federation's program concerning both the production and distribution of wealth could not help but appeal to various types of intellectuals.

Something of the same nature occurred in consequence of the Federation's seemingly altered policy in regard to politics. It will be recalled that one of the earlier points of disagreement between organized labor and the intellectuals concerned the wisdom of establishing a labor party. In 1924 the Executive Council of the Federation endorsed the LaFollete candidacy and urged the rank and file in the unions to vote for him. No active part was taken by the Federation in initiating the third party movement—a movement which had a much broader base than the wage-earning class. It is altogether probable that an entirely different course would have been followed had either of the old parties nominated a man acceptable to the Federation.[1] But once the line-up of candidates became clear, the Executive Council and the *Federationist* gave LaFollette what to all appearances amounted to whole-hearted support. At the same time, the intellectuals of the persuasion to which attention is primarily directed here—those keenly interested in promoting the well-being of wage-earners and of a distinctly liberal (and sometimes radical) bent—rallied with many manifestations of joy to the LaFollette banner. Hopes ran reasonably high for making a sufficiently good showing in the election to warrant the permanent establishment of a liberal party, if not a "labor party" in the British meaning of the term.

Election results were so disappointing as to have the effect

[1] It was carefully explained in the *Federationist* that the endorsement of LaFollette was not to be construed as approval of everything he stood for or as abandonment of the Federation's traditional political policy of "rewarding its friends and punishing its enemies". Rumor has it that President Gompers was inclined to stand out against the endorsement of LaFollette, in spite of being a warm admirer of the Wisconsin senator. After the election, pronouncements of the Executive Council made it clear that the Federation was not ready to participate in the permanent establishment of a third party.

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of lessening the confidence of many intellectuals in the efficacy of political action during the immediate future. Unless and until, these intellectuals came to believe, a sudden and unexpected turn of events occurs which substantially modifies the political outlook, there is little benefit to be anticipated from the formation of a national liberal or labor party. The existing state of things, coupled with the lessons learned from the LaFollette candidacy, appreciably weakens the former criticisms directed against the Federation for its lack of interest in the third-party idea. This is particularly the case in view of the fact that the Federation's officials supported LaFollette; the Federation leadership can no longer be accused of *always* constituting the most formidable obstacle in the way of the successful functioning of a third party.

What is more natural, then, when disillusionment (at least for the present) obtains concerning politics but when, at the same time, promising new developments appear within the organized labor movement, that the intellectuals should have undergone a new orientation with regard to the Federation? The Federation no longer seems to be hopelessly "practical" in a sense obnoxious to the intellectuals. Evidently it is developing some "ideas" and "ideals" which have possibilities. And not least of all, the Federation gives clear evidence of an increasing respect for the intellectuals.

Likewise the Federation has perceived that intellectuals are not necessarily possessed with an incurable propensity for advocating the "impractical". Their ideas, to be sure, are not to be accepted without close scrutiny but they *are* worthy of investigation. This attitude, one suspects, reveals a much greater degree of open-mindedness on the part of labor leaders than formerly obtained. Moreover, it appears that labor leaders in increasing numbers understand that certain intellectuals, as experts in one capacity or another, have it within their power to perform valuable services for organized labor. Once this fact is fully realized, the disposition to make use of such experts is likely to become more and more pronounced.

The outcome of the present tendency is difficult to predict. Evolution is typically a slow process, subject to numerous un-

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forseeable variables. However, it does appear improbable that in the near future anything similar to the conspicuous rôle played by intellectuals in the British labor movement is in store for their brethren in the United States. The prominence achieved by the British intellectuals is primarily a concomitant of the British workers' interest in politics. This interest intellectuals have done much to encourage; but the basic factors which permit a degree of success in British working-class politics appear to be independent of the intellectuals. However that may be, evidently conditions in the United States are far from ripe for the successful emergence of a labor party and the accompanying prominence of a certain number of the intellectuals who identify themselves with such a party.[1]

But although at this time the kinds of activity on behalf of wage-earners that are open to the intellectual will seldom cause his name to be blazoned forth in the front-page headlines of the newspapers, this does not detract from the importance of these activities. The intellectuals will not formulate policies, the indications are, on behalf of organized labor. Nevertheless, in the capacity of consultants and advisers, much can be accomplished in the direction of making labor's policies effective. And as we have observed, the policies to which the unions are increasingly giving adherence are of a kind to meet the hearty approval of the intellectuals.

In addition to the newer policies of organized labor to which reference has been made, is the constantly growing attention that is devoted to "workers' education". The term is one to conjure with: what are the essential attributes of "workers'" education? Whatever the answer may be, the intellectuals clearly have an opportunity both in assisting to find the answer and in carrying out the details necessary to successful "workers' education". Incidentally, it ought to be of some solace to those intellectuals who are impatient for the time when independent political action by labor will be practicable, to realize

[1] For good analyses of the obstacles to the success of a labor party in the United States, see Selig Perlman, *History of Trade Unionism in the United States,* ch. xiv, and an article by Paul H. Douglas in the *American Labor Monthly,* Feb. 1924 (reprinted in Furniss, *Labor Problems,* pp. 407-415).

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that "workers' education" should be valuable preparation for politics.[1]

Moreover, the Federation's expressed desire to eliminate waste in production and in other ways to enhance the quality and quantity of goods and services, affords inviting possibilities for the intellectual with technical training. This is a field of almost incalculable potentialities and one in which experts sympathetic with labor and the wage earners, themselves possessed of a great fund of technical knowledge, should find much ground for increasing mutual respect.

The tendency now unmistakably present for numbers of intellectuals and labor leaders to be drawn together in closer coöperation may be diverted or suffer a setback. Temperamentally intellectuals and labor leaders are typically different. Possibly such differences as exist are largely those of training and experience. In any case, it is evident that continued tolerance and open-mindedness are called for if the present degree of coöperation and goodwill is to be maintained and extended. Intellectuals would do well to give heed to the views set forth in an article by John P. Frey in the *Federationist* for September, 1924. Mr. Frey is the editor of the *Molders' Journal* and for some years has been prominent among the leaders of the Federation. To him largely belongs the credit for formulating the wage theory approved by the Federation in 1925. The article is entitled "Control of Our Movement"; its whole tenor indicates a much greater friendliness for the intellectuals than is revealed by the excerpts in the first part of this article. But Mr. Frey was constrained to write:

[1] The writer is not unaware that participation in politics is itself a form of education, of "doing". But in view of the fact that independent political action by labor is not now feasible, a well-thought-out plan of "workers' education" and its widespread adoption would be of value, should such a time ever come. Education for workers of probably a more fundamental nature and with another end in view—active participation in the control of production—is stimulatingly dealt with by Horace M. Kallen in *Education, the Machine and the Worker*. Education of the kind Kallen advocates would appear to be necessary if the full benefits for labor are to result from the Federation's more recent policy concerning production.

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With . . . recognition of our power, there developed a desire on the part of many individuals outside of our movement to take a hand in directing its policies and shaping its activities. Their motives were not prompted by altogether similar purposes. There were some who believed that their suggestions and purposes would increase our strength to further their theories, or advance the welfare of some reform movement in which they were interested. . . .

If there is one necessary condition to our existence as a Trade Union Movement, it is that we shall retain complete control over the making of policies and the development of the program by which they shall be carried into effect. We cannot divide with others the responsibility which rests with us. We cannot permit others to direct our movement or decide how it shall function. Our movement necessarily consists of trade unionists only, and these must be the only ones who shall decide what shall be our policies and methods. The moment we surrender a measure of directive control to our friends, or to those who desire to use our movement for their own ends, that moment we cease to be masters of our own organization. . . . We cannot escape the conclusion that to permit these friends to pass beyond the position of advisers would be dangerous and fatal to our movement.

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LAND INCOME

MAN toils for a livelihood. This is a statement that is true in all times and places. The fact arises necessarily out of the nature of the world in which we live and out of man's nature. Man has needs, and to satisfy these needs he must toil. In toiling he comes into relations with the external universe and with his fellow men. Toil is cost; the return that he gets out of his toil is income. As evolution of economic society goes forward, all of these relationships become increasingly complex. It is often said that every generalization requires limitations, but it would seem that we have a generalization in what has been said that holds during the course of human history. In other words, by and large, the relationships of man to man in our economic life growing out of his relations to external nature have become more complex with every advance that we have made in our economic life and were never so complex as they are today.

In our older economic treatises it was said that we have three factors in production, namely, land, labor and capital. We may carry our analysis further and introduce other requisites in production; that, however, is not necessary now and here.[1] In treating these requisites of production we have costs, on the one side, and income, on the other side. These costs have been more carefully analyzed and elucidated in the case of capital improvements than in the case of capital in land. Something has been done in the way of analyzing labor costs, and many attempts have been made to show the income that is required to cover these costs adequately. Much remains to be

[1] The writer has no desire to enter into a discussion of fine-spun distinctions between land and capital as requisites of production. There are some differences and some similarities. But these do not preclude treating land for certain purposes, not as a requisite of an entirely different nature, but as a form of fixed capital in some respects different and in some respects like other forms of fixed capital. The distinctions between land and capital seem to be chiefly those of degree rather than of kind.

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done, however, in the way of analysis and exposition of labor costs. Now when we come to land the cost side has received little treatment, and in many expositions of economists it is entirely neglected. We have land treated as a gift of Nature, and then over against land as a gift of Nature we have income called rent. This rent is treated as a free gift and to the recipient an unearned income.

The classical economists, in treating land as a distinct factor of production, narrowed the concept of land to the original, indestructible gifts of nature. Since the land in this sense existed independently of man, the income attributed to these original gifts of nature was costless. What man had to add to the original gifts, in the form of working, waiting and risk-taking, in order to obtain the services of land in a usable form, involved costs in the nature of labor and capital costs.

The practical difficulties of separating so-called bare land from what is contributed to the bare land in making it usable constitute one reason for the author's somewhat different approach in this article. Moreover, it is desired to get away from presuppositions and, indeed, prejudices which are connected with the term rent when used as denoting an unearned income from the free gifts of nature.[1]

[1] When capital values are discussed, in various treatises, illustrations are given of increments in the value of particular units of land. To one who looks at the actual situation in country and in city one is struck with decrements in the value of land, and a little investigation shows that these decrements are enormous. There are many localities in which over the same period of time decrements on some units of land more than offset increments on other units, and, indeed, far more than offset them. At the annual dinner of the Chicago Regional Planning Association some two years ago a speaker stated that in his judgment the decrements in land values in the last few years in Chicago had equaled the increments. Into the accuracy of the statement it is not necessary to enter here and now, further than to say that, while no one knows the facts of the case, the present writer believes from observation and knowledge of various particulars that the increments in the past ten years have far more than offset the decrements in Chicago. Attention is simply called to the undoubted fact that there are large decrements in land values. Is there any relation between increments and decrements and, if so, what?

The presuppositions of economists have just been illustrated. If they had not had these presuppositions of unearned increments, they would have been more inclined to notice decrements in values and to examine the true nature of the

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Hence to focus attention on the cost and income aspects of capital in land, it seems desirable not to use the term rent, but to use different terms as in the title of this article, which is written from the investment point of view.[1] This is done with no desire to add to the existing confusion of terminology in economics. No one can deny that with the ownership of land, or at least some land, an income accrues to the owner of the land. Property in land is sought because it yields an income, or is expected to yield an income. No one can deny, on the other hand, that accompanying the utilization of land there are normally and regularly costs. It is proposed to bring into some relationship cost and income. There may or there may not be a surplus of income over costs.

When we turn to costs we find a species of costs that has been overlooked in discussing the income of land. In the case of credit capital we consider waiting costs. In the case of fixed capital other than land we consider a similar waiting period during construction which involves costs. In the utilization of the land we have what we have designated as ripening costs. No one at all familiar with land settlement in the country or with the development of the city can fail to notice the costly waiting period during which land ripens into use. Take a suburb of a city, for example. It takes time for it to develop until the land is fully utilized. Congestion may be taking place in the city, the suburb may be ideally located, and ideally planned, but its development takes a period of years. Consider some of the implications of this waiting period. We may perhaps distinguish two more or less distinct phases of this waiting period in the utilization of landed property. One is the inter-

income yielded by land. The failure to notice facts of decrements is the more astonishing especially as decrements have been so striking, and in their effects so appalling, in the case of agricultural land over a large portion of the United States and Europe in the past fifteen years and more.

[1] To treat the whole subject of land as a requisite of production in its various relationships is impossible in a single article.

[2] We might, perhaps, also speak of decaying costs; for example, when a neighborhood begins to deteriorate, the holders of land in that neighborhood become subject to the risk of especially heavy losses, owing to the difficulty of withdrawing the capital invested.

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val of time necessary to put improvements on the land for the particular uses which are demanded. This is no different from the variable time element in the production of all forms of fixed capital, except that the interval is likely to be longer in the case of real estate than in the case of many other types of improvement capital. The other time interval is that during which land, considered merely as sites or unimproved fertility, is kept in its present use, a transitional use, or remains idle despite physical availability for some higher uses, until the demand for these higher uses becomes effective. This is the ripening period of land, strictly speaking.

Two illustrations may help to make these two forms of waiting clearer. Here is a landholding of 160 acres, in its raw state, undeveloped for any commercial use. The owner may have acquired the area looking ahead to the time when he could make it a profitable farm. He has invested liquid capital—money or credit—in his holding. He puts more capital and labor into improving the land for farming purposes. Time is required before the original and additional investments can be made to yield any income, to say nothing of an income above the costs. This is the time interval in producing fixed improvement capital. But he does not develop his holding all at once; he improves and utilizes it piecemeal because he already has title to the land necessary for gradual expansion into an economic unit. But the title to this excess land—acquired for future use—also represents an investment of capital even though for some years, perhaps, it is carried at costs exceeding the income therefrom if any. In other words, in this second type of waiting, capital is fixed in unutilized land capacity that only gradually ripens into use after a considerable waiting period.

A second illustration may be found in the case of urban land. Here is a residential subdivider who acquires title to a 160-acre farm on the outskirts of the city. Presumably the owner has acquired the area in anticipation of the time when he can make a profitable subdivision. The holding represents a fixation or investment of liquid capital to an amount larger than is justified by the present use. The capital tied up in this excess land

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might be used in some other way to yield an income from the beginning of the investment. The subdivider may decide to lease his 160-acre tract to the former farmer-owner for continued farming use or he may begin at once the long process of planning, platting, and improving the land for urban uses. These preliminary developments require additional capital, labor and time before the tract will begin to attract prospective lot-buyers—a necessary first interval in the production of dwelling sites. It would be unusual, however, if after these preliminary developments the subdivider were able to sell all his lots at the same time. Such land developments are ordinarily utilized piecemeal. During the interval between the first and the final sale of lots, much of the tract remains only partially developed for residential purposes. This is unutilized, ripening land capacity for dwelling sites; the costs of carrying it exceed current income therefrom; and the cumulative costs may exceed the final sales consideration. This interval of time during which these lots are ready for occupancy and for further capital investments by the lot buyer, but are not taken up, represents a true ripening period.

The writer is familiar with one suburb of a growing city which developed very rapidly, and yet it was more than thirty years before the development was even approximately completed, and at the end of thirty-five years the land will not be fully occupied. If the development had been more rapid, it might have been in many ways less desirable. One familiar with a development of this kind cannot help thinking of the term ripening. One part of the land after another ripens into higher uses. Those who carry it in the meantime have costs, and this is true whether the land belongs to the city, or the state, or private individuals. The writer quotes with slight modification what he said elsewhere about ripening costs.[1]

Broadly conceived, ripening costs occur when land is ripening from one use to a higher use, for it takes time to change from one use to another. They consist of expenditures made, or income foregone,

[1] Contribution on "Land Economics" to Professor John Bates Clark's *Festschrift* in celebration of his eightieth birthday.

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during this period. If the holder of the land is a private individual, the costs falling on the holder of the land are in the form of taxes, special assessments, and interest foregone, in so far as these costs are not anticipated and discounted in the purchase price of the land in question. If the ripening costs are discounted in the purchase price the discounting process is merely a method of transferring the burden of these costs from the purchaser to the seller of the land in question. These expenses involved must be paid or sacrificed, even when there is no income from the land. These costs of ripening use are particularly significant in the case of land because of the large investment and longer period of time required to change from one use to another.

Normally all costs are expected to be paid eventually out of the income from the use of land or recouped in the sale price. With land, however, we observe that many people are induced to meet the ripening costs by the expectations of recoupment out of an increment in land value. From this observation is formulated the so-called law of ripening costs in land utilization: *The costs falling upon the holder of land during a period of ripening use are socially necessary and are properly chargeable to the increment in land value resulting from the change in use.*

Obviously the time interval described above as a ripening period is not peculiar to capital investments in land. In greater or less degree all forms of fixed productive capital exhibit this feature; but in the case of land this ripening period exists to a degree not found in connection with most other forms of fixed capital. Any attempt to explain why this is so requires careful analysis of the peculiarities of land as a type of fixed capital. For example, the unstandardized and specialized nature of the commodity, the immobility and durability of land, the ratio of land value to improvement value, the low rate of capital turnover, the legal rules regarding estates in land and transfers thereof, the practices and customs of those who use land not only as a commodity to be bought and sold, but also as a source of productive services needed to carry on other activities—all these and other characteristics need careful examination in the light of their effect upon this factor of the ripening period. Considered in the aggregate, these characteristics seem to lead to the conclusion that with land this ripen-

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ing process is highly significant in explaining the nature of land costs and income.

One point, however, deserves special mention. Each separate unit of land owned and used cannot be treated as entirely self-sufficient. It is profoundly affected by the uses of contiguous land. The services of a city lot are closely tied to the services of neighboring lots; some are affinitive, some parasitic and some antagonistic. This feature largely accounts for the fact that in developing land from one use to another an area larger than currently needed for profitable immediate use is ordinarily required.

This characteristic of the interrelationships among uses of adjacent areas is also involved in the two types of questions most often asked when this explanation of ripening land is advanced. Why does the farm owner or the subdivider need to carry such a large unutilized land capacity? In other words, is not the discrepancy between the area originally acquired and the area that can be developed immediately at a profit a matter of poor judgment? The second type of question is: Granted that a ripening period occurs, are not the costs incurred in this interval individual, speculative costs? In other words, is the ripening period socially necessary, or even economically necessary?

In answer to the first question, both the farm-land buyer and the subdivider in our illustrations judged that the area purchased was necessary to develop an economic land unit. To be sure, their estimates may have been wrong; they may have purchased irrationally or on the basis of past experience, or observation of the practices of others. Assuming that their purchase was made on rational grounds, they may have figured that a larger area would ripen too slowly and that a smaller area would necessitate another purchase subsequently, at higher cost, in order to protect the original investment. Consider the alternative procedure of acquiring land piecemeal as demanded from time to time.

The tendency of values of particular units of land to "spill over" or become imputed to adjacent units indicates a rough market judgment of economic units of land utilization. It is a

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fact that the purchaser of land must take into account in determining the size of the unit that can be economically developed for utilization. If the choice is piecemeal development, he is likely to find that the acquisition of additional land units will require constantly increasing capital investments as the benefits from the originally developed unit become imputed to adjacent units owned by other individuals. To avoid this additional expense, and or to avoid possible deterioration in the quality of demand for his original holding, because adjacent units owned by other individuals may be put to inharmonious uses, a land developer may find it necessary to acquire a land capacity more than that immediately demanded. This estimate of the economic size of land unit to be developed in the future admittedly is a matter of good or poor judgment and is influenced to some extent by speculative considerations; but it is a judgment that invariably is made, although the amount of unutilized land capacity, the length of the ripening period, and the costs thereof, will vary as the estimate is poor or good, speculative or conservative, and efforts are constantly made to reduce the length and costs of the ripening process. And the reason such an estimate has to be made is traceable to the characteristics of land as a commodity and as a more or less peculiar form of fixed capital.[1]

In answer to the second type of question, one may grant that the costs incurred in connection with the ripening of land fall upon an individual and should be considered in an investor's valuation of land, without contradicting the statement that these costs, or some part of them, are socially or economically necessary. The economic or social necessity of ripening costs depends entirely on whether or not these costs can be reduced to

[1] Similarly in the use of fixed capital in the form of equipment for furnishing public utility services, we find the problem of unutilized capacity looms large in cost calculations. Under ideal conditions, with a static population and uniform daily, seasonal, and annual demand for utility service, the problem (or costs) of unutilized capacity would not exist. But these conditions are obviously contrary to everyday experience in a dynamic society. Even with a well-managed plant, there is today unutilized capacity, involving costs which must be met out of revenues, or else the concern will not continue functioning. Figures of load factor indicate the extent of this relatively permanent unutilized capacity.

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the vanishing point and still meet the effective demand for land adapted to various uses. One may even grant that these costs are too high at present from the point of view of social or economic necessity and that vigorous attempts should be made to reduce them, and still not controvert the necessity of *some* ripening costs. Indeed in some German cities where additional land for residence purposes is developed under public auspices when, as, and if demanded, we find a piecemeal development of the city which reduces the ripening period to a minimum perhaps but which does so at the expense of an inharmonious development and congestion. This sort of foreshortened ripening does not appear to be socially desirable, although from the standpoint of taxpayers' immediate interests it may perhaps appear economical.

Whether land is changed from one use to another under private or public ownership, the determination of the economic necessity of ripening costs hinges upon the balancing of costs and incomes. What length of ripening period and what ripening costs from zero to infinity are economically necessary may be tested, perhaps, by the maximum net income at the end of the ripening period, which in turn will be recognized as the result of the interactions of effective demand and supply over a variable period of time, at variable prices and rates of capitalization. If the result is a net deficit, we may say that the ripening period is too long and the cost too heavy and to a certain extent, therefore, economically unnecessary. But if the market for land absorbs the supply, and still yields a margin over costs, we may say that, in the judgment of the participants in the market, the waiting period and costs involved in reaching this result are economically necessary.

In public utility economics analogies may be found as regards both the treatment of historical cost and the "net deficit theory". Historical cost means waiting, and it means investments of all sorts made in order to bring up a public utility to a place where it yields a profit. These past costs are part of the capital costs upon which a return may be paid. A parallel in public utility economics is found likewise in the "net deficit theory" of determining going value, by which losses sustained

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during the period of a growing concern are capitalized into the rate base. Quite in the same way when we make investments in bringing land into use, and while we are awaiting its destined use, costs are incurred upon which a return must be yielded if the enterprise is to be successful. A super-return of any sort cannot be thought of until the past expenses have been repaid, or until they have been capitalized into a base for interest and profit.

Other costs in land utilization are familiar enough. In the case of agriculture we all know of those costs with which the farmer is familiar. They can be traced from the sacrifices of the pioneer up to the present period. In the case of urban land we have the costs of many sorts incurred while land is being brought up to its present state of desirability. We have not only taxes and special assessments and various public charges, but we have voluntary contributions in time and in money which the land owner makes for the improvement of his city and for making these improvements known. Anyone familiar with the development of a modern city knows that these costs are heavy.

Now there are certain puzzling situations that meet us when we begin to examine the income that accrues from the ownership of landed property and compare the income that accrues from other kinds of property. At no moment of time in a freely competitive society is it clearly more advantageous to make an investment in land either in city or country than it is to make other investments. Those who make investments compare one kind of investment with another and choose that which they think will, on the whole, give them the largest returns. Among investors there are very shrewd minds who prefer investments other than in landed property. It is often said that, on the whole, the Jews are very reluctant to buy land as an investment, and yet they are noted for their shrewdness in making investments. Many of them who have made large fortunes in various kinds of business, for example, in banking, are very reluctant to buy land. This holds also for others. The writer recalls one instance that may be regarded as characteristic of many investors. A wealthy lumberman, who in

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the course of his life accumulated millions, regarded the purchase of land with a lumber yard as undesirable. He might purchase a lumber yard, even if he had to buy a small tract of land with it, but it was an objection to the purchase that had to be overcome on account of other desirable features of the investment. In case the venture did not meet his expectations he could move his lumber yard, he said, but he could not move the land. Now the question which suggests itself is this: If there is a peculiar and special increment in land values coming as an income to the owner, why is it that so many of the shrewdest men in our time prefer other investments? Some shrewd men do make investments in land, but in doing so they weigh one investment over against another and feel that for them the investment in land is desirable. The point is the competition in investments reducing them to a common level of desirability.

As a matter of fact, the competition among investors in land appears to be especially free and open. How rarely does it happen that when a new bank is established the opportunity to buy stock is thrown open to the general public? It goes, as a rule, to a small group of investors who constitute a privileged circle an ordinary man cannot penetrate. Later on the stock may be purchased at an advance, and the owner selling out his stock very frequently has rendered no service except that of holding the stock. The business of the bank may be built up and become very profitable. That means a service. It means that some people have shown skill and have worked hard. When a city is developed and becomes prosperous some people have worked hard to bring this about, although only those who have participated in a development of this sort appreciate how much hard work goes into it.

The writer recalls a conversation with a man who had made an investment in bank stock, and on account of that investment was not able to purchase some lots in a growing and successful addition to his city. The writer remarked, "You made a mistake, did you not, not buying those lots?". The reply was, "No, I do not think so". So he got out his pencil and began figuring the relative returns upon the two investments that were

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open to him. He found that the bank stock had given him quite as large a return, and that without any care or trouble whatever, whereas he would have had to give a considerable amount of attention to the lots, had he purchased them.

When one reads Ricardo, one notices an apparent correspondence between the phenomena of the actual world and his theory of rent. This is puzzling because it does not seem to correspond to the facts of the case as described in the foregoing. Different pieces of land are utilized which give widely different returns to the owner. This is true whether we have to do with agricultural land or with urban land. We have marginal land which must pay labor costs and capital costs. Then we have land which does far more than this, because it yields a much larger return for every unit of labor and capital expended. It is this difference between the net returns on land at the margin and the net returns on land above the margin that Ricardo called rent. Now if those working on the margin receive a return exactly equaling the outlays in toll and expenditures, do not those working on the better grades of land receive more than a return, and is not this return an unearned increment? We have, on the one hand, the fact that investments in land are not superior to other investments, but simply competitive investments. We have, on the other hand, land of different grades of profitableness. If those using the poorer lands receive a competitive return for the expenditures of labor and capital, do not those on the better land receive something more? The adherents of Ricardian economics say that they do receive something more and this something more is unearned.

When we turn to other fields of human economic activity we find a similar situation. Let us refer to banks as an illustration. We find men who receive on their original investments in bank stock annual dividends of fifty per cent, yet we find other men who own bank stock which may give a return of six per cent. Indeed, we find owners of bank stock who receive no dividends at all. We find owners of bank stock losing their property through failure just as we find men who invest in real estate and lose all. We find all sorts of inequalities in the returns made to investors, and it makes no difference what field

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of investment or economic activity we investigate. There are those who have made their investments and get large returns not open to newcomers who must make investment on the margin just as men must take up new marginal land, provided they do not want to buy out those who have already made investments. In this respect, there seems to be a precise similarity between land and other investments. Newcomers must make marginal investments.

The writer ventures to offer an explanation of the differential returns accruing to fortunate investors. These come from certain clusters or groups of relationships. In modern economic society we derive an income out of our relationships with our fellows. In this complex of relationships any one individual has affiliations with a great number of groups, a family, a church, a corporation or several of them, a local community, a labor union, a social club, a professional association. Each one of these groups is held together by some common purpose, and the affiliation of the individual signifies a right or claim to share in the advantages or opportunities accruing to the group as a result of its associated activity. In and through these relationships we, as individuals, invest our energy and our capital, in return for which we have rights to share according to our position in the group and the time of making the affiliation.

A bank serves as an illustration. In various ways an individual becomes affiliated with the group of people whose activity is the functioning of a banking enterprise. The beginning of the affiliation may be the result of an inheritance, contract, or some other cause. The terms of the affiliation will determine, to a considerable extent, the position of the individual in the bank. In various ways, through custom, through skill in serving the group, through contract, many individuals in time acquire a position of leadership in the group. This gives them an advantage over other associates in the enterprise. Sometimes, however, the mere lapse of time gives old members of a group an advantage over new members or those who would like to affiliate themselves. Here is an individual, for example, who buys stock in a new banking enterprise. His part in the enterprise, we will say, is merely that of the passive share-

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holder. If the bank is successful, he finds his original investment becoming more and more profitable. The holders of the old bank stock may go on year after year receiving thirty or forty or fifty per cent on their original investment while at the same time new investors may only have a return of six per cent or less. In short, the relationship of an individual to others in a banking enterprise, may yield a net income (or net loss) greater than that of non-members and of newer members, either because the affiliation was made early in the life of the group or because a position of influence in the affairs of the group has been bought or otherwise acquired. A special differential gain, in other words, accrues to those who "get in on the ground floor".

Just in the same way we have groups or clusters of relationships connected with the ownership of landed property and we find similar unequal returns between old investors and new investors, and between leaders and the rank and file. When a cluster of relationships is successfully getting control of the opportunities which are sought, there is competition on the part of the newcomers to make an affiliation and thus gain a share of the opportunities. But it is a competition which is handicapped, for it is not able to reduce the returns of those who have already entered the group to the new competitive level. We have here given what for lack of a better term we may call a "group relationship" explanation or theory of land income. These "group relationships" are not the cause of land income. They may explain why some individuals rather than others may gain by social changes. The fact that a railway magnate's son-in-law knew long before other people where a certain railway was to run and where the stations were to be located, gave him an advantage in buying land; but the superior gain, if any, which arises from this land is not caused by the group relationships of the son-in-law and others associated with him but by the increase in the service of the land caused by the improved transportation facilities.

It may be noticed, however, that there are certain kinds of economic relationships which in some respects have a privilege and in some respects have a disadvantage. Those who invest

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in public utilities, on the one hand, are in a legally preferred position so far as competition is concerned. One who would establish a new competitive railway must get a certificate of convenience and necessity. On the other hand, the charges are limited to a fair return, and this is measured in terms of competition.

We find in our actual economic world banks and all sorts of business concerns operating with various degrees of profitableness, just as we find men cultivating land and utilizing it otherwise with various degrees of profitableness. In each case we discover groups or clusters of relationships which revolve about an economic institution, a bank, a mercantile concern, a piece of land. The sharpest competition obtains. There is no willful limitation of competition, but the competition is unequal. The dollar invested in one case yields a far larger return than the dollar invested in another case. Note, however, that the dollar is not fluid. It gives a return because it operates in and through the cluster or group of relationships. We have land of grades A, B, C, D, E, and we have enterprises of grades A, B, C, D, E. Competition puts a limit upon returns of all the superior grades, but does not reduce them to equality.

It cannot have escaped careful observers that land as property has been brought by economic evolution to an ever closer and closer approximation to other forms of productive wealth. There is still a distinction between land and movable wealth, but in legal as in economic significance generally this distinction is less marked. In many places where there is registry of title it is almost as easy to transfer property rights in land from one owner to another as it is to transfer merchandise. One evidence of this is seen in the fact that investments in land are apparently not so stable as they once were. We have a continual shifting of business from place to place within a city and from city to city. Even great financial centers in cities may not be quite so impregnable in their location as at one time they appeared to be. While business shifts and land utilization changes, in every case we have not diminishing but increasing inequality arising in and through groups and clusters of relationships attached to institutions.

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In earlier times land might seem peculiar as it was the chief kind of wealth. The rich man very generally in the early history of England was the land owner. As Alfred Marshall has well said, the chief source of wealth, out of which savings were made, was in past times land. There were exceptions in some countries and in parts of some countries but, by and large, this was the case. When one went into a drawing-room, where people of fashion were gathered together in England in the early part of the last century and well on into that century, the rich men one met were largely land owners. Even now in the English *Who's Who* landed proprietors very often mention the number of acres that they own. Forms of wealth have multiplied, and now in any gathering of wealth and fashion in the United States and in England most of those present would owe their fortunes to other sources of wealth than property in land. Land comes to take its place more and more just as one kind of property, as one source of wealth, and in our competitive order its returns are governed by competition in like manner as are other investments.

Land in any usable shape has normally and regularly to be produced. We have the raw material out of which to make land and the supply of raw material by far exceeds the demand for it. It is only in special locations that land has value, but normally and regularly the utilization of the land involves heavy costs, and these costs limit the supply. When one undertakes to bear these costs one must be persuaded that the return will be as great as one could have from any similar investment of labor, capital and enterprise. The investment in supplying land is highly competitive.

Some land can be secured at the expense of water surfaces of the earth. When it comes to percentages, the areas thus secured are very small, but they often have high significance of a social and economic character. It is said that about one-half of the land of Holland has been redeemed from the water. This has high value expressed in monetary terms. It is in other respects of very great significance to Holland that its land supply should be increased by approximately one hundred per cent, or even by fifty per cent. This means something to

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all who believe that Holland, or the Netherlands more strictly speaking, has a contribution to make to the history and culture of the world.

When we come to urban land we have a supply so far in excess of the demand for it that it may be spoken of as practically unlimited. Generally speaking, agricultural land is the raw material out of which urban land is made. How relatively small the demand for urban land is may be seen in the fact that, if the entire population of the earth were urban, that is to say, if all the people of the world lived in one city, the state of Wisconsin would be an ample area. It would provide room for shelter and recreation. The population of the world would not be congested, provided they did not move around much, and congregate in certain areas such as the loop in Chicago.

Let us use as an illustration of "made land" the land made along the shores of Lake Michigan in Chicago. If the area of the land redeemed from the lake is expressed in a percentage of the entire area of the United States or of Illinois, it is not significant. It is significant in percentage of area when compared with the total area of the city of Chicago, and when the value is considered it has vast significance for the city, and some significance for the state and nation.

One consideration that should always be remembered is that when an increment in rent or income is anticipated, it is discounted in price. In other words, the present price is high in proportion to the anticipated annual yield of the land. Consequently, the investor has no assurance of a surplus return upon his investment.

As a matter of fact, the present valuation put upon anticipated increases of rent is ordinarily too high because the increases in rent are not apt to be so large as are expected. This is due to the natural optimism of man, and the tendency of this optimism is to reduce the percentage returns on investments in landed property. We have brought forward, in what has been said, other reasons why investments in land are simply competitive investments, yielding simply competitive returns, and probably, on the whole, less than many other kinds of investments.

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This striving for super or differential gain is a great dynamic force in a progressive economic society such as that in which we live. We enter into relations with our fellows and establish a bank, and we put our best powers into its operation. We seek out relations, and we attempt to render service expecting a financial return. We endeavor to multiply our relationships and to do something better than others are doing. We keep pressing forward, and if we succeed, we have more than a marginal return for our investment. In business enterprises on every hand best efforts are put forward to establish relations in rendering services in buying and selling. Society gets ahead on account of these ceaseless endeavors. Men seek to improve themselves in a multitude of ways in order to secure greater gains. This is one of the reasons for the expansion of educational institutions and especially schools of commerce. As society becomes more complex, it is more and more difficult to meet with success, which means getting above the margin, and men take more and more pains and spend more and more money, or their parents do, in training for economic life. It requires, indeed, a better man and a better trained man to succeed now than in earlier stages of economic life. The pace is fast, and there are those who are left behind and who are called "the competitive rubbish heap of humanity". The driving force is the seeking for superiority, or something above the margin.

In these clusters of relationships about an enterprise we are concerned not merely with external nature but with human faculties. Two men cultivate pieces of land precisely similar in natural gifts, fertility, situation, etc., and the returns are unequal. Whether we are dealing with farmers or with merchants, the inequalities of men are productive of inequality of return. The Ricardians made the mistake, in explaining and measuring rent, of considering inequality of land and leaving out of consideration inequality of men cultivating the land, as has well been brought out by Professor H. C. Taylor in his *Agricultural Economics*.[1]

[1] Ch. xvii, pp. 190-203.

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The role of conjuncture, or to use more familar English words, luck and chance, in our economic life has never been investigated adequately. Its significance, however, in the distribution of wealth is so tremendous that this circumstance is surprising. Economists have given some attention to it, but not enough to say it has had anything like adequate scientific treatment. Unforeseen movements bring fortune to some and failure to others. Of course, other forces are in operation and play a larger rôle. Perhaps economists and others have been inhibited either unconsciously or half-consciously from portraying the rôle of luck and chance because of the fear that they might lessen the incentive to that activity which normally and regularly must be counted upon for economic prosperity.

In a case of land income, one who is at all experienced in real estate operations over any considerable period is familiar with the movements which are wholly or partially beyond the control of the individual. Those movements which are under his control and which can be foreseen are reflected in prices. Frequently investments in real estate return only two or three per cent of current income, even in the case of improved property, because an increase in land income is anticipated. The farming lands of the Middle West for a long period of years gave an extremely small annual return just because an increase in land income was expected. When this increase in income came it was a part of the normal returns upon the investment, but very generally the increase was not so large as was expected, and consequently the returns on the investment were reduced to a percentage less than that yielded by interest on bank loans in the same territory.

Recently, however, there has been a tremendous fall in land values in the Mississippi Valley, and this was generally not anticipated at all, or the expectation was that it would be far less than it actually was. Consequently, there has been a tremendous loss, mounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, which the farmers in the Mississippi Valley have suffered. These gains and these losses, which were so far beyond human control that they could not be anticipated, may be regarded as unearned increments and likewise unearned decrements. There

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are those who say that these are the only unearned increments that we have in our modern economic life. It is difficult, however, to discriminate and to say what is due to pure luck and what to foresight. Some have more insight than others, and what is pure luck to one is foresight to another. Of course, we do have "lucky strikes" of all sorts reflected in movements of value. Sometimes we find them in long swings and sometimes in short swings of values. In the western part of the United States we had a long period of rising land values and in recent years we have had a sharp downward swing in farm-land values.

When we compare land income with other kinds of income we are naturally confronted with the question whether luck and chance plays a larger rôle in the case of land income than in the case of other kinds of income. It may be difficult for any human being to answer this question adequately. During the World War it was not the land owners but others who reaped the vast fortunes, especially manufacturers of munitions and war supplies generally. Some had tremendous fortunes due to luck and chance, because they were in a position at once to take advantage of the enormous demand for supplies of this sort. Vast fortunes are being very generally made as a result of investments other than those in land. All that we can say is that it is not obvious that land is at the present time especially favored with returns coming from luck and chance. On the other hand, those gains when reflected in land values contribute a share in income regularly to the public treasury through our system of taxing land upon its selling value.

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REVIEWS

National Character and the Factors in its Formation. By Ernest Barker. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1927.—vii, 288 pp. $3.50.

How and why is one nationality distinguished from another? What is the real nature of national character and especially of British character? These questions Mr. Barker undertook to answer in a series of lectures which he delivered at Glasgow in 1925-1926 and which he has now revised and embodied in a book. The book is refreshingly free from both didacticism and sentimentality. It is clear and straightforward, adequately documented, and delightfully expressed. It is sane and sensible, and altogether a very valuable contribution to a subject which generally has evoked more words than thought.

The author examines race and geography as factors in the formation of national character but minimizes their importance and rightly subordinates them to historical cultural factors. Culture, of course, has its economic aspects, and Mr. Barker devotes one of his most suggestive chapters to a discussion of relative density of population and relative distribution of occupation as determinants of a nation's traits. The chief emphasis, however, he puts on what he terms the "spiritual factors" of culture — law and government; religion; language, literature and thought; ideas and systems of education. His method is severely historical, for which at least historians can be profoundly grateful. It enables us to understand that national character is fluid and changing, that English character of the twentieth century is different from English character of the eighteenth century and this in turn from English character of the fourteenth century. Incidentally it emancipates us from the many modern metaphysicians who discourse on the "soul" of a people as if it were a holy thing, eternal and immutable.

From Mr. Barker's employment of technical terms, there can be some dissent. He is too vague and indiscriminate in his use of the words "nation" and "nationality". Nor does he discriminate between the purposeful systematic propagation of national consciousness and national enthusiasm in the nineteenth century, which may

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be called "nationalism", and the less articulate and less effective but still widespread national feeling of earlier times, which has been termed "national consciousness". He describes as "national consciousness" or "national spirit" what we would describe as "nationalism", and it leads him to make some very dubious statements. "The self-consciousness of nations", he says (p. 123), "is a product of the nineteenth century". That depends, we suppose, on definition; but certainly some national self-consciousness, in the ordinary meaning of these English words, was evidenced by Englishmen of the times of Chatham and Burke, of Locke, of Elizabeth, of Henry VIII, and even of Chaucer; by Germans of the age of Luther; by Frenchmen at the rehabilitation of Jeanne d'Arc in 1451; and much earlier, by Armenians, by Hebrews, by Persians, by Egyptians. Haven't the most primitive people some self-consciousness of their tribe, that is, of their nationality? We concede that the nationalism of the nineteenth century is something more; but if it be only national consciousness it is not peculiar to the nineteenth century.

What Mr. Barker says of the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century (pp. 123-125) is the least enlightening portion of his book. He mentions political and military events — the partition of Poland, the French Revolution, and the career of Napoleon — but he ignores economic and other cultural factors. He speaks of the "rise of a political philosophy of nationalism" and names Rousseau, Hegel and Fichte, but he does not mention Locke or Herder or Alfieri or Burke.

To be sure, the author is not concerned primarily with nineteenth-century nationalism. It is only incidental to his historical analysis of national character, and this topic itself is a very big one. It is so big that even Mr. Barker's lucid and painstaking treatment of it will invite criticism of seeming errors of commission and omission. There is ample room for honest difference of opinion about emphasis and interpretation.

Perhaps the author has underemphasized the importance of language in the formation of nationality and national character. At any rate he wavers here, and for once his customary clarity forsakes him. On one and the same page (p. 13) he asserts that "a group may form a nation without possessing a common language", and declares that "just because a nation is a tradition of thought and sentiment, and thought and sentiment have deep congruities with speech, there is the closest of affinities between nation and language."

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He is quite sure that the English language was highly important in the making of the English nationality, but he is equally sure that the tri-lingual Swiss are a single nationality (which to the reviewer is very doubtful).

Perhaps, on the other hand, the author has overemphasized the influence of political government. "It is States", he says (p. 120), "which make nations (rather than nations States) until the beginning of the nineteenth century." Which is largely true of England and France and Spain. But what of Austria? "Scotland", the author admits (p. 193), "provides a peculiar case of a strongly marked national character, and a high degree of nationality, expressing itself not in the usual form of a national State, but in that of a national Church and a national system of education." But is the case of Scotland so peculiar? Has there not been a strongly marked national character, without guidance by a State, in Armenia, in French Canada, in Ireland, in Italy, and numerous other places?

In general, the author is soundly sceptical about race and any biological heredity of national character. But there are occasional lapses. He assumes indelible differences, both physical and mental, among the Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean races of Europe, and starting from the questionable premises that the Alpines are agricultural and the Nordics anti-priestly and that the British are largely Nordic, while the French are predominantly Alpine, he argues that "agriculture has always been far less rooted in England than it is in France," (p. 32) and that England "was ready to accept a religious [Protestant] revolution which, if it affected Alpine Switzerland, was more particularly at home among the Nordic populations of Holland, North Germany, and Scandinavia" (p. 45). This is an instance of so hot a pursuit of a theory that mere facts are overlooked. It so happens that those regions of France which have clung most stubbornly to pre-Protestant Christianity — Normandy and Brittany, Lorraine and the North — are most thoroughly Nordic, probably more so than England, which contains a large admixture of the Mediterranean race. Besides, despite differences between England and Ireland in many respects, religion included, there is a striking similarity of racial strains. If France (and Ireland) are more largely agricultural than England today, should the explanation not be sought in known facts of cultural history rather than in untenable racial hypotheses? England herself was largely agricultural not so very long ago.

Though singularly cautious about attributing to the English any

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national character which is not peculiar to them, Mr. Barker cannot wholly escape the spell which has been woven by Taine and many another literary critic and historian of English literature. He here waves a magical wand and brings out of his hat (from nowhere else) three distinctive themes of English poetry — the historical, the religious, and the elegiac. "To face the facts; to be honest with life and your own heart; to grieve and yet to endure and conquer — this is the teaching (and it is neither unworthy nor has it been ineffective) of one of the most characteristic and continuous themes of our literature" (p. 231). Are not the same themes distinctive of the literature of Greeks, Romans and Slavs, indeed of all human literature?

Nor can Mr. Barker resist the temptation to exalt the English Liberal's modern idea of imperialism into an abiding national character. To connect the contemporary "mandates" of the League of Nations with a modern English notion of "trusteeship" is one thing, fairly credible; but to associate this notion of "trusteeship" with imperialist practice of a Disraeli, a Lord North, a Clive, or a Raleigh is another thing, quite incredible.

Certain omissions may be noted. There is nothing on the growth of the British Empire and of the imperialist attitude of mind (except the few remarks on "trusteeship" just referred to), and nothing on the development of sea-power, as determining English national character. In the chapter on religion, there is no mention of Catholicism or its influence since the sixteenth century, even in Ireland. In the chapter on education there is no description of curriculum and text books. No notice is taken of English journalism and none of the varied contributions of the several economic and social classes in English life.

Mr. Ernest Barker's book is excellent so far as it goes and for what it aspires to be. But national character, as the author repeatedly asserts, is ever changing; what it has been in England, and why, he shows in this book. What it is now in England he would set forth more convincingly if he would write another book dealing with the agencies by which one or another kind of nationalism has latterly been instilled into the hearts and minds of Englishmen. It also would be a valuable book, for Mr. Barker is fully alive to the two rival nationalisms which today are universally at grips. "The nation", he says (p. 276), "is not to be discredited because there is much false nationalism abroad. I have sometimes thought that there are . . . sovereigns which dispute our allegiance. One is blood —

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or the idea of a nation as a group of kinsfolk, united by an intimate consanguinity within their gates, but divided from the stranger without by an impassable barrier of difference. That is false nationalism. Another is contiguity — sweet ties of neighborliness, strengthened by old and common tradition, which unite the racial blend that inhabits a given territory and make it a nation of the spirit. . . . That is true nationalism. . . . To prefer the second of these sovereigns, which we call by the name of contiguity, is not to fall into any worship of the state, or to subscribe to any patriotism of flags and 'days' and power and victories. It is simply to cherish a loving sense of the community of the spirit in which we live, with its manifold and immemorial tradition. . . . A patriotism of this order is not a patriotism which is externally directed, either against other nations or against the great cause of internationalism: it is a patriotism that is internally directed to the chastening and sublimation of all that is small or mean."

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

Qui sera le maître, Europe ou Amérique? By LUCIEN ROMIER. Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1927.—v, 239 pp. 12 *fr.*

Lucien Romier has begun where André Siegfried left off. "Who Shall Be Master" is essentially a further examination of the conclusions reached in the last pages of *America Comes of Age*. With regard to the factual situation in America the two authors see very nearly eye to eye, but where M. Siegfried is primarily engaged in looking at America itself (albeit his European background makes his treatment inevitably somewhat comparative), M. Romier stands far enough away to be able to keep two continents in view, and his interest is less in the fact, which he accepts, than in its significance.

This is his interpretation: The Western World, the world of historic and national tradition, of individualism and of variety, has through the last century been the scene of accumulation of certain powers which are now a challenge to its earlier ideas. The chief characteristic of the new accumulation is numerical. The population increase, made possible by the increased production of goods, has resulted in a civilization made up of masses which is in large measure antithetical to the preceding régime. Governmentally, a mass civilization means the substitution of the group for the individual in politics, and destroys the base of bourgeois Liberalism. Economically, it means group conflict of two sorts. The working and the

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exploiting groups in a given industry will struggle against each other over the distribution of the gain accruing from that occupation so long as a gain exists; if the gain is menaced, however, whether by shortage of raw materials, by competition, or by some other condition, the conflict assumes another face, and all those collected around that industry will form one mass for its defense. The unit of life in either case becomes the economic mass; it is no longer either the individual or the family, for as women enter industry the resulting disappearance of status and dissolution of ties minimizes the importance of the home.

America is preëminently the type country of this new civilization. Its statehood was contemporary with the industrial revolution; that fact, combined with the conglomerate character of its population, made it the inevitable scene of the most rapid development of mass civilization, since here there was no challenge from the historical forms that elsewhere proved powerful. The great extent of space uncut by frontiers made possible standardized production and sales on a scale elsewhere unknown. The resulting increase in facility of life has come to be exalted as an independent good, and has given the effort to "make money" the force of a moral obligation.

The implications of this morality of success are what constitute the essential character of the New World's civilization. The national resources have been such that the general man can cherish some not wholly Utopian aspirations of attainment, a fact which has in large measure kept bitterness from increasing along with the growing number of millionaires. The belief in the desirability of goods is responsible for the humanitarian quality of the American people; the philosophy of success, in what is not quite yet a closed world, engenders generosity for the unsuccessful. But the belief in the facilities of life for all people presupposes mass production, which is another name for standardization, and the social facts contingent on the supremacy of a standard, where that standard is regarded as morally valuable, are the facts which the European regards with the gravest doubts.

Does a mass society involve a return to an undifferentiated form of life: is there any form of communism more real than the communism of standardization? Is the artistic and intellectual passivity of mass society a proof that such a way of life is incompatible with creative originality? Wherein does such a society find its unity?

The last question cuts deepest, for it looks ahead and demands what are the forces which hold together an industrial mass when the

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prosperity of its development period is gone. The recent hermitage legislation of the United States is significant. In the early days the United States attempted to establish prosperity by admitting foreign men and rejecting foreign goods. The immigrant then made the goods, and the continual flow of new immigrants absorbed the surplus of increasing production. Now America has shut the gates against further foreign men. What is to become of the surplus production? The impending necessity of attempting to dispose of the present surplus on the field of international competition or else curtailing production at the source—possibly both—is the beginning of profound industrial change. The agricultural crisis is also significant; the existing disparity between the price of the manufactured articles a farmer must buy for extensive production and the return which he receives for his produce cannot be indefinitely prolonged, and whatever way the knot is cut, the industrial repercussions will be considerable. The stress of such a period breaks the economic ties between its members. What will then become of a society whose unity has been almost entirely economic in base? To survive, it will need to find other ties on which to place its highest value, ties arising from a belief in the supreme importance of the spirit, with its original creative power, of the family, as a means of preserving a tradition, and of a humanism which overcomes the brutality of the machine. The real proletarian is man, not the prey of other men, but the prey of machines.

> The master of the world will be the man of civilization who knows how to make machines serve his purposes, and not the proletarian, seeking in the machine the secret of a civilization. . . . In that respect the decision has not yet been given between Europe and America. . . . It will be made by the mothers of families and by the schools. The future belongs to the best school and the best family, capable of supplying, for the effort of man in the *prey* of machines, an object and a justification other than that of finding the wherewithal to eat and drink.

At the moment one hears a very great amount of talk in Europe pro and con "Americanism". The word is used to cover a multitude of meanings, some of them related to facts and some to influences. By no means all of these involve an antithesis to Europe. The use of highly specialized production methods involves no antithesis; America is a step ahead of Europe (though in the case of Germany, for instance, only a very short step) in beginning to use such methods, just as England seventy-five years ago was a step ahead of the Conti-

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nent in beginning industrialization, but no one questions that the other countries will follow. The essential difference, the real antithesis, lies not in a fact but in an attitude, and the value of M. Romier's book consists in having distinguished this. Europe questions the material optimism of America. Out of the experience of her history, Europe realizes that very soon the present will also be history, and wonders if, when the new things are old, it will be possible to see with clearness why they were once made.

H. D. HILL

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914. Edited by G. P. GOOCH and HAROLD TEMPERLEY. Volume I. *The End of British Isolation.* Volume II. *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Franco-British Entente.* London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927.—xxxii, 355; xxxii, 430 pp. $3.00 each.

In discussing these two first volumes of the great British collection of documents dealing with the origins of the war, a comparison with the epoch-making German series (*Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette*) is well-nigh irresistible. In both cases the governments have been wise in entrusting the work to historians whose names are in themselves guarantees of good faith. It would be hard to think of any two Englishmen better fitted by training and experience than Mr. G. P. Gooch and Mr. Harold Temperley, and these volumes will only add to their reputation for conscientious scholarship.

In the arrangement of the materials the English editors have followed closely in the footsteps of their German predecessors. The rigid chronological system was rejected and the documents have been grouped in sections and sub-sections according to subject, the order within the sections being, however, chronological. The present reviewer's experience has been that the topical arrangement of documents offers such obvious advantages to the investigator that he can only rejoice in the decision come to by both the German and the English editors. His only criticism of the British publication on this score would be that in some cases the material has been somewhat too much broken up, especially in the chapters concerned with Anglo-German relations.

Aside from this purely technical point the English editors were confronted with various other difficulties inherent in the nature of their enterprise. There has been no governmental overturn in Eng-

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land, as there has been in Germany, Austria and Russia. This means that the British government is to be the more highly commended for its resolution to lay the cards on the table. On the other hand, this circumstance may well have been responsible for the fact that the editors have systematically left out personal details. Considerations of space undoubtedly influenced them in the same direction. The editors were allotted only ten volumes in which to cover the period from 1898 to July 1914, to which the German collection devotes, roughly, volumes thirteen to thirty-nine. More rigorous selection was absolutely essential and more extensive deletions inevitable. This is very noticeable in connection with references in the documents to press comment. In all but a few instances this material is omitted, although a real understanding of the policies of a government can hardly be gained unless one knows just what expressions of public opinion were actually brought to bear in making decisions. While fully sympathizing with the difficulties under which the editors were laboring, there is no blinking the fact that this collection is vastly inferior to the German series in point of interest and instructiveness. The very fullness of the German documents, the wealth of personal detail and press comment, give the reader a warm and close familiarity not only with all the intricacies of special problems, but with all the numerous personalities who played a rôle in the diplomatic world of pre-war Europe. The fact that the British government regularly published extensive Blue Books on various questions of necessity makes a supplementary collection of this kind rather "chunky" and "spotty".

Taken in themselves, the reports of the British representatives abroad lack the fascination of many of the German despatches. It may be that in their private letters the English diplomats "opened up" and gave free rein to their imaginative and speculative powers. In that case it is the more to be regretted that English statesmen on leaving office still carried off with them so much of their correspondence and that the official records should be so incomplete. But judging them by the material here presented one is forced to the conclusion that they were, almost without exception, a hard-headed, prosaic and unimaginative group of men, driving a hard bargain, intent on their country's interests, essentially opportunists muddling along as best they could and not given, like many of their German contemporaries, to broad speculation or synthetic thought. The German ambassador was told by Lord Sanderson that "he ought to know that we had not got a policy and worked from hand to mouth" (vol.

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II, p. 88). It must be confessed that the remark was illuminating. In any case one need not look in these documents for wild marginalia like those of the Kaiser, nor for brilliant and incisive reports or memoranda like those of Bismarck, Bülow or Marschall. Neither are there hair-splitting, legalistic and morbidly logical analyses like those of the suspicious and egocentric Holstein. The dramatic element is completely lacking and the reader, toiling through the long-winded and wearisome negotiations concerning the delimitation of frontiers in the little-known hinterland of Africa, finds himself again and again gasping for a breath of life.

In point of substance there are very few "revelations" in these two volumes. One cannot escape the conviction that the British government had very little to conceal and that the voluminous Blue Books published from time to time were more honest and more exhaustive than could have been reasonably expected. If the British statesmen were not geniuses neither were they Mephistophelian intriguers. Their empire was a world empire and their interests ranged over the whole globe. The proper care of these interests was in itself an almost Herculean task. There was no time for the elaboration of intricate combinations and no desire to become involved in complicated alignments. In the particular years here dealt with, the situation of the empire was, if anything, more critical than it had ever been before. The much-vaunted "splendid isolation" was becoming a liability rather than an asset, though it appears that Lord Salisbury insisted on maintaining it to the end of his life. With the South-African difficulty looming large on the horizon there was every probability that England's traditional rivals, the French in Africa and the Russians in Asia, would seize the opportunity to satisfy their ambitions at the expense of British interests. Not even the Germans could be reckoned on in this extremity, for the Kaiser and his advisers had themselves embarked on a "world policy" and a realistic and unscrupulous one at that. For them the general tension was only too welcome, for it supplied the opportunity to work out the famous theory of the "two irons in the fire" and to sell their good will at a fancy price to the highest bidder.

The points of greatest interest in these volumes are, then, the Far East, the Anglo-German relations and the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. In regard to the first we find some interesting notes corroborating the dramatic seizure of Kiao-Chow by the Germans, but more particularly some valuable documents revealing for the first time Lord Salisbury's attempt to conclude an agree-

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ment with Russia in the spring of 1898. There was no misapprehension in London as to the ultimate claims and designs of the Russians in China, and Salisbury was willing to make large sacrifices in order to take the edge off the long-standing Anglo-Russian antagonism. There was to be "no partition of territory, only a partition of preponderance," but this was to extend from the Near to the Far East. Russia was to enjoy a preponderant influence in that portion of the Turkish Empire north of the Euphrates as far as Bagdad and in China north of the Hoang-ho, while England was to enjoy a similar position in "Turkish Africa, Arabia and the valley of the Euphrates south of Bagdad," as well as in the Yangste Basin. A similar suggestion was made by Lord Balfour in 1903, though there is no trace of it in this collection. Why the Russians did not take up the proposal more seriously is not entirely clear, but it appears that they disliked the idea of bringing in the Near East and were still hopeful of securing what they wanted by direct negotiation with China. In any case the project fell through, the Russians took Port Arthur and the British countered by securing Wei-Hai-Wei. The Russian-English antagonism continued unabated and it was evidently not due to Russian statesmen that a coalition hostile to England was not consummated during the Boer War. Under the circumstances the English were forced to turn to Germany. The Convention concerning the Portuguese colonies represented a great concession, but the so-called Yangste Agreement of 1900 was a complete failure. With the Russian occupation of Manchuria after the Boxer rising the situation became still more critical and the English, still further estranged by Germany's insistence on sacrifices in the wretched Samoa business, were almost obliged to listen more attentively to the suggestions of the Japanese. The documents bearing on the negotiation of the famous Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 1902 are of great interest. There is abundant evidence to show that the Japanese would never have fought over Manchuria, but that they were determined to go to war on the Korean question. Furthermore, it is clear that Marquis Ito was throughout in favor of reaching an agreement with Russia direct. Under the circumstances Lord Lansdowne showed no inclination to make great concessions, and in the years following the conclusion of the alliance he made no effort to encourage the Japanese. Manchuria had long since been abandoned by the English and there was always the possibility that France might join Russia in a conflict and so involve England. In that case Germany would have held the whip hand, and that explains in part

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the unedifying rôle played by William II in encouraging the Japanese. There appears to have been some distrust of Japan on the part of England down almost to the outbreak of the war with Russia. Ito's influence was apparently suspected, but the conflict in the inner councils of the Russian Government, which is reflected in these documents, was so serious that there was no preventing the crisis.

Anglo-German relations fill a large part of these volumes. We find new evidences of the Kaiser's threats to join France and Russia if the English failed to satisfy his desires, and there is plenty of complaint on his part: ". . . You make any concessions asked for by France or Russia, you cede half-continents to them, but when Germany asks for an island two-thirds of which has been planted over by its subjects, she is met by a refusal" (vol. I, p. 130). Of course the whole German attitude during these critical years was one of exploitation and refined blackmail. It was a miserable atmosphere for the conduct of negotiations for an alliance. Of the earlier offers, made through Chamberlain, there is almost no trace in these documents. The pertinent papers are apparently all in the Chamberlain and Salisbury archives and will be published only when the authoritative biographies by Mr. Garvin and Lady Gwendolen Cecil appear. The negotiations of 1901, by far the most important, are treated quite fully and the documents show that the first moves were made by Baron Eckardstein, though he himself maintains that the initiative came from Lord Lansdowne. It is well-known that the negotiations broke down because of the German insistence that England join the Triple Alliance and assume all the responsibilities implied in such action. Quite obviously the game on this basis was not worth the candle for the British, but one cannot help but feel that there was some justification for the German demand. With the intricate international relations of the time, Germany's position as the ally of England would have been much more precarious and exposed than that of England as the ally of Germany. Discounting the suspicion and distrust on both sides, discounting even Lord Salisbury's aversion to the alliance idea, the other obstacles to the scheme were almost insuperable. "In principle the idea is good enough," wrote Lord Lansdowne at the very beginning, "but when each side comes, if it ever does, to formulate terms, we shall break down" (vol. II, p. 63). From the parliamentary viewpoint alone, he wrote later in retrospect, "it was undoubtedly a very stiff fence to ride at" (vol. II, p. 81).

The negotiations for the Anglo-French accord are very fully dealt

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with, and the material here presented gives us the first authentic account of the origins of this important agreement. What stands out particularly from these documents is the part played by Delcassé and Cambon. There can no longer be any doubt that the French minister was intent on the agreement and that he regarded it from the beginning as the first step towards a larger English-French-Russian settlement. From the moment when he took over the foreign office at the very height of the Fashoda crisis, he made no secret of the fact that he would have preferred an alliance with England to an alliance with Russia, and that "he had always regarded as eminently desirable a cordial understanding between England, France and Russia" (vol. I, pp. 171, 216). Cambon seems to have been empowered in December, 1898, to work for a general settlement of outstanding questions (vol. I, p. 196). It was a grand conception and Delcassé knew how to bide his time. When the opportune moment arrived, in 1903, the initiative came from him and the negotiations, so far as he was concerned, were carried through in a statesmanlike fashion. The French having made the first approaches, the advantage naturally lay with Lansdowne, but he too showed on many occasions the moderation and tact which are indispensable for success. It is quite evident that Lord Cromer was one of the driving influences in favor of a settlement, though there is comparatively little material bearing on the Egyptian aspect of the problem.

The few points here touched upon should be sufficient to indicate the range and importance of the documents published in these first volumes. The editors have, on the whole, done their work well. There is an excellent index of documents, a very convenient index of persons, showing their official positions and listing the despatches for which they were responsible, and finally a satisfactory subject index. The editors have spared themselves no trouble in giving references to the Blue Books and to the German collection, and in certain instances have prefaced chapters with admirable historical notes. On the other hand, there are not a few typographical errors and an obvious mistake on page 291 of volume I. "Foreign Minister asked whether it was possible that H. M. Government had any suspicion that Italy might have entered into an agreement with France in regard to Italy . . ." should evidently read, ". . . in regard to Tripoli." In the note on page 270 of volume II the text of the treaty is completely confused, article II being incomplete and appearing again as the first part of article III.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY WILLIAM L. LANGER

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The Immediate Origins of the War. By PIERRE RENOUVIN. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1928.—xiv, 395 pp. $4.00.

The value of M. Pierre Renouvin's work on the immediate origins of the war has been recognized by students of the problem ever since the appearance of the first French edition years ago. The surprising thing is that it should have escaped translation so long, when far less substantial or scholarly works, many of them outspokenly controversial in character, have appeared in English garb. The delay, however, has had one advantage, for it has given the author the opportunity to revise the French text and embody new material, notably the information in the eleventh volume of the important British documents.

To the reviewer it seems that the great significance of the book lies in the very fact of its existence. Most of what M. Renouvin has to say has been said before by so-called revisionist writers, but many of these writers have been accused, directly or indirectly, of having an axe to grind. The German scholars are suspect by reason of their very nationality. In addition many of them are politically adherents of the old régime, discredited in democratic countries because of their nationalist or monarchist sympathies. The English writers have too much to do with *Foreign Affairs* and have radical affiliations, while the American historians of the subject are frowned upon by the profession, put aside as uncomfortable cranks or looked at askance because they studied at a German university years before the war, while Roosevelt and the Kaiser were still writing each other letters of mutual admiration. As for the French revisionists, they have been wholly decried. Members of the Society for the Rights of Man, many of them, they have been classed as reds, radicals and pacifists, enemies of M. Poincaré and hardly worthy of *la belle France* because they have tried to give the barbarian his due. But along comes M. Renouvin, professor of the history of the great war at the University of Paris, Director of the French War Library and Museum, Editor of the *Revue de l'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale.* No Frenchman in the profession could be more *au fait,* and he has written an account of the events of July 1914 that has won the applause of revisionists the world over. Since the appearance of his volume the ludicrous attempts of the old guard to defend the allied version of the great crisis have all but ceased. The authority of M. Renouvin has crushed most of them. The shafts of personal criticism levelled at a Montgelas, a Barnes or a Fabre-Luce are of no

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avail when directed against the armored position of a Sorbonne professor. We have to thank M. Renouvin for having cloaked with his prestige any number of conclusions for which open-minded scholars have contended during the last decade. This in itself gives the book an almost unique position. Since its appearance even those who always play safe have been able to accept the essentials of the revisionist view without taking chances.

This does not imply that Renouvin's book is above criticism. In the first edition relatively little was said of the Sarajevo affair, for example. The subject has been elaborated in this English translation, but the chapter devoted to it appears to the reviewer to be still inadequate, to rather evade the question of the Serbian government's complicity and to gloss over the fundamental question of Austria's justification. Just because Berchtold and his associates hopelessly bungled their case is no reason for blinking the fact that their case was good. One should remember that in the early days of the crisis European statesmen were almost unanimous in the opinion that Serbia had merited harsh handling. Then again, M. Renouvin has little to say of the fact that the Austrian government gave complete and frequent assurances that Serbian territory and sovereignty would be respected. Neither is he entirely fair to the Germans. On the crucial point of Bethmann's attitude on July 30 he sticks by the allied thesis and prefers the wild assertions of Kanner to the closely-reasoned and level-headed deductions of Fay, which seem to the reviewer to be positively irrefutable. The Russians have come off badly as a result of post-war researches and M. Renouvin makes no attempt to disprove the priority of Russian mobilization. But he is apt to overemphasize the purely diplomatic side of the crisis and does not sufficiently hammer the fact that the military measures of the Russians were decisive because they cut short the progress of diplomatic negotiations just as they were entering upon a hopeful phase. Turning lastly to French policy, it is quite understandable that M. Renouvin should want to make out the best possible case for his own country. But even if it is agreed that Paléologue was a dangerous man in a key position and that Isvolski was not a paragon of virtue, it seems to the reviewer quite unpardonable that M. Renouvin, with the British documents at his elbow, should fail to point out that Grey's first proposal, made on July 22, was for direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna, which he regarded as the "best method of all," and that this proposal was flatly rejected by Poincaré in favor of united action by the Entente; or that

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he can still accept Poincaré's version of the ten-kilometer withdrawal measure, after it has been completely exploded by Viviani himself and is utterly disproved by the British documents. In the same way his interpretation of Messimy's advice in regard to Russian military measures is severely strained and by no means convincing.

These are merely a few of the more important points to which exception must be taken. M. Renouvin's book is not the last word, but it does show how little, relatively, remains of the Entente position and how thoroughly article 231 of the peace treaty has been riddled by the efforts of honest historical scholarship.

WILLIAM L. LANGER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Industrial Combinations and Public Policy. By MYRON W. WATKINS. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927.—xix, 331 pp. $2.50.

The past two years have witnessed the publication of a number of studies touching the "trust problem" in some of its aspects, e. g., the National Industrial Conference Board's volumes on *Trade Associations* and *The Public Regulation of Competitive Practices*, and J. M. Clark's *Social Control of Business.* There has also developed a rather widespread interest in the alleged power trust. To these evidences of a reviving interest in questions of monopoly and government control of it may now be added the work of Professor M. W. Watkins of the University of Missouri on *Industrial Combinations and Public Policy,* published in 1927 but practically completed some four years earlier.

Since the book is recommended as a textbook by Professor Allyn Young, the editor of the series in which it appears, those of us who are offering courses in this field have looked forward to its publication as a supplement to, or a possible replacement of, such admirable standard works as those of Jenks and Clark and of Eliot Jones. The plan of the book is excellent and the author is largely successful in his avowed intention to make his readers feel that they were "'being taken somewhere' by a guide who 'knew where he was going'." Moreover, Professor Watkins has a facility and felicity of expression which make his chapters most interesting reading and insure him a wide hearing.

In treating the causes of the combination movement Professor Watkins distinguishes between fundamental or "objective" causes

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and "motives". The former factors he lists as the "passing of the frontier," the "decline of the rate of interest," and the "industrial revolution." The first two of these factors he considers to have been more important than the third in causing concentration. But objective factors merely determine certain broad boundaries within which human agencies work out their designs. Among the motives most frequently alleged by promoters of industrial combinations a desire to promote economic efficiency stands prominently, but in our author's opinion it actually played a secondary and obscure rôle. As he sees it, the dominant motive has been "a remorseless sort of profit-seeking" in which "anti-social activities . . . flourished like Australian jackrabbits."

In part two the combination movements in the steel, harvester, glass, paper, and corn-products industries are reviewed briefly. This review has convinced Professor Watkins that the superior economic efficiency claimed for combination is almost entirely mythical and that an unavoidable tendency to monopoly, except in public service industries, is nonexistent.

The final section of the book traces the law of combinations from its common-law origins through the acts of 1914 and concludes with a chapter on "public policy toward the control of industry." The legal analysis is much briefer than is common in books of this sort and devotes very little space to the facts in the court decisions mentioned. The main alternative policies of government to business are stated as: (a) *Laissez-faire;* (b) Compulsory competition enforced by judicial proceedings; (c) Legislative regulation and administrative supervision of competition; (d) Administrative regulation of business, including the fixation of prices; (e) Nationalization. Because of the divergencies between industries it is not wise to apply any one of the foregoing policies to all of them. Agriculture may safely be left to *laissez-faire;* public service industries require close regulation, including price-fixing. This leaves for consideration "the great mass of manufacturing industries and the well-established lines of trade." For these *laissez-faire* and compulsory competition are dismissed as demonstrated failures; nationalization also, because it "runs counter to settled social tradition and to the dominant social ideal in American society." Of the remaining alternatives, regulated competition and regulated combination, Professor Watkins advocates the former because he is convinced that it will secure a nearer approximation to maximum social welfare. This conviction rests partly upon his summary of the histories of certain combinations, but in the re-

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viewer's opinion it rests much more fundamentally upon the theoretical conclusions formulated in chapter six: "Competitive and monopolistic price-making in relation to the common welfare."

As the author states (p. 314), the argument of this chapter follows without material deviation that of Professor Pigou in his *Economics of Welfare*. Briefly stated, it assumes as valid for a given period the traditional classification of industries into those of constant, increasing and decreasing costs. By use of the conventional diagrams it goes on to show that under constant or increasing costs a restriction of output below or an expansion beyond that amount which would result from the free play of demand and supply factors would cause losses to either buyers or sellers greater than the gains which would accrue to the other group. The same conclusion is reached under a condition of decreasing costs when production is restricted short of the equilibrium point of demand and supply, but an extension of production beyond the margin results in gains to buyers which are greater than the losses to sellers. The net result of the analysis is to bring Professor Watkins to the conclusion that the "maximizing of the welfare of producers and consumers" is, in general, dependent upon "such an adjustment in the market as brings marginal cost and marginal price offer into equilibrium," and that "hence free competition, rather than monopoly, best promotes the common welfare" (p. 98). To this conclusion Professor Watkins excepts, as indicated, industries of decreasing costs, but he goes on to contend that in them monopoly is no more effective in maximizing welfare than is competition and that "there is no certain way of maximizing welfare" in such industries "except by the exercise on the part of the state of an arbitrary and impossibly wise control."

The theoretical validity of the entire argument is open to serious question, as Professor F. H. Knight has demonstrated (*American Economic Review,* March, 1926, p. 51 *et seq.*), but the present reviewer does not care to enter into that controversy. He is desirous, however, of pointing out that there is no justification for limiting the activities of an "impossibly wise" state control to industries of decreasing costs. In industries of increasing costs the intra-marginal producers reap a differential gain usually designated as "economic rent." An "impossibly wise" state could nationalize such industries, maintain physical production at or past the point previously established under competitive conditions, set a price below the previous competitive price, and pay the losses on productive units whose costs were above this arbitrary price from the smaller differential gains still

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accruing to the low-cost units; and if nationalization seems too drastic the same result might be accomplished by paying the losses of high-cost private producers from the proceeds of an excess-profits tax on low-cost producers. In other words, it seems illogical to talk of restrictions on the activities of an "impossibly wise" state.

The really unfortunate aspect of this theoretical analysis, however, is its rigid application to the industrial situation. In chapter six and again in chapter twelve it is definitely held that the only industries to which are applicable a governmental policy of "administrative regulation . . . including the fixation of prices" are the "so-called public utilities" (pp. 106 and 281). These, according to Professor Watkins, are industries of decreasing costs resulting from "internal" economies. It is interesting to note that he includes in this category the telephone business (pp. 106 and 109), and consequently recommends for it extensive regulation. Although most economists would doubtless agree that it requires that sort of regulation, to the extent that they recognize the validity of the categories at all, most of them again would class the telephone business as one of increasing costs. Moreover, it is important to note that in limiting the field of regulated monopoly to public service utilities such industries as the mining of coal and the extraction of petroleum are left to the ministrations of the "invisible hand." But British mines and American bituminous mines have operated under competition for a sufficiently long time to have demonstrated that this régime is designed to "maximize social welfare." All the evidence at hand points in a contrary direction; so much so, that it is improbable to the point of incredibility that state control could be so unwise as to make a more thorough-going mess of the industry than private management and competition have achieved. The Sankey and Samuels Coal Commission reports in England, the last Federal Coal Commission, and Hamilton and Wright in this country have demonstrated that competition in coal is a flat failure. It has resulted in a criminal waste of a vital national resource and has, in England, reduced the miners to a condition that already has once brought the nation to the verge of disaster. Equally convincing are the facts by which Professor Stocking and others have demonstrated that in the production of petroleum competition has failed to function.

It may be that to other readers the facts presented in the second section of the book will form a sufficient bulwark to support Professor Watkins' theoretical conclusions, but to the reviewer they seem inadequate for that purpose. In the discussion of the steel and har-

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vester combines it is pointed out that "both have lost ground to outside competition" and it is alleged that "there is no reason for believing that this has been brought about by other than economic causes" (p. 127). In other words, the superior economic efficiency of "trusts" has not been demonstrated. But Miss Tarbell has quoted Judge Gary to the effect that the Steel Corporation was willing to and would accept W. J. Bryan's figure of fifty per cent as the maximum proportion of any industry which one concern should be allowed to control, and there is evidence that a fear of Federal prosecution prevented these and other combinations from pressing to the limit their economic advantages. Although other facts presented in the book lead the reviewer to different conclusions from those of the author, it is not feasible to elaborate the divergencies here. That the author himself is not inclined to lean too heavily on his factual analysis is perhaps not an unfair deduction from his statement that he is "frankly skeptical of 'inductive proofs' of the workings of social arrangements" (p. 130). The reviewer is even more skeptical of the deductive "proof" that permeates this book. Questions of social policy require more for their solution than the drawing of lines on a diagram and the comparing of the sizes of various areas delimited by those lines. Consequently, it seems that Professor Young's compliments to the author on his omission of "sterile 'information'" are particularly unhappy. As the reviewer believes he has demonstrated, Professor Watkins has omitted or undervalued not only that information which is sterile but also a great deal which is pregnant with meaning for the solution of the problem he has undertaken. For this reason, then, the reviewer lays down the book with the conviction that he must agree with its author's frank admission in his preface that "the truth is yet a long way off."

CHARLES A. GULICK, JR.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

A Survey of the Social Structure of England and Wales as Illustrated by Statistics. By A. M. Carr-Saunders and D. Caradog Jones. New York, Oxford University Press, 1927.—xvii, 246 pp. $3.50.

This book is one of those which constitute the precondition of important books' being written. A statistical survey of the social structure of England and Wales, it indicates both the swing of modern political science over to quantitative methods of treatment and its

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preoccupation with objective structure rather than with subjective "principles". In almost every chapter legislation and the activities of government have to be touched upon. But Professor Carr-Saunders and his colleague direct our attention not, according to the habit of the last generation, to the instruments or stage properties of government, but to those social facts which any profitable legislation must take into account. So far as is possible in a brief and preliminary survey, the facts given present a picture remarkably enlightening.

In one or two instances an anti-ecclesiastical or a partisan bias seems to peep forth and to weaken the impersonal cogency of the accumulation of evidence. In some cases is it forgotten that simplicity and ease of comparison are more important than wealth of information. In tables XIII and XV comparison is rendered unnecessarily difficult and only tucked away in the text do we discover that, in Scotland and excluding certain classes, 43 per cent of the population live more than two to a room. Strictly comparable figures are not given for England, but only that 9.6 per cent of those who live in "private families" were in 1921 living more than two to a room. In a chapter on education no estimate, such as Mr. H. A. L. Fisher has recently given, is made of the university population. In neither of the chapters on population is that figure of high practical importance, the replacement birth-rate supplied. We are, however, given the ratio of births to marriages for England and Wales (2.4:1), the average number of persons per "private family" (4.14), and the number of living children under sixteen per married man (1.27). And there we are left to our choice with an admonition that the present birth-rate will, *ceteris paribus,* lead to stabilization of population by 1970 at 48-9 millions. The convict class seems to be treated on page 204 as coextensive with (or, in intelligence, a fair sample of) the criminal class. And the highly favorable English figures showing the proportion of arrests to cases reported are omitted. There is no index.

These are, however, but very minor blots on an extraordinarily convenient and illuminating survey of a kind hitherto unattempted and based upon a critical treatment of the evidence available. It is instructive to learn that 80 per cent of a sample of 175 Lancashire cotton-mill owners had risen from the wage-earning classes. It is interesting to learn that only 4-5 per 1000 English elementary school children reach a university, although a level of ability is to be found among these children such that 62 per cent of all who go on from

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grant-aided secondary schools to the universities have come from the elementary schools. In brief, the university population forms a trivial percentage of the whole, and this despite evidence of scholastic ability among the children of the poorer classes. It is interesting to learn that, while .4 per cent of the estimated population is mentally deficient, .05 per cent of the population conducts the whole of the highest professional work of the community: lawyers, doctors, holders of higher administrative posts in the State or business, university professors. Another matter which may be commended to democratic theorists for thought is that the fertility rate varies in a steadily inverse proportion, for the major sections of the population (although not for criminals or *controlled* defectives), so far as a variety of tests can indicate it, from the more to the less intelligent portions of the population. The more intelligent children come on the average from the smaller families. To the decline in the size of working-class families, as well as to higher wages, is attributed the fact that, instead of 11 per cent of the whole population, as in 1913, only 4-6.5 per cent, in 1924, were living in "primary poverty" in the five towns investigated by Bowley and Burnett-Hurst.

It is much to be hoped that some way will be found of preparing volumes on a similar plan for European countries and for some of the states of the Union. The figures could not, of course, be in any precise sense comparable. But no better way seems to present itself than by using these statistics of mortality, overcrowding and the like in a quantitative description, of providing a means for judging what contributions the various governments of the world are making towards "facilitating the objects of society" and towards the promotion of the progress of civilization in material wealth, health, peace and education. And it is by these pragmatic tests and not by their high-flown pretensions or sovereign claims that the governments of the world and the state-mechanism must ultimately be judged in relation to the overruling claims of human development.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN

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Prize Law During the World War. A Study of the Jurisprudence of the Prize Courts, 1914-1924. By JAMES WILFORD GARNER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927.—xlviii, 712 pp. $6.00.

Professor Garner's book on *Prize Law During the World War* is *per se* a refutation of the assertion that there is no international law in time of war. Yet the text includes passages which cannot fail to comfort those who speak in terms of "The Lawless Law of Nations." Ever since the problems of the last war arose, international lawyers have been divided in regard to them. Judge John Bassett Moore has been the prophet of the biblical doctrine that there is "nothing new under the sun"; his *International Law and Some Current Illusions* will long remain the classic exposition and defense of international law in time of war. Professor Garner, on the other hand, speaks of the "unprecedented situation" during the last war, though the Napoleonic era affords ample precedents in many important respects. Mr. Garner obviously believes in the soundness of many of the British arguments, though his defense of the Allied positions seems less vehement than in his earlier volumes—*International Law and the World War.* He believes of Sir Samuel Evans—President of the British Prize Court during most of the war period—that "it may be said without fear of contradiction that he proved to be a worthy successor of Lord Stowell and that many of his decisions will rank with those of his great predecessor." With this estimate the reviewer cannot agree; Sir Samuel's decisions are indeed characterized by great learning, industry, and intellectual ingenuity, but they lack that magnificent impartiality and judicial detachment which have been the keystones of Lord Stowell's lasting fame as a prize judge. To that impartiality Sir Samuel lent lip service but not strict adherence; the judge did not rise above the patriot.

The law of contraband is the vital spot in prize law. It is in connection with this subject, therefore, that the greatest divergence in views is to be expected and is found. Professor Garner seems to take the view that the Allies were justified in "abolishing" the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. Particularly throughout the chapters dealing with contraband and blockade, Professor Garner points out—as did the British Prize Courts—that certain distinctions were "illogical" and "arbitrary". This is

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perfectly true and equally irrelevant. As Sir Samuel Evans himself seemed to recognize in his famous decision in the *Kim* case, rules of prize law are the result of conflicting interests of neutrals and belligerents. The right of the former to continue to trade during the war is admitted as is the right of the latter to injure the enemy. These rights necessarily clash and the result has been a series of compromises. The question is not whether under twentieth-century conditions a given belligerent would consent to a certain compromise if the matter arose *de novo,* but whether a certain rule has been established by agreement in the past. On this point there may again be difference of opinion and on the vital point as to whether Articles 34 and 36 of the Declaration of London (prohibiting the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to conditional contraband) altered the preëxisting rule, Professor Garner agrees with the British Prize Courts in maintaining the affirmative. The reviewer holds the opposite view.

But regardless of such inevitable clashes, no student of international law can fail to be grateful for the extremely valuable service rendered by the author in the present volume, nor can he afford not to have this book on ready reference. Were it not for the recent compromise adjustment of the American-British war claims, Mr. Garner's book would undoubtedly have played an important rôle in what many fondly hoped was to be a second "Geneva arbitration". As Professor Garner himself admits in his preface, Professor Verzijl of the University of Utrecht had already covered the same field in a thoroughly scholarly way, but the former has given us the material in much more readable and accessible form. His arrangement, chapter and paragraph headings and index are most useful. Besides, the average reader is possibly not sufficiently polylingual to follow all of Verzijl's quotations in their half-dozen or more original tongues. Professor Garner has not contented himself with secondary sources, but wherever possible has secured the official texts of the actual decisions.

The volume and thoroughness of the British decisions has naturally caused them to receive a major place, but the jurisprudence of the Continent and of the East is not neglected. One notes with much satisfaction that Professor Garner points out that there is no essential difference between the British and German theories of applying international vs. national law in the Prize Courts. In this connection, however, the distinction in British law between pre-

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rogative Orders in Council and those issued under authority of Acts of Parliament is not made entirely clear.

Professor Garner also renders great service in pointing out that neither the Hague Conventions nor the Declaration of London had binding legal effect save as they were expressive of preëxisting customary law. One might well, if space permitted, draw attention to many other details in both procedural and substantive law, in which the present volume is of great value. It may suffice to say that it will form a necessary part of every international law library, private or institutional. It does not pretend to go beyond its title; there is little detailed discussion of the prize law of the past, and one regrets the infrequency of expressions of the author's own views. But in such sections as those dealing with the registration of vessels, belligerent domicile, and nationality of ships and goods in general, the book's utility is not confined to prize law itself.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

Business Cycle Theory. Its Development and Present Status. By ALVIN H. HANSEN. Boston, Ginn and Company, 1927.—v, 218 pp. $2.00.

This monograph was originally submitted in the competition for the best criticism of Foster's and Catchings' *Profits*. But in it the discussion of the Pollak theory of business cycles was carried through by presenting most of the numerous explanations of the phenomena, thus pointing out all the other elements in the modern economic system which might make for fluctuations and disturbances. As a result the essay turned out to be a survey of current business cycle theory, and is presented as such. The book, however, still reveals the limitations of its earlier form. One may doubt whether a balanced survey of current business cycle theory would devote 58 out of its 207 pages of text to the presentation and critique of the Pollak "dilemma of thrift".

The various theories are grouped under three inclusive headings: I, the Capitalistic Economy School — with two subdivisions, (a) the capitalistic system of distribution, (b) the capitalistic process of production; II, the Exchange Economy School; and III, the Money Economy School, the latter again with two subgroups — (a) the rate of interest-profits group, (b) the cost-prices-profits group. The weather, health, and crop hypotheses are excluded from the discussion and referred to but incidentally, since at most they account

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for only the generating cycles. The sources covered in the discussion include not only English, French and German studies, but also some Russian ones.

The summary of the theories is clear and balanced, although in a number of cases the exposition is too complete, giving not only the specific element of the particular theory or group, but also a large part of its descriptive contents which it shares with a number of other hypotheses. As a result, the specific point of the theory does not stand out as clearly or as one-sidedly as it would in a terser treatment, and a good deal of repetition is involved. On the other hand, such a type of presentation helps the reader to realize that there is a large element in common among the various theories, and that the differences are those of emphasis.

Another detailed criticism concerns the author's tendency to mention early economists as though they were in line with the modern ones. Lauderdale and Thornton had quite different problems before their eyes, and one may question whether Thornton's and Ricardo's views on the factors determining the demand for bank loans should be discusssed in the money economy group of business cycle theories.

The most interesting part of the book is the last chapter. It deals with: (1) a summary of what in the current body of business cycle theory are considered to be the essential characteristics of the cyclical movements; (2) a discussion of whether the cycles are self-generating; (3) a prognosis of the future of cyclical fluctuations. The summary is interesting, revealing that there is quite a significant field upon which agreement exists. The prognosis of what might be called the secular trend in business cycles is in line with the summary.

On the question of the self-generating cycles one cannot easily agree with the author. The accusation of circularity scarcely holds ground, for we are dealing with a historically repetitive phenomenon, and the search for specific antecedents would take us by backward tracing to the original cause of the first business cycle. The circularity involved in a treatment of a typical business cycle swing is similar to that of the biological discussion of birth and growth, a circularity due to the continuous nature of the phenomenon itself. Neither does the argument hold that business men would adjust themselves to the situation and thus eliminate cycles, if there were no new disturbing factors. The idea that cycles are self-generating does not exclude the presence of disturbing factors or of a secular trend. But it denies the necessity of positing an outside fact that

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would repeatedly and conveniently present itself to provoke a new upward swing.

To conclude: The book may be of some service as an easily available and wide survey of existing business cycle theory. But one cannot help feeling that the interest would be greatly heightened and the value much enhanced if the part devoted to the Pollak theory were ruthlessly condensed, the presentation of the theories sharpened, and the critical and synthetic part developed to a greater length that would preclude the perfunctory form in which it appears at present.

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The Spanish-American Frontier: 1783-1795—The Westward Movement and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley. By ARTHUR PRESTON WHITAKER. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927.—viii, 255 pp. $3.50.

Vigorously as Theodore Roosevelt made manifest how the West was won, he left many phases of the struggle resting upon the vague basis of surmise. This is especially true of the early relations between the United States and Spain, where his spirit of the frontiersman scouted the possibility that there might be two sides to the question. During the past quarter of a century numerous monographs have cleared away the obscurity by removing the surmise about given personages or episodes; but until the appearance of the present work no comprehensive account was available of just what happened between 1783 and 1795 to effect a practical, if not altogether amicable, adjustment of the matters at issue.

Extensive research in Spanish archives and utilization of evidence derived from American sources have enabled Dr. Whitaker to indicate what the forces and factors were. Even if at times the picture provided is one suggestive of fitting together the pieces of a puzzle, rather than a symmetrically ordered collocation of scenes and characters, it affords an outline sharp enough to render discernible what took place.

The general title is not happily chosen. A prospective reader might infer that the book had something to do with what the adjective "Spanish-American" long since has connoted. The subtitle also fails to show just what the author had in mind. Incidents confined almost wholly to the region of the present States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi are only a part of the

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"Westward movement and the Spanish retreat in the Mississippi Valley". A stricter interpretation of the facts, moreover, would indicate that geographically there was hardly such a thing as a "Spanish retreat". The entire matter hinged instead upon a settlement of the question whether the Mississippi River should be opened to American navigation below the mouth of the Yazoo, and whether the area southward from that point to 31 degrees should be turned over to the United States.

Well as the fundamental issues are known and however fully the diplomatic negotiations affecting them have been treated elsewhere, the story of what actually occurred behind the scenes, alike in the backwoods of the "Old Southwest" and in the council-rooms of Spain, has never been told before with such breadth of knowledge, careful description and apt characterization as here presented. Plot and counterplot, the contrasting personalities of polished Spanish official and rough American frontiersman and their rivalry in seeking the favor of the Indian, furnish a panorama of singular vividness and interest, despite the rather episodical handling of it. Incidentally, the author has made a significant contribution by demonstrating that the long delay in the adjustment of the controversy was caused by the United States, "even more than by Spain".

The framework of the volume reminds the reader of the methodology of a doctoral dissertation. Occasionally such a piece of writing as "In the conflict for this stake was tested each of the rival empires' power of incorporation, its power to produce a living social synthesis out of bewildering diversity" (p. 13) jars his sensitiveness to the realities of the historical situation no less than to the rhetorical meaning of sentences. If he knows Spanish, he wonders why proper names in that language are quoted so variously. It seems curious to find no reference to Wilkinson's oath of allegiance to his Catholic Majesty or to Clark's projected expedition antedating that divergence from sound American loyalty. Some account of the Spanish administrative system in Louisiana and the Floridas would have been welcome. Allusion to the moral indiscretions of Manuel de Godoy and Alexander Hamilton might have been omitted to advantage. Reference to the "Gallican Aranda" (p. 174) proves that Dr. Whitaker is not well informed about the real attitude of that diplomat toward France. These, and other blemishes, however, do not detract essentially from the value of a work so creditable to the scholarship of a young author.

WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD

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Communism. By HAROLD J. LASKI. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1927.—xi, 256 pp. $1.00.

That Communism is a body of scholarship, that it is a program of policy, that it is a system of strategy for attaining that program—these aspects have never been at once so clearly distinguished and so deftly connected as they are in Mr. Laski's treatment. This slender volume of two hundred and fifty-odd pages, into which as into some sonnet form the writers for the Home University Library must generally cast their thought, will probably remain for some time the clearest and most temperate "brief view" of Communism available in English.

The primary purpose of a book such as this should be a swift, luminous exposition of Communist doctrine. Exposition of this sort has in the past been not untinged with distortion; in scholarship, as in boxing, though it is one of the sporting traditions not to foul your opponent, an impassioned bout produces its doubtful blows. It does not come amiss therefore that our author should affirm at the very outset his intention to abide by the Marquis of Queensberry. "I have sought," avers Mr. Laski in his Preface, "so to state the Communist theses upon the topics I have discussed that its own advocates would (as I hope) recognize that even an opponent can state them fairly."

The chapters that follow deal in succession with Communist movements, the materialist interpretation of history, Communist economics, the Communist theory of the state, and Communist strategy. In the first he essays a reinterpretation of the history of radical thought from Plato to Trotzky, in which he places the major emphasis on the nature of Marx's thought and the character of the Russian Revolution. "Marx found communism a chaos and left it a movement . . . Before his time communistic theories were not a programme but a series of moral aphorisms. Marx supplied it with a strategy, and Lenin and his disciples have turned that strategy into an applied philosophy . . . Those who represent the Bolshevists as a set of unprincipled adventurers in German pay do sorry service to the understanding of the greatest event in history since the Reformation." The scholarship of Communism, as expressed by its theory of materialist interpretation and its own set of economic doctrines, has in the past been thrashed out almost *ad nauseam,* but Mr. Laski's treatment is fresh. It is, however, in the chapter on the Communist theory of the state that Mr. Laski is at his best. Deftly he uses the

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formal classical theory of the state as a background against which to throw the Communist analysis of the defects of the actual political machinery; then just as deftly he superimposes upon both of them the Communist program for doing away with this state both in its rhetoric and its actuality — the use of violence by a minority to hasten the inevitable end, the replacement of the dictatorship of capitalism by the transitional dictatorship of the proletariat, the eventual ideal communistic society in which political force is formally ended and labor is voluntary. In his final chapter Mr. Laski maps out the "strategy of Communism," by means of which Communism plans to achieve these ends.

Interwoven with these threads of exposition, which are mainly in the nature of humanized scholarship, is the author's own critical attitude, which is even more interesting to the student of the current swing of political opinion. Though he calls himself rightly an opponent of Communism, he accepts a large part of Communist doctrine. The materialist interpretation is to him "undeniable as a general doctrine," though he does not accept Marx's inferences and predictions from it. And again, though Communist economics is unsound as economic theory (Mr. Laski seems more certain than many professional economic theorists as to what economic theory is) that does not prevent "the conclusions which Marx built upon his theory of surplus-value" from being "in large part true." These conclusions, as is well known, constitute a scathing indictment of capitalist economic organization. The Communist attack on classical political theory and the Communist description of the injustice of the political machinery of the modern state are also not unpleasing to Mr. Laski; though he abhors the theory of minority violence and almost the whole of Communist strategy.

What can we make then of Mr. Laski's own critical position as shown indirectly in this little book? For one thing, though he calls himself in the Preface "an opponent" of Communism, he makes it clear in the body of the book that one may accept or at least sympathize with Communist scholarship yet be unwilling to embrace Communist policy or employ Communist strategy. One may, to state it differently, make common cause with the Communists in criticizing the economic organization and decrying the political injustice of the modern democratic state, without subscribing to their religious faith in violent tactics and desperate remedies. Mr. Laski, for one, is willing to give representative institutions "much further experiment than has so far been attempted."

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A reviewer in an English conservative journal attacked this book violently as an instance of Mr. Laski's own bolshevist beliefs. But that is rather wide of the mark. Rather does Mr. Laski pursue a *via media* between violent change and no change. Running through the book there is the admonition that as a society we must mend our walls if we do not want them tumbling about our heads. Mr. Laski becomes thus a part of the great English tradition of Liberalism, though I believe he would call himself a Laborite; for Liberalism is not a program, it is an attitude. The conditions which it seeks to affect change with each generation, but its attitude of high seriousness and sweet reasonableness are part of the tradition set by Mill and Green and Morley and Arnold. This attitude, applied to rapidly changing problems, produces often a program which would seem radical to an earlier generation.

The traditional approach of Liberals to the problems with which this book deals has in the past been ethical. Mr. Laski retains this strong ethical tone, but there are indications throughout the book that he is groping for some psychological supports as well. Communist economics, he says, "builds its appeal upon some of the profoundest impulses of men". At the end of almost every chapter he sounds a note of warning — that the best weapon against Communism is the satisfaction of those impulses. It is to be regretted that he does not follow this lead more thoroughly; the psychology of the school of Bentham has become somewhat inadequate for modern Liberalism. Nowhere does the author analyze the connection between the frustration of these profound impulses and the attitudes looking toward dominance in another society. Nor — and this is an even graver fault — does he give the psychological converse of this trend: that men possess habits as well as impulses, and that in their political and economic habits the acceptance of the capitalist state is becoming firmly encrusted.

MAX LERNER

NEW YORK CITY

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Politica Externă a Romaniei (*The Foreign Policy of Roumania*). Bucharest, Cultura Nationala, 1927.—706 pp. 150 lei ($1.00).

This is the third volume published by the Rumanian Institute of Social Science, the first dealing wth the Rumanian Constitution, and the second with the Rumanian political parties. The Institute was founded in 1918 for the purpose of research in social and political science. Free from political tutelage, the Institute has collected material, placed it in competent hands and in this way achieved results of genuine scientific value.

The first part of the volume comprises a series of nineteen lectures (text in Rumanian), affording a general exposé of "the spirit, method and tendencies of Rumanian foreign policy." The second part gives (in French) the texts or brief outlines of the documents relevant to the League of Nations, the peace treaties, reparations, minorities, the Straits, the Danube, frontiers and alliances. At the end a synoptic table gives all treaties and international conventions and arrangements to which Rumania is a party.

"In its tendency," says Professor Gusti in his preface, "the volume tries to react in the spirit of the Rumanian Institute of Social Science as much against pure ideology as against pure empiricism, bringing into relief the interdependence, always real and deep, existing between ideas and facts." As it is difficult to analyze here all the nineteen lectures, I shall refer only to those of particular interest. Mr. Antipa in his "Study of the Danube" gives a miniature monograph on the various problems touching this waterway. Mr. V. Bratianu, present Prime Minister of Rumania and head of the nationalistic school of economics, sketches the future of Rumania in the international forum as he attempts to shape it through his economic policy. Mr. Corteanu in his lecture on the "Danubian Confederacy" gives a lucid exposition of the idea of Central-European federation of which he is a sincere adherent. "However difficult the realization of this idea would be," he says, "it must never be abandoned, for it is the only possible method of establishing peace on the Continent without either German or Russian supremacy." And when one considers the material benefits that would follow from some sort of tariff understanding among the Danubian states, the thesis becomes still more persuasive; the idea ought to gain ground. In fact, such a confederacy, although it is doubtless still far from full realization, is gradually taking shape from year to year as a result of closer rela-

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tionships among the Little Entente states on the one hand and between the Little Entente and Hungary and Austria on the other. Mr. E. Botez pleads for the unification of the Danubian régime through the dissolution of the European commission having jurisdiction over the Danubian canal at Sulina and the extension of the jurisdiction of the Danubian commission set up by the peace treaties over the whole course of the river from Ulm to Sulina.

The question of the Straits is masterfully treated by Mr. Diamandi, the Rumanian minister at Paris. Mr. Diamandi sums up the Rumanian point of view with reference to the Straits: "Rumania demands the setting up of a régime of liberty in the Straits. Our interests coincide with the interests of the Great Powers." The following principles follow from the above: liberty of navigation for commercial and war vessels and the demilitarization of the coasts. Against this thesis was advanced the Russian thesis: the thorough arming of Turkey, an arsenal in the Straits, and the closing of the Black Sea. In the end the Allied thesis was accepted by the Turks and finally by Russia.

On the question of minorities a most interesting paper is contributed by Mr. Iulio Maniu, who was the leader of the pre-war opposition to Austro-Hungarian domination and who is now the leader of the National Peasant Party, the liberal party of Rumania. It is worth noting that the program of toleration toward minorities drawn up by the Transylvanian Rumanians, who were formerly under Magyar rule, goes farther than the minimum prescription of the minorities treaties and has been endorsed by the Rumanian liberals.

Professor Gusti, President of the Rumanian Institute of Social Science and its moving spirit, closes the cycle of lectures with his address on the League of Nations, giving an historical description of the development of the idea of universal peace.

It is not necessary to lay stress on the value of the documents given at the end. Suffice it to say that for the first time they are scientifically treated and taken out of the esoteric atmosphere of the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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The Rhineland Occupation. By HENRY T. ALLEN, Major General, U. S. Army. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1927.—xii, 347 pp.

Six days after the Armistice of November 11, 1918, a group of armies selected from the Allied Forces for the occupation of Germany, all under the command of Marshal Foch, and aggregating more than a million men, moved forward simultaneously in the direction of the Rhine. The American contribution was the recently organized Third Army of nearly a quarter of a million men, under command of Major General Joseph T. Dickman. Their route lay in a northeasterly direction across the neutral territory of Luxemburg, to Trier, and down the beautiful valley of the Moselle to the junction of that river with the Rhine at Coblenz. The region is full of historic associations. Trier has noble Roman monuments. Log timbers of Caesar's bridge have, in recent years, been discovered a short distance below Coblenz. The ruins of feudal castles line the high bluffs of the Moselle, and the slopes of the valley are covered by the vineyards which have added to its fame. Many an American soldier will carry to his last day memories of this fair region, and of its conservative, home-loving people.

General Allen's book is an account of the occupation and government of this area by American forces, for a period which lasted for more than three years. It is a soldier's account, terse and reserved. Frequently, it is not as detailed as the reader might desire, considering the importance of the matters discussed and the power of the author to illuminate these matters. The American Third Army passed out of existence on July 2, 1919, and its place was taken by a limited number of troops, subsequently known as the American Forces in Germany. Of these forces General Allen took command on July 8, 1919, and remained in command until the evacuation at the end of January, 1923. The force which in December, 1919 numbered 842 officers and 17,986 men, was gradually reduced to half of this number before the time of withdrawal. Small as was the Force, in a total of about 135,000 allied troops on the Rhine, it was a carefully selected body of highly trained, seasoned and disciplined men. It maintained a fine record, won commendations from friends and former foes, and departed amidst the undisguised regret both of the Allies and of the Germans. The American Commander is entitled to full credit for the distinctly fine character of this body of troops, and the recognition which they received.

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On the whole, the attitude of the inhabitants was friendly. The danger of Bolshevism had filled the conservative German mind with fear, and even hostile troops were preferred to Spartacists. The American occupied territory, being primarily agricultural, suffered less economic loss and paralysis than did the industrialized regions of the Rhine; and this fact undoubtedly made the American task relatively easier. American soldiers quickly made friendships with the German families where they were billeted, and this undue intimacy called forth the famous "anti-fraternizing order" of the Third Army, which was rescinded in September, 1919. Thereafter, and in spite of original orders, increasing numbers of marriages between soldiers and German women created a problem for the Commander.

About one-third of General Allen's book deals with the political difficulties that filled the years between the termination of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rühr occupation. There are chapters on the Separatist Movement, Sanctions, matters dealt with by the High Commission, and the series of crises leading up to the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, at the commencement of which the American forces were withdrawn to the United States.

The earlier chapters deal with the Military Government, and it is particularly this portion of the work which would have justified expansion. The United States Army has a well-developed doctrine of military government, or the exercise of military authority over occupied territory. It is a doctrine that appears to have its origins in the bold and well-conceived proclamations and orders of General Scott during the campaign of 1847, which began with the capture of Vera Cruz, and ended with the occupation and military government of Mexico City. The American Commander, on that important campaign, took full responsibility for all territory in the possession of his forces. He guaranteed the protection of the inhabitants in their persons, property and religious observances. He provided for the prompt trial and punishment by "Military Commissions" of civilians who attacked the safety or the self-respect of the American troops, and he used the local civil and judicial administration so far as it was possible to secure its coöperation. These principles, in general, are those upon which American practice rests, and they have found valuable illustration in Porto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines, in Vera Cruz, Mexico, in 1914, and finally in Germany, in the episode here considered. The necessity for the assumption of full responsibility by the military commander is plain.

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Where such responsibility is not assumed, as was the case with the Allied forces in the Siberian intervention of 1918-20, inconvenience, distress and disaster are bound to follow.

The American principle is to concentrate the entire responsibility in the Commanding General. Under his orders and control, all power is exercised—legislative, executive or judicial. In the Rhineland occupation, this principle was departed from. In the first place, there was a Supreme Military Command which was not American; but, as a matter of fact, each national army organized its military government in its own way, and the area commanders controlled independently the civil administration in their respective territories. Secondly, an Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission was created, consisting of four Commissioners, one for each of the Allied nations holding occupied territory, and it was proposed to give this High Commission (a civil body) general governing authority. The failure of the United States to ratify the Versailles Treaty left this country without an official representative on this Commission, other than the American military commander whose position became that of an observer. The Supreme Council at Paris recognized the validity of the actions of the American Army under its war powers, and on the other hand, General Allen promulgated in general orders the legislative ordinances of the Commission that affected the territory under his responsbiility.

Thus the difficulties of divided responsibility were largely overcome, but the plan itself was fundamentally wrong. There is an interesting chapter contrasting the types of administration presented by the French, British, Belgian and American authorities, and this discussion emphasizes anew the lesson that in such a situation as military government, the officer commanding the force should be the military governor. So far as possible, civil administrative duties carried out or supervised by members of army staffs should be a part of his command. Civilians should be employed for such duties only where expert qualifications cannot be furnished by the army itself, and then only under complete and unlimited responsibility to the commander. Military government is a temporary expedient, and should be withdrawn as soon as conditions permit, but while it exists, it should be in complete control.

Considering the frequency and importance of American military interventions, it is remarkable that so little careful attention is given to the subject of military government, and that the opportunity remains for mistakes in principle. General Allen's volume, ex-

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plaining as it does some of the difficulties inherent in an anomalous situation, re-emphasizes the need for a thorough exposition of this subject, and an agreement upon its terms. The difficulties of the situation, however, did not prevent the American Commander from meeting all situations in such a way as to enhance the reputation of the American Army. The value of the book is increased by the publication of several excellent maps and useful appendices.

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A History of Socialist Thought. By HARRY W. LAIDLER. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1927.—xxii, 713 pp. $2.50.

Harry Laidler is uncommonly well equipped to write such a history as this. He is a trained student of economics and sociology and he has for a long period been actively engaged in the direction of the educational work carried on, in the colleges and elsewhere, by the League for Industrial Democracy, an organization devoted to the stimulation of the study of socialism.

Socialism, it has often been remarked, is at once a religion, a propaganda program, a form of social organization and a school of thought. It is as a school of thought, a system of social philosophy, that Dr. Laidler sets it forth. His task, it may be noted at the outset, is made the more formidable by the fact that he has to deal, not with a single system of thought about economic reorganization, but with a whole series of related systems. Moreover, in respect to each body of doctrine, be it Communism or Fabianism, it scarcely serves to write the history of its thought without following up the distillation of that thought into propaganda, into the "movement" and its campaigns, tactics, etc.; and its crystallization into a form of organization, a party. Dr. Laidler has recognized these necessities, yet he has done so without permitting the activities of socialist groups to push their doctrines out of the center of the picture: his book is primarily what its title implies, a history of socialist thought.

It is a compendious history: from the ethico-religious Utopias of such Old Testament prophets as Amos and Hosea (700-800 B.C.) to the diluted Communism of the Russian Bolsheviks (A.D. 1927), the world's socialisms are set forth in their several forms. Between the Prophets and the Bolsheviks are the Utopias of Plato, More and

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Bacon, of the French Utopian Socialists, Babeuf, Cabet, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Louis Blanc, Prondhon; of Brisbane, Hertzka, Morris, Bellamy and Wells; the socialism of all socialisms — that called Marxian; Fabian Socialism; the socialism of the German Social Democracy; Revisionism, Syndicalism; Guild Socialism; State Socialism; Socialism of the Chair; Christian Socialism. To all this are added chapters on post-war socialist thought and on the Consumers' Coöperative Movement. Dr. Laidler exhibits a thorough acquaintance with the works of the great thinkers who have been the chief feeders of the stream of socialist thought. By paraphrase and quotation he sets that thought before us. And, wisely, he remembers that thoughts are parts of lives; he supplies us, therefore, with not a little biographical matter relating to the leading figures in the several "schools" of socialist thought that he describes.

After reading this altogether competent and exhaustive survey it is natural that a reader should seek some unifying thread of doctrine on which to string the several socialisms. There is, to be sure, the negative fact that all the socialisms involve adverse criticism of most of the economic systems now generally prevailing. This, however, is unsatisfactory. More useful is the fact that all, or nearly all, of the socialist schools wish to substitute coöperation for competition, as the basic, motivating principle in economic life. Whatever may be said of the socialisms preceding the industrial revolution, it is clear that, for those that have taken shape since the coming on of the factory system, this antithesis between coöperation and competition has a central and significant position. Over against the régime of private competitive capitalism, Socialists propose to set up one which (whatever may become of the "privacy" of ownership of capital) is coöperative, based on combination, rather than competitive, based on separation. Socialists, of almost all the schools, unite in wishing to substitute coöperative for the existing competitive commonwealths. The speed and manner of substitution would depend upon the kind of socialist one is. Upon the same circumstance would also depend some very important ancillary features of the coöperative commonwealth itself. Will this commonwealth be just one world-wide Rochdale Coöperative Society? Will it be a series of industry-units, each one owned and operated by the whole body of persons productively active therein? Or a series of gigantic state-owned and state-operated trusts? Or a similar series of trusts, state-owned but operated by private lessees for profit, by the whole body of persons productively occupied therein; or by some such tripartite operative

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agency (composed of representatives of the state, the operative officials and the employees) as that suggested some years ago for our railroad industry by Glenn E. Plumb. Finally, is the coöperative commonwealth simply the natural culmination of the present slow process of change which our present competitive commonwealth is undergoing, from a régime characterized, as J. A. Hobson puts it, by competition, qualified by monopoly (which is to say combination, which is to say coöperation, at least within the four corners of each monopoly), to one characterized by monopoly (or coöperation) qualified by competition?

In the reviewer's opinion the kind of an economic community we should endeavor to create upon this planet is one that fails exactly to fit any of the categories implied by the foregoing questions. In his opinion the use-motive should generally, as radicals of almost every stripe insist it should always, control over the profit motive — and in those functions or industries where this predominance of the use-motive is socially desirable, if such predominance cannot be had without the elimination of the profit-motive, then the profit-motive should be eliminated. We appear to have accepted the necessity for such elimination in the case of the function of carrying the mails. We do not appear to have accepted this necessity in relation to the function of railroad transportation, but the existence of the Interstate Commerce Commission would seem to indicate that we do believe that the use-motive (i.e., the public interest) should be paramount. The reviewer would contemplate with no little concern the prospect of an indefinite extension over industry (even over the public utilities, merely) of the method of establishing the primacy of the use-motive that has been followed in the matter of the carriage of the mails. And many socialists (all, perhaps, except the state socialists) would agree with him. Most socialists who would work toward their coöperative commonwealth by way of public ownership, are not satisfied with public ownership, merely; they insist upon the necessity for democratic operation and control, under state ownership.

State ownership and operation, as with the U. S. Post Office, often described as State Socialism, might as fittingly be dubbed State Capitalism. Indeed, many intelligent socialists declare that we are moving through a long cycle (between the first two phases of which we now are) of (1) private competitive capitalism, (2) private coöperative (i. e., monopolistic) capitalism, (3) public, or state, capitalism (often called State Socialism), and (4) socialism, a régime that, apparently, would be brought into being by setting up democratic

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operation and control (of a sort closely akin, the reviewer imagines, to that elaborated in the Plumb Plan for the railroads, and less closely akin to that glimpsed by the Syndicalists) under state capitalism. To all this emphasis on state power and public ownership the proponents of the Syndicalist variant of socialist thought would make violent objection. The Guild Socialists, less violently, would echo the objection. And, of course, the exponents of anarchist thought, if (philosophic) anarchism may be called a variant of socialist thought (it surely may be described as a variant of radical thought) would re-echo it again. They think the "coöperative commonwealth" can be worked out more satisfactorily by voluntary action within different functional groups than by state action. One would expect them to point with special satisfaction to such voluntary developments within individual industries as the system of unemployment insurance in the Chicago men's clothing market — a system jointly operated by associations of employers and employees in the industry. For reasons that cannot be gone into here, the Syndicalists do not, actually, appear to derive any satisfaction from such experiments. For many industries, however, the reviewer considers that their effective operation, with the use-motive paramount and the profit motive subordinated or extinguished, may most appropriately be taken care of by reliance upon such unofficial methods of self-government as are suggested by current developments in the clothing industries.

The reviewer is unable to see that it is either likely or desirable that the profit-motive be everywhere supplanted by the use-motive. In respect to some industries and services he does believe that such complete substitution of motives can and probably will, be made. In still others all that may be required is the subordination of the profit to the use-motive. But it would seem, not only not against the public interest, but clearly in the public interest to perpetuate, even forever and ever, the management, and probably even the control and ownership, of certain industries (such as the manufacture of luxuries) on the basis of private, competitive, gain-seeking capitalism, limited only by the necessity of conforming to such laws as might be thought desirable to insure to the workers in these industries certain minimum standards of wages, hours and general working conditions. Here those who like that sort of thing would find just the sort of thing they like. These industries would provide an outlet for their energies, which might otherwise be let loose, disastrously, in those fields wherein the public good required the subordination or even the complete extinction of the profit-motive. Most industries and serv-

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ices, in the interest of the public good, should at least subordinate, and in many cases extinguish entirely the profit motive, either by official (public) methods, (regulation or nationalization) or by voluntary (private) methods (trade union action, company union action, employers' association action, or all these combined) or by a combination of official and unofficial methods. Some industries now according primacy to the profit-motive should, in the reviewer's opinion, have that motive nationalized out of existence. Considerations akin to those that have led to the socializing of the post-office business, would seem to weigh heavily in favor of putting the business of sending telegrams on the same footing, and scarcely less heavily in favor of a like disposition of other public utilities. So too, with the development and sale of power. And the time, surely, is ripe and more than ripe, for courageous experimentation in the soft coal industry, first, perhaps, with a program of consolidation and regulation, and then if this program fails, with nationalization.

There are, finally, as Harold J. Laski points out in his *Grammar of Politics,* some industries, such as the distribution of milk and other necessary food supplies, in which the profit-motive should not be accorded a dominant position, but in which the method of substituting the use-motive is not the conventional socialist one at all but the method of the Rochdale coöperator.

This is the kind of realistic attitude toward social and economic reform to which one seems driven by a thoughtful consideration of the History of Socialist Thought in the light of the nature of man and of the economic mechanism he has constructed to serve him. The conventional labels do not fit such an attitude: It is not conservative; that least of all. It is not socialist, although it comes very close to some of the fifty-seven varieties. It is not nationalist. It is not liberal, except in a very limited sense; it is more than that. It seems to be a kind of eclectic radicalism — a radicalism that is likely to be regarded with suspicion by the radicals because it proposes to utilize even capitalist planks in the platform of its Utopia, if only they be sound social timber.

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BOOK NOTES

Except perhaps in the case of Great Britain, the domestic politics of European states quite baffles the average American. Parties are so numerous, their names are so meaningless or misleading, and the political scene is so kaleidoscopic that most people soon give up trying to keep track of what is going on. Even professional students of foreign affairs find difficulty enough. It has long been apparent that the situation would be helped by an authentic, up-to-date, and inexpensive guide-book, a short of Baedeker for the European political world; and it is a pleasure to record that such a *vade mecum* has at last appeared. *A Political Handbook of Europe; Parliaments, Parties, and Press* (New York, The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1927; 103 pp. $1.00) has been edited by a former executive director of the sponsoring organization, Mr. Malcolm W. Davis, and affords an exceedingly complete and usable, as well as entirely accurate, guide to the outstanding data of European politics as of January 1, 1927. For each country, large and small, are presented, chiefly in convenient tabular form, (1) the party composition of Parliament, (2) the party programs and leaders—by individual parties and by "blocs"—and (3) a list of all important newspapers, with in each case political affiliation and name of editor or proprietor. In the main, the data are, of course, purely factual; but where—as in outlining party programs—statement of opinion is involved, careful consultation with both official and private authorities seems to have maintained the entirely objective and trustworthy quality of the publication. The Council expresses the hope—shared by the reviewer—not only that the present handbook may be revised and reissued, "perhaps at intervals of six months," but that it may be "merely a preliminary version of a more comprehensive edition, covering other areas of the world." The Council on Foreign Relations is one of the sanest and best of our various post-war organizations for the study of international affairs, and should be encouraged to carry farther the practical service which it has rendered in putting out the publication herein described. In connection with the lists of newspapers, it would be exceedingly helpful to American students of foreign politics if future editions were to contain, in addition to the present features, lists of the foreign papers received regularly by

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each of the principal libraries in different sections of the United States and Canada.— FREDERIC A. OGG.

Paul Radin in *Primitive Man as a Philosopher* (New York and London, D. Appleton and Company, 1927; xviii, 401 pp. $3.00) is not the first to deal with philosophic speculations among primitive peoples. But Dr. Radin dispenses with the arbitrary evolutionary scheme by which John W. Powell, who did it before him, obfuscated and distorted his material. His book is in the nature of an anthology of primitive philosophical attitudes and judgments gleaned from an extensive use of the literature of ethnology but stressing particularly the views of the groups among which Dr. Radin has done field work. Apart from the fascinating nature of the material itself, the contents of the book ought to annihilate for all time the concept of the "untutored", uncontrolled savage, which has become part of our tradition. It adds convincing refutation to River's criticism of Levy-Brühl's concept of the "pre-logical mind" of primitive man, which has received much uncritical praise from certain ethnologists. The author also disposes effectively of the undemonstrated assumption of a dead level of intelligence among primitive peoples by giving judiciously selected proofs of the existence of an intellectual class among them. In this book the primitive man lives and feels and thinks; he is not a mere puppet of the academic ethnologist but a personality.—BERNHARD J. STERN.

In *The Story of the American Indian* (New York, Boni and Liveright, 1927; xiv, 371 pp. $5.00) Dr. Radin reopens once more the controversy which has concerned American ethnologists since Lewis Henry Morgan engaged in polemics over the relation of Mexican culture to other aboriginal culture patterns in America. Radin's argument, as a diffusionist, that all culture in America radiates from the culture center in Mexico, the thread that gives unity to his book, threatens again to divide American anthropologists into opposing camps and to provoke acrimonious debate which will be futile until more facts are available. In this volume, unlike the one reviewed above, the individual Indian loses his identity, except in the prologue, while the author describes variations in culture patterns and traces the spread of certain ideas. The value of the book would be greatly enhanced by an index and references to the sources used.—BERNHARD J. STERN.

One of the most stimulating volumes in the social science field that has appeared in recent months is that edited by William Fielding Ogburn and Alexander Goldenweiser entitled *The Social Sciences*

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and Their Interrelations (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927; viii, 506 pp. $3.50). The realistic objective of the editors is expressed in the Preface: "The contributors were requested to deal with conditions, problems, and methods as they exist today. They were also asked to make their papers concrete and factual with only a limited amount of earlier historical material and very little speculation as to the status of the sciences in the far distant future." The contributors, among whom are such men as John Dewey, Robert H. Lowie, R. R. Marett, Franz Boas, Roscoe Pound and Morris R. Cohen, have executed their articles, for the most part, with candor, sophistication and competence. The book is the best available survey of the interrelation and interdependence of Anthropology, Economics, History, Political Science, Sociology and allied fields. To each selection is appended a pertinent bibliography.—BERNHARD J. STERN.

The Builders of America by Ellsworth Huntington and Leon F. Whitney (New York, William Morrow and Company, 1927; xiv, 368 pp. $3.50) is a scientific yet popular plea for the preservation of civilization by increased child-bearing on the part of the classes whom the authors regard as "builders of America". The more familiar program of negative eugenics is little more than touched upon. The principal materials are statistics gathered from *Who's Who in America* and from graduates of Yale and Harvard and alumnae of women's colleges who have been graded according to their parentage, the number of their children, their success in college and in life, etc. The general result is an overpowering demonstration of the need for a higher birthrate among the intellectual and artistic groups. With twenty-four per cent unmarried, and twenty-three per cent married but childless, and an average of 2.8 children for each fruitful marriage, Harvard graduates have a general average reproduction rate of only 1.5. If the children of the 411 men in the class of 1895 were to intermarry, and their descendants likewise, and if they alone were to populate Harvard, the Class of the year 2000 would number but 119, and the university would admit its last student in the year 2350. Of course the Harvard group is not strictly endogamous, nor are college graduates as a whole. But the well-to-do non-collegians have a still lower rate of reproduction, as appears from some novel statistics. The lowest reproduction rate, or the highest extinction rate, appears among the artists, including musicians and actresses, and among the feminists, whose number would halve itself with each generation, if not recruited from other

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classes. There is, however, a small aristocracy that does reproduce itself. The Yale students, for example, who come from the largest families are those whose parents were both college graduates; and curiously enough, among the women listed in *Who's Who* the doctors of philosophy have the largest families (although, because of the number who have no children at all, the general average is only .8). It is significantly brought out that within each occupational group as a rule the more successful the father, the greater the number of children. Yale graduates were divided into ten groups according to their success in life, the test being more comprehensive than mere financial standing. In the leading group, 95 per cent are married; in the lowest, 65. Of the leaders, 80 per cent have children; of the lowest group, only 40 per cent. And the gradations between are regular. Nearly half of the men in the highest group have three or more children, but the ratio falls to about one-tenth for the least successful. The most successful among the Yale and Harvard graduates, as designated by means of ratings given by men who knew them, were distributed among the professions in the following order of numerical importance: missionaries, ranking first by a large lead, then professors, ministers, office-holders, writers and editors, doctors, lawyers, business executives, engineers, military officers, teachers, bankers, business men not executives, farmers, and unspecified occupation. The sons of such men, rated by judges who did not know the parents, revealed an almost identical order of professions. Objective ratings of the sons' records in college, especially of their studies and their non-athletic activities, yield similar results. The statistical methods employed by the authors are perhaps simpler than the statistician would desire; no average is used save the arithmetic mean, and mathematical correlations and measures of dispersion are lacking. The numerous diagrams are good. The quoted estimates of the cost of crime by Smith and Prentiss contain an error of duplication, including the amount stolen and used by criminals, as well as the amount spent by them. It is also a mistake to assert that the Juke tribe of more than six hundred individuals could have been prevented by the sterilization of the original Max and his feeble-minded mate. The Jukes of today are descended from many other degenerates, and represent not only the high breeding rate but the selective mating of birds of that feather.—S. C. GILFILLAN.

James K. Pollock's *Readings in American Government* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1927; 354 pp. $2.50) is a valuable addi-

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tion to the class-room material for introductory courses in this field and also affords for the teacher ready reference to many useful illustrative extracts. The main problem in preparing such a volume arises from limitation of space and is one of selection. Pollock's book is somewhat less than one-third as bulky as the corresponding compilation by Crawford, and moreover aims to present a collection of classic interpretative passages rather than a mass of data descriptive of the contemporary working of American political institutions. The basis of selection has the advantage of allowing adequate treatment of a limited number of outstanding topics. The extracts have been carefully chosen and are representative. Dealing as they do with principles rather than practice, however, the work of correlating classic expositions with practical applications is perforce left to the teacher. For instance, it is fortunate that although Cooley's statement is chosen to explain due process of law, Justice Holmes' dissent in the Lochner case is also cited, if in another connection. Moreover the pertinent paragraphs from the original message alone are insufficient to expound the Monroe Doctrine. This difficulty, however, is unavoidable if the volume is to be confined within moderate limits, and the very characteristic which it gives to the selections renders them all the more effective starting-points for discussion. — A. GORDON DEWEY.

In their *American Government and Citizenship* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1927; 764 pp. $4.00) Professors C. E. Martin and W. H. George offer their contribution to the texts available for general courses in this field. Its main feature is the division of the volume into three parts—political theory, government and politics, and foreign relations—in the approximate ratio of two, five and five. The first part is justified on the ground that an appreciation of the Founding Fathers' purposes is necessary to an understanding of the subsequent unfolding of their labors. The second part abandons the traditional approach to the extent of discussing the main organs of government topically, and including those of nation, state and city under each head. However it comprises essentially a description of organization and powers, to the neglect of politics and processes and of the fundamental problems involved. In the third part there is ample material for the discussion of American foreign policies and the conduct of external relations. The utility of this triple division in the text and the degree of integration possible in a course so planned are matters for prospective users to determine. The book, despite its novel arrangement, is essentially descriptive, not interpre-

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tative, although penetrating analysis may well be combined with the factual matter imperative in an introductory text. Hence it affords only a tentative response to the appeal of many instructors for an alternative to the traditional lines of approach.—A. GORDON DEWEY.

Starting with the postulate that the organization philosophy of chief executives is the focal point for attack upon the problem of industrial unrest, Mr. J. David Houser spent a year in travel and interviewing American executives as a basis for his book on *What the Employer Thinks* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1927; viii, 226 pp. $2.50). To induce frankness he promised to mention no names; to check against the executive's statements, he also interviewed employees under promise not to reveal their identity, and then returned to the executive with what he learned to gather any additional light on the executive attitude. His results are here published in the form of cases, with analytical commentary, in so fair, clear and impersonal a way as to characterize him as a scholar. It will be possible to note but a few of his findings. He found few indications of any marked sense of social obligation in the minds of executives; little organized sense of inspiring in workers a sense of the significance of their work; small concern for human needs, other than to treat employees "fair", without, however, making sure that subexecutives were fair; an outstanding lack of adequate methods for learning how employees were actually treated; little sense of obligation toward employees and scant sympathy for welfare work. There were individual exceptions. Satisfied that the average executive has defective executive vision, and in some cases none at all, Mr. Houser suggests what is needed. This is, first of all, a need for understanding resulting in management by insight. The head cannot function well unless the body, the employees, do. And the latter, if dissatisfied, can by various forms of undiscoverable sabotage revenge themselves. This will always be so until the naïve assumption that workmen are actuated only by financial motives, by the pay-envelope, gives way to management based on inspiring leadership which wins the cordial cooperation of the worker.—EDWARD KREHBIEL.

Although his contemporary Marx could see in him nothing but the "petit bourgeois" with the "sentiments of a tallow chandler," Proudhon has been claimed, and with considerable justice, as the father at once of anarchism, of syndicalism, and of the characteristically French type of socialism. His economic federalism, as he preferred to call it, "mutualism", is well set forth in a small volume entitled *Proudhon's Solution of the Social Problem* (New York, Vanguard

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Press, 1927; xvi, 225 pp. $0.50), consisting of adequately translated excerpts from Proudhon's own writings, edited with an introduction by Henry Cohen. The editor has made on the whole a good selection of Proudhon's most pertinent passages, and has included utterances on the credit-bank scheme from both the earlier *Contradictions économiques* and the later *Intérêt et Capital* (the famous debate between Proudhon and Bastiat); it is to be regretted, however, that the equally pertinent and different statements made by Proudhon in his still later *Plan de l'Exposition perpetuelle* have been omitted. Proudhon's solution of the paradox of property ("property is robbery," yet essential) was to make the common man at once worker and owner, by giving him free access to credit. Let small producers unite, he urged, either as individuals or better still in groups, to form a Mutual Credit Bank which will issue notes redeemable not in specie but in goods or services of the associated members, the security being commercial paper or other evidences of actual transactions, and the discount rate being merely enough to cover overhead—perhaps one per cent. Let this process continue, and presently all other would-be lenders will find themselves drawn down toward the same low level of interest, the rent of land will fall, the cost of building construction likewise, and the independent workingman with an anchor in the soil and strong local and trade interests will come into his own. With the multiplication of banks will spring up all sorts of other coöperative concerns, cultural and administrative and protective as well as economic, and fewer and fewer functions will be left to government. Proudhon actually put his plan to the test when, in the midst of his political and journalistic activities, he managed to organize a mutual banking association with himself as president. A considerable amount of non-interest-bearing stock had actually been subscribed when Proudhon was imprisoned for revolutionary propaganda and the whole affair had to be liquidated. Contemporary American mutual credit bank projects are described, in this same volume, by Charles A. Dana and by William B. Greene, the former adhering directly to the Proudhonian scheme, and the latter deriving his inspiration, apparently, from American pioneer sources.—Dorothy W. Douglas.

Since the end of the great war and since the plebiscite in northern Schleswig has been taken both German and Danish scholars have turned with renewed interest to the history of the two Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in the nineteenth century. Professor Otto Brandt of Kiel has done some important and original work in this

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field and easily takes rank among the more prominent historians on the German side. His little brochure: *Zur Vorgeschichte der schleswig-holsteinischen Erhebung* (Berlin, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927; 61 pp.) is devoted to the discussion of a number of disputed points and is distinctly polemical. An interesting and instructive first chapter deals with the decline of the German influence (Holsteinismus) at the court of Copenhagen in the later eighteenth century and with the transition of the Danicizing policy as initiated by Frederick VI in the years of the French Revolution and Napoleon. But greater significance attaches to the second and third chapters, in which the writer completely explodes the idea that the movement in the Duchies against separation and for union with Germany goes back only to about 1813 and that it originated chiefly with Dahlmann and his fellow liberals. After Brandt's researches, which have been very extensive, there can no longer be any doubt that in its initial stages the movement was of a very different character. It began in the last years of the eighteenth century and took the form of conservative opposition to the violation of old privileges of the estates by the king. The leader of this campaign was Fritz von Reventlow, who gathered about him, at his estate of Emkendorf, a considerable number of like-minded spirits. The movement was already well-defined and clearly orientated towards Germany when Dahlmann came to Kiel in 1812. Without in any way attempting to minimize the great significance of the historian and liberal leader, Professor Brandt shows conclusively that his claim to originality has been unduly exaggerated. At Kiel he found a circle composed of men closely in contact with the Emkendorf group who had already considered and discussed the problem, had already disinterred the texts of the old privileges and had already taken up the struggle with the Danish king. It was there that he found his inspiration and there that he found the necessary support.— WILLIAM L. LANGER.

The enactment of the so-called "McFadden Bill" by the United States Congress brought to a conclusion a struggle that had been going on in the United States for some time. This struggle involved the right of national banks to establish branches in those states which permitted branch banking for banks organized under state law. The merits of this controversy, with some of the historical background, are set forth in Charles W. Collins' *The Branch Banking Question* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926; xi, 182 pp). The book is a useful review of the subject of branch

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banking as it has arisen in the United States. The author gives enough material to enable the reader to understand the historical and legal background of the controversy and he summarizes clearly the main arguments on both sides. As it stands, however, the book is incomplete, because it ends with the fate of the McFadden Bill undetermined. The reader will have to supply a final chapter of his own, based on the McFadden Bill as finally enacted without the so-called "Hull" amendments. The new legislation makes it possible for national banks to establish branches on conditions substantially identical with those enjoyed by state institutions in the communities where the national banks are operating.— E. E. AGGER.

The individuals treated in *American Masters of Social Science* edited by Howard W. Odum (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1927; vii, 411 pp. $4.50) are all worthy subjects for psychographs by a Lytton Strachey or a Gamaliel Bradford who could do justice to their many-faceted personalities and interests. The contributors are, however, fellow social scientists and disciples, not professional biographers skilled in the art of blending personality and ideas into a composite picture. The result is a conventional collection of laudatory sketches of unequal merit, which, however, contains much material of interest and value to the historian of social theory as it has developed in America.— BERNHARD J. STERN.

Whatever else may be said about Pitirim Sorokin's *Social Mobility* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1927; xvii, 559 pp. $3.75) it has failed lamentably in its expressed purpose to deliver sociology from its "plague" of "preaching and evaluating judgments". The book teems with factual data on the important subject of the fluctuation of economic, political, religious and occupational stratification, and the effect of social mobility or lack of it upon society. But in his selection and presentation of this data, the author manifests his prejudices, his biases and even his phobias. Especially in his attitude toward the communists and the proletariat, the terror-stricken *emigré* fleeing from the Soviet has gotten the better of the "impartial" scientist. In the light of the intense passion displayed in his discussion of many controversial questions, it is ingenuous of Professor Sorokin to consider his book a contribution to "scientific sociology".— BERNHARD J. STERN.

In an excellently edited and skillfully coordinated textbook entitled *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, D. C. Heath and Company, 1927; xxiv, 926 pp. $4.48) Jerome Davis and Harry Elmer Barnes have taken cognizance of the adulthood of sociology by recognizing

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that no one individual can adequately write on its diverse specialties. They have assigned the treatment of the different aspects of the subject to men competent to deal with them as their dominant interest and the result is a clarity and vigor of presentation that is lacking in most texts. In the first section entitled "The Evolution of the Great Society", Barnes in his customary jaunty kaleidoscopic manner gives a rapid survey of the history of civilization from primitive to contemporary times. Ellsworth Huntington is only a bit less fantastic than usual with his many graphs and statistics which in the end prove very little about the effect of the physical environment on culture. The liberal spirit which prevades the book is marred by palpably absurd reactionary statements by F. H. Hankins who analyzes the biological basis of society. Typical are the following: "The poverty of parents, which is obviously the most important environmental cause (of infant mortality) is itself primarily due to the inferior physique and intelligence of parents," and "Persons of low mental endowment are eliminated from the public school system; only the supernormal are able to achieve a college education and professional status." L. L. Bernard contributes to the selection of the psychological factors his lucid analysis of instinct and deals also with such questions as social control and leadership. Malcolm Willey leans heavily on Wissler and Ogburn but adds new material in his animated presentation of the cultural approach to sociology. It is regrettable that he ignores C. M. Case's book on this subject which deserves extended mention. Seba Eldridge's discussion of social organization is necessarily thin, confined as it is to ninety pages in which he dissipates his efforts in an attempt to treat all phases of his problem. Finally, Jerome Davis applies sociology to social problems with a minimum of the unctuous reformist twang that is characteristic of such discussions, but his paragraph headings are often ludicrous in their simplicity and it seems strange that he had to go to Labrador for an illustration of a man dying from starvation due to poverty. The *Readings in Sociology* (New York, D. C. Heath and Company, 1927; xviii, 1085 pp. $6.00) which accompanies the volume shows excellent judgment on the part of the contributors in the choice of materials which supplement each chapter of the text.—BERNHARD J. STERN.

Miss Katherine Mayo's book on India justly called for a reply, and this has been effectively made by Dhan Gopal Mukerji, in his little book *A Son of Mother India Answers* (New York, E. P. Dutton the Company, 112 pp. $1.50). In this volume the author,

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a well-known Indian writer, lecturer and traveller, gives ample proofs of Miss Mayo's misquotations, misrepresentation by lifting sentences from their context and thereby conveying false implications, and misuse of anonymous authorities. He shows that she has drawn faulty and untrue deductions and generalizations from insufficient evidence or particular and occasional observations. Although Mr. Mukerji avoids the mistake made by so many incensed Indian critics (see especially Dr. Cornelius' article in *Current History*, December, 1927), of accusing Miss Mayo of being a political agent or paid propagandist on behalf of the British government, and attacking her on the meaner grounds of an imputed sex psychology which gave her a jaundiced view of India's sex-life, this Son of Mother India cannot quite rid himself of a suspicion (p. 65) that Miss Mayo is 'patronized' by the government, (where " 'patronized' is accepted as an elegant synonym for 'subsidized' "). This suspicion of course is unfounded; and elsewhere Mr. Mukerji discounts books such as hers because " written by *tourists*" (p. 13). He challenges Miss Mayo to substantiate and clarify her case by bringing out " a very short and new edition of the book packed with strict facts and ready clinical notes " (p. 86) and " to sacrifice all the offensive and unreliable sweeping statements from her work and reduce it within such desirable limit as the strict facts of her observation would permit " (p. 82). It is to be hoped that some one, if not Miss Mayo herself, will do this, in a scientific and unprejudiced spirit; the advantages and service of such an honest and impartial report Mr. Murkerji admits and Indians would welcome. On the whole, this little volume should be read by every reader of " Mother India ". The dual perusal will do much to rectify myopia or astigmatism, and, while not repudiating the main contentions of Miss Mayo in regard to abnormal physical conditions in India, will nevertheless correct the perspective which she has so unfortunately distorted in the too superficial and prejudiced record of her brief visit to India.—KENNETH P. KIRKWOOD.

The highlands of the North-West Frontier of India, touching Kashmir, Afghanistan, Tibet and the land of the Pamirs, have proved to be as great a challenge to the political ambitions of Great Britain (and Russia) as the untravelled wastes of the Gobi Desert and the virgin snows of the Himalayas have been a challenge to the explorer. Sir Francis Younghusband, in *The Light of Experience* (Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, 1927, 303 pp.) tells how he answered both challenges in masterly fashion. This auto-

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biography of one of England's foremost Empire-builders in the Middle East is an interesting account of his twenty-eight years of exploration and political office in Manchuria, Turkestan, the Himalayas, Tibet and the Indian frontier. Although there is too obvious a tendency toward self-praise, the reader forgives it because of the readableness of the narrative, and because of the undoubted contribution which Sir Francis Younghusband has made both to Imperial history and to geographical science. There are some delightful vignettes of such personages as Salisbury, Cromer, Roberts, Kitchener, Cecil Rhodes and 'Mr.' George Curzon, which show a penetrating judgment and apt portraiture of character. The latter part of the book is devoted to Younghusband's retirement in England, his spiritual gropings in religious experience and interpretation, and his faith in and love for his native country, of which he draws a rapturous picture in a few final brilliant paragraphs, illumined by a fine optimism. As a personal commentary upon some significant phases of modern history in Asia, and a "review of some men and events" of his time, the student will find this volume a most readable narrative; as a book of adventure it is fascinating. —KENNETH P. KIRKWOOD.

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